DANISH DEMINING GROUP

A Comprehensive Assessment of the Current State of Risk Education in Afghanistan:

Findings of Baseline, KAP Survey and Casualty Analysis

REPORT

The Danish Demining Group (DDG)
March 2018

Acknowledgements

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) acknowledges the following donors whose generous contributions have supported the field work and finalisation of this work. Acknowledgement is dedicated to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the United Kingdom's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).

DDG acknowledges the support of the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) of Afghanistan and the UNMAS in facilitating and supporting DDG's research, data collection and consolidation of findings throughout the process. Acknowledgment is also extended to the national and international Implementing Partners and mine action organisations of the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) for their continuous support and feedback.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF Tables

LIST OF FIGURES

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMAS	Afghanistan Mine Action Standards
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
AP	Anti-Personnel
APMBT	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
ARCS	Afghan Red Crescent Society
AT	Anti-Tank
CV	Community Volunteer
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DMAC	Directorate for Mine Action Coordination
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EC	Encashment Centre
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IP	Implementation Partner
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude, Practice
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
MAPA	Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan
MRE	Mine Risk Education
MREL	Mine Risk Education Level
NTS	Non-Technical Survey
PPIED	Pressure-Plate Improvised Explosive Device
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
RE	Risk Education
RS	Resolute Support
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TC	Transit Centre
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Services
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) has delivered Risk Education (RE) in Afghanistan since the early 2000s and continuously analyses hazard maps, casualty data, return statistics, and other relevant data to adapt RE, safety messages and methodologies to cater to the identified at-risk and risk-taking groups, including children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and other vulnerable groups. This baseline and Knowledge, Attitude, and Practices (KAP) survey assesses knowledge, attitudes and practices regarding landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) among returnees, IDPs and host communities; and establishes a baseline for RE provided to returnees against which DDG and the wider Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) can measure the impact of RE. Finally, this exercise provides recommendations for tailored, innovative and appropriate RE methodologies and messages for different demographics of the target population, intended for the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan.

The baseline and KAP survey adopts a methodology of primary data collection, secondary data collection and a casualty analysis. The primary data collection consists of individual questionnaries and focus groups discussions in specific districts within the provinces of Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar, where DDG has delivered Mine Action activities. The secondary data collection mainly consists of a desk review of previous KAP surveys carried out in the country (2004, 2005, 2009, 2009-10). The findings are utilized to underpin the conclusions and recommendations of this report. The data collected through the questionnaires and the focus group discussions is presented graphically in the report, and finally concluded on.

In conclusion, the findings show that people in Afghanistan have varying degrees of 'mine smartness' (local responses, including knowledge, logic and everyday practices, to explosive threats), and correct/incorrect information regarding explosive weapons, they are at risk due to a multitude of activities, the main one being travelling and they have pre-existing attitudes which impact on how they perceive and act on received information. Consequently, having one set of RE materials and passing on the same standard safety messages in a one-size-fits-all manner to all target groups is neither relevant nor effective. Thus, in order to reach the most at-risk and needy beneficiaries, additional modalities of delivering RE should be considered, including using Community Volunteers and working through community structures.

It is, thus, recommended to review and field test existing RE materials to gauge their applicability to the most at-risk groups and their efficiency in achieving a decrease in casualty numbers. Such a review together with the casualty analysis and findings of previous KAP survey and the at-hand DDG baseline/KAP survey should input into a comprehensive MAPA RE Strategic Plan clearly outlining primary and secondary target groups and how to bridge tailored RE messages to each identified at-risk and risk-taking category, as well as specific materials and training packages need to be developed and standards should be reflected in AMAS and IP Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Main recommendations based on the findings of this baseline and KAP survey:

- Afghan people know a lot about mines and ERW and have at least some correct information about behaviour. They are neither reckless nor intentional, but rather desensitized to the risk posed by mines/ERW, due to having been exposed to or having lived with the threats for so long. Therefore **there is a need for a new category of at-risk or risk-taking groups in Afghanistan; the inured** i.e. accustomed to the threat.

- It should be considered **to establish an easier, three-digit and potentially toll-free Hotline number**; a number which can easily be memorized – even for children.

- Safety messaging should **include information about the specific threats, i.e. ERW and PPIED**, which are the main source of accidents in Afghanistan.

- When delivering RE to recent returnees**, the message of "ask local where is safe and unsafe" should be more prominent**, e.g. by delivering the message at both the start and end of the session.

- RE should take into account that casualty data shows that the majority of accidents happen while people are travelling. **RE messages should be available for people on the move** e.g. through radio broadcasts.

- RE session participants, regardless of age, sex, social group or livelihood, only remember three pieces of information after the session, therefore make them **short and easy to remember:Don't touch** landmines or other ERW, **Don't go** into dangerous areas, and **Report**.

- Any future endeavours to uncover attitudes and, especially, behavior should employ a mixed methods approach, including qualitative data collection such as **participant observation**. This is based on the fact that people's daily tend to differ from what they would answer in an interview.

- It is important **to ensure that men attend RE sessions** and that RE is tailored to counter a perception that men may be slightly less at risk, as casualty data shows otherwise.

- People prefer to report findings of mines/ERW to a trusted and known authority such as the police or community leaders. Consequently, it should be considered **to formalize a network of community leaders e.g. through identification and training so they can form a link between affected communities and the Mine Action authorities.**

- Passing on the message of "stand still, don't move" to people who have no other choice than to move is simply not working. **Unsafe behavior needs to be addressed with due consideration of *actionable* and *realistic* courses of action.**

- It is recommended that pre/post RE session monitoring should not just assess whether people know of safe behavior but, indeed, whether they are practically **able to act safely and report found items.**

- It is recommended **to put in place a comprehensive data management process**. DMAC should lead the development and implementation of national guidelines, which all MAPA IPs should adhere to, including standards, and ensuring that data is collected in a well-coordinated manner.

1. INTRODUCTION

CURRENT SITUATION AND EXERCISE RATIONALE

While almost 79% of the known area contaminated by recorded minefields and battlefields has been cleared, the remaining 21% qualifies Afghanistan as one of the countries most affected by landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in the world. As of December 2017, an estimated 1601.5 km² remains affected by3,860 identified hazards, which impede development, humanitarian assistance and returnee settlement. 571.2 km² consists of legacy contamination and 1030.3 km² is new contamination (post 2001). Whereas out of those only 69.3 km² of minefields (MF), battle fields (BF) and Abandoned Improvised Mines

(AIM) and 540 km² of Firing Ranges (FR)were surveyed and recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), another 421 km² of MF, BF and AIM have been assessed but not yet recorded in IMSMA; the national mine action database administered by the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC).

Afghanistan acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) in September 2002. In 2012, the Government of Afghanistansuccessfully requested a ten-year extension to complete its commitments under the APMB by 2023.However, since 2013, funding shortfalls have meant that humanitarian clearance targets have not been met. Furthermore, the continuously increasing contamination from Pressure-Plate Improvised Explosive Devices (PPIEDs)hampers this commitment – further delaying the achievement of a mine-free Afghanistan.

Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) needs are as great now as they have ever been since the international intervention in 2001 as Afghanistan once again is the country with the highest recorded casualty levels in the world. In 2017, more than170civilian Afghanswere killed or injured by ERW and mines including PPIEDeach month.

The challenges are also compounded by the recent and expected flows of Afghani returnees. In 2016, an unprecedented influx of returnees has worsened the displacement situation in the country. According to UNOCHA, 654,000 Afghans fled their homes due to conflict, and approximately 620,000 documented and undocumented Afghans returned from neighboring countries -primarily from Pakistan- as a result of the deteriorating protection environment and crackdown on Afghans.

Both displaced people and returnees have been found to lack basic safety nets and access to basic services. They are considered to lack essential information on the current fighting, and thus associated risks of explosive weapons. Thereforelandmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Risk Education (RE) was set as a key protection need by the Protection Cluster (Humanitarian Response Plan).

In 2016 and throughout 2017, the Danish Demining Group (DDG) has provided RE to Afghan returnees in UNHCR Encashment Centers (ECs), IOM Transit Center (TCs) and at border crossings in the East (Torkham), South (Spin Boldak) and West (Malik Nimroz). The number of RE sessions has expanded threefold in 2017 as a result of the influx of Afghan returning from neighboring countries due to the deteriorating protection environment. Whereas the demand for RE for the returnees' border crossings and at the ECs and TCs was exponential, the need for community-based RE also increased proportionately to accommodate to the increasing demands within high-return communities that hosted Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and host community members. As a result of the increasing conflict, provincial capitals across Afghanistan host more than 54 per cent of IDPs, increasing the demands for all protection services including RE ***(UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan 2018-2021)***.

This growth has triggered DDG to initiate an inquisitive exercise to collect baseline data that could support its RE department develop its existing RE packages and adapt them to the needs of various target groups and operational settings. This initial objective has also intersected with the commitment of the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to take stock of the current RE progress in the country and support learning and development of new approaches. As a result of this joint objective, and in support of DDG's in-house initiative, UNMAS and DMAC have supported DDG in the extension of the baseline and survey exercise,in order to understand the current levels of knowledge and practices of RE in the country and the recommendations to better respond to the current humanitarian needs.In order to draw recommendations for future programming, a thorough desk review of previous KAP surveys, as well as a casualty data analysis has been included in this exercise.

RE MAPA Implementing Partners (IPs), and RE stakeholders including representatives from the different United Nations Agency and humanitarian organizations[1]came together in a validation workshop to review and consolidate the findings and recommendations of the above exercises. This participatory feedback has informed the finalization of the report at hand.

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME OF AFGHANISTAN AND DANISH DEMINING GROUP

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) was established in 1989. In 2017, the Afghan Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), formally took on to execute aspects of the mine action programme management of the MAPA. DMAC is supported by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) but has absorbed most of the Afghan technical mine action personnel previously employed by UNMAS. The Afghan Government has asked UNMAS to continue to support them beyond 2018 with advisory services, fundraising and fund management.

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) was established in 1997 as a Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) NGO. Since 2007, it has been wholly integrated into the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)'s international department as a Humanitarian Mine Action and Armed Violence Reduction Unit. DRC is a non-profit organisation that works worldwide to help and protect refugees, internally displaced and other conflict-affected persons.DDG established its operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1998 and registered with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) for Afghanistan as a Mine Action NGO in 2000. The same year DDG moved its base operations to Kabul, and conducted operations in central and eastern regions of Afghanistan. DDG has continuously been committed to building the national Mine Action capacity by training a large number of professional Afghan national mine action personnel across a wide range of disciplines. DDG has solidified its reputation as a credible mine action organization and implementing partner of the MAPA. DDG Afghanistan's Strategic overall goal to assist the Government of Afghanistan, the Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) and the MAPA in achieving compliance with the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) and declaring the country free from mines and other explosive ordnance by 2023 in addition to supporting national priorities for mine action services.Based on its global experiences, DDG works to tailor RE methodologies to consider needs and priorities on the basis of age, gender and diversity. As such, DDG continuously analyses hazard maps, casualty data, return statistics, and other relevant data to adapt safety messages and methodologies to cater to the identified at-risk and risk-taking groups, including children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and other vulnerable groups.

WHAT IS RISK EDUCATION?

As one of the five pillars of HMA,[2] Risk Education (RE) is an integral component of DDG's operations in Afghanistan. Incidentally, the origin of mine action can be traced to Afghanistan where the UN first appealed for funds to carry out civilian demining activities in 1988, thus leading to the establishment of the MAPA the following year. Afghanistan, thus, constitutes the cradle of HMA, including RE, and many other countries looked to Afghanistan when setting up their own national HMA programmes. However, the field of HMA has evolved in the past 30 years in the with the advances and changes in weapons development and means of warfare, including recent changes in rules of engagement and increasing disregard for International Humanitarian Law. Simultaneously with the diversification of threats and risks to civilian populations, the international HMA community launched the first editions of the International Mine Action Standards in 1997, thus capturing lessons learnt and providing technical guidance for continued improvements in the provision of HMA activities.

[1] A complete list of the findings and participants of the "Status of Risk Education in Afghanistan Workshop" and the Report is found at DMAC's website http://dmac.gov.af/publications/mine-erw-risk-education/

[22]The five pillars of mine action include mine survey/marking/clearance; mine awareness; mine victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and mine ban advocacy.

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) defines RE – often also referred to as Mine Risk Education (MRE) – as:

> *"activities that seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from mines and ERW, (including unexploded sub-munitions), by raising awareness and promoting safe behaviour … The objective is to reduce the risk to a level where people can live safely, and to recreate an environment where economic and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by contamination" (IMAS 12.10, Second Edition, Amendment 2, June 2013)*

As such, RE seeks to raise awareness and promote behavioural change – this is done through public information campaigns, education and training as well as community liaison.

Departing from the definition and objectives put forward by IMAS, DDG elaborates on the definition further:

> "*RE is therefore (1) an educational process (2) intended to reduce casualties (3) through the modification of behaviour." (DDG SOP 9: Risk Education, 2017)*

These definitions reflect how RE, like Humanitarian Mine Action overall, has evolved since its beginnings. ContemporaryRE is not solely about educating at risk groups in order to increase their knowledge but, rather, education to affect wider changes in how people can safely go about their lives, even if explosive threats persist in their communities.This requires comprehensive and on-going assessments, monitoring and other data collection and analysis to ensure that the different needs and priorities of at risk groups are identified and taken into consideration of any RE intervention.

One of the tools, which can help ensure that RE interventions are designed to accurately address the various at risk groups, is the Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP) survey.

WHAT IS A KAP SURVEY?

A KAP survey is a representative survey conducted on a particular population to identify the knowledge (K), attitudes (A) and practices (P) of a population on a specific topic; in our case landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). A Risk Education (RE) KAP surveyis a means to collect information on the way in which interviewees experience the presence of mines/ERW, but more specifically on their knowledge of dangers associated with mines/ERW, and how this knowledge is translated into action, or not as the case may be.

A KAP survey can help identify a lack of knowledge, faulty operating procedures or influential cultural beliefs, thereby enhancing understanding and targeting stumbling blocks in the reduction of mine or ERW related accidents. Further, a KAP survey can highlight factors, which influence unsafe behaviour, such as the reasons behind certain attitudes and practices relating to mines/ERW. As such, the KAP survey is essential to help HMA operators plan, implement and assess their RE programs.

TIMELINE

Planning of the baseline/KAP, including drafting of the questionnaires, commenced in June 2017, with the tools and methodology finalised late in July.Enumerators were recruited in September. DDG RE teams were trained and commenced implementing the baseline survey on 20 September 2017; the baseline data collection was concluded on 8 November 2017. The training of the enumerators for the KAP survey took place early November and data was collected in the period of 8-30 October 2017.Data entry took place in November and December2017.

By the end of November, DDG Data Entry clerks checked and entered the baseline and KAP survey data into a database designed in-house. The findings were analysed, summarised and ready for validation by mid-December. The casualty analysis was also finalised by mid-December.

On 13 December 2017, DDG together with DMAC and UNMAShosted a consolidation workshop in Kabul, Afghanistan, to present and validate the findings of the casualty analysis and baseline/KAP survey and commence the formulation of recommendations and action planning for the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) as a whole. All MAPAMRE Implementing Partners (IPs) and other relevant stakeholders, including United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UNICEF, were present[3].

[3] The MRE workshop report is available at DMAC's Website http://dmac.gov.af/publications/mine-erw-risk-education/

2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The baseline/KAP was fashioned as two interrelated data collection exercises: One baseline looking at recent returnees to Afghanistan and one KAP in areas, where DDG is operational but where no baseline was undertaken.

The aim of the baseline/KAP was to:

1. Assess knowledge, attitudes and practices regarding landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (mines/ERW) among returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities; and
2. Establish a baseline for RE provided to returnees against which DDG and the wider Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan can measure the impact of RE.

The specific objective of the **baseline** survey was to collect more detailed information on(a) knowledge of returnees with regards to mines/ERW; (b) attitudes towards risk awareness, including safe and unsafe behaviour; and (c) practices in terms of reporting and stated behaviour towards/around explosive hazards.

The specific objectives of the **KAP** survey were to (1) identify knowledge and practices related to ERW and safe behaviours; (2) understand why people may engage in unsafe behaviour; and (3) assess if there is a need to adapt the current approach to RE and offer directions for such adaptations.

The combined baseline/KAP survey was, thus, intended to produce recommendations for tailored, innovative and appropriate RE methodologies and messages for different demographics of the target population.

For each target group the baseline/KAP sought to identify the following at-risk or risk-taking categories[4]:

- *The Unaware*: those who do not know about the danger of mines or ERW; this category typically includes very young children;
- *The Uninformed*: those who know about mines or ERW, but do not know about safe behaviour; this category typically includes children or the elderly;
- *The Misinformed*: those who have been given poor information about safety or believe that s/he knows all about landmine/ERW (former soldiers/front line fighters);
- *The Reckless*: those who know about mine safe behaviour, but ignore it; this category typically includes adolescent boys playing with ERW;
- *The Intentional*: those who have no option but intentionally adopt unsafe behaviour; this includes especially male youths or adults farming or collecting scrap metals in suspected hazardous areas.[5]

The guiding research question for the baseline was:

> *To what extent do recent returnees to Afghanistan constitute unaware or uninformed at-risk categories?*

The guiding research question for the KAP survey was:

> *To what extent are the remaining landmine/ERW casualties a result of intentional, reckless or misinformed risk taking?*

[4] IMAS, Best Practice MRE Guidebook, 2005.
[5] This category is also referred to as *The Forced* to acknowledge that risk-takers often have no choice but to adopt unsafe behaviour, e.g. as part of their main livelihood strategy.

The latter research question was guided, in part, by the findings of previous KAP surveys undertaken by the MAPA, which demonstrated a high Mine Risk Education Level (MREL). The high MREL was taken to be at least one reason for a decrease in casualty numbers. Assuming that the MREL among Afghans is still high – a fair assumption considering how much RE has taken place since the last KAP survey in 2009-2010 – why are casualty figures at a historical high?

Mobile populations cause particular challenges for all humanitarian interventions, including RE and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR).[6] In 2016 alone, more than half a million Afghans were internally displaced as a result of conflict and equally more than half a million Afghans returned, either voluntarily or as a result of being forced, from Pakistan and Iran.[7]

Returnees and IDPs often lack knowledge about the local contexts, which they are moving to or through, and, thus, are additionally exposed to explosive hazards. RE messages and methodologies need to be specifically tailored to these groups; this necessitates more insight into movement patterns and settlement priorities.

The international aid community was alarmed following the 2016's influx of some 620,000 Afghan returnees from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Resources have been accelerated to respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs of those returning, with special focus and commitment to providing potentially life-saving RE. DDG has extensively provided RE in emergency settings to large numbers of returnees in 2016 and throughout 2017. As such, the baseline survey sought to identify key vulnerabilities of this population in order to ensure that RE messages, methods and materials are developed and/orrevised to address the needs and priorities of the specific at-risk and target groups.

[6] IMAS, Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 2: Data Collection and Needs Assessment, 2005.
[7] Afghanistan Analysts Network, 'Caught up in regional tension? The mass return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan', 22 December 2016.

3. SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 TARGET GROUPS

The baseline/KAP survey focused on returnees, IDPs and host communities in order to establish RE needs for these specific target groups and highlight, where valid, the distinctions. The data collection was founded on a questionnaire, which was administered to respondents of both sexes, including children from the age of 6-11, young people between the ages of 12 and 17, adults between the ages of 18 and 59, and elderly persons above the age of 60. Further, for the KAP survey Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) helped to triangulate the information gathered through questionnaires; FGDs were not utilised during the baseline data collection due to constraints such as the fact that beneficiaries were passing through highly specific sites and pulling respondents aside for longer periods of time would cause disruptions at the data collection sites.

All respondents were disaggregated in line with the following criteria:

- Returnees: Children, young people and adults of both sexes
- IDPs: Children, young people and adults of both sexes
- Host communities: Children, young people and adults of both sexes

Returnees includedpersons or groups of persons who returned either voluntarily or forcibly to their place or country of origin. This included people who were internally displaced as well as people who were refugees in neighbouring countries. The return might be temporary or incomplete due to a variety of factors, including ongoing insecurity, lack of basic services and lack of employment opportunities etc. hampering or hindering returnees' efforts to reach their place of origin.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)includedpersons or groups of persons who were forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence due to armed conflict, situations of generalised insecurity, or natural or human-made disasters, and who did not cross an internationally recognised state border.

Host communities included persons or groups of persons residing in the communities, in which returnees and IDPs were settled, hosted or were passing through. This could include families and friends of returnees and IDPs who host them in their houses.

3.2 GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

The baseline covered project locations in which DDG is operational to address the RE needs of recent returnees to Afghanistan. Specifically, the baseline was undertaken in UNHCR Encashment Centres (ECs)in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar as well as in IOM Transit Centres(TCs) in Torkham, Nimroz and Kandahar.

The KAP covered three provinces in which DDG is currently implementing RE activities: Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar, including (1) currently or previously high impacted communities; (2) areas of high return movements; and (3) areas in which returnees and/or IDPs have settled, either temporarily or permanently, including so-called Spoke sites.[8] In all three provinces, data collection further encompassed sites in which DDG RE teams have been operational in order to cross reference findings and compare prevalent knowledge, attitudes and practices in areas which have not seen any RE with areas in which DDG has provided RE.

[8]'Spoke' sites are peri-urban areas in Kabul and Herat, in which DRC-DDG provides services across protection (including Humanitarian Mine Action), legal, psychosocial and livelihoods sectors from its established multi-service community centres and outreach teams.

Communities were chosen for the KAP survey based on pertinent information related to sites such as IDP camps, return areas and impacted communities.

The reason to collect data from IDPs, returnees and community members was to establish a KAP level for each target group so that the RE programmes can be customized according to their level of understanding.

Figure 1: Data collection locations

In each province, the above-mentioned three categories were considered during data collection from the different target groups (IDPs, returnees and community member), even though it was not always possible to send teams into desired locations. Locations were selected to ensure that data could be collected from all target groups(community people, IDPs and returnees) in each province. Additional locations wereselected in order to secure that data was collected in mine/ERW impacted communities.

Please see below for further information.

Kabul: Kabul, Paghman and Bagrami districts
The enumerators could reach most of target locations planned in Kabul accept for Khaki Jabbar; however, they struggled to find returnee locations. During the survey, data was collected from: six IDP locations, three returnee locations, and four impacted communities.Seven of the villages covered by the KAP survey are also covered by DDG RE operations.

Nangarhar Province: Jalalabad, Behsud, Kama and Surkh Rod districts
The data was collected in the planned locations but enumerators were not able to find more IDP locations due to lack of data on IDPs. Data was collected from: Two IDP locations, three returnee locations, and

seven communities including five impacted communities.Two of the villages covered by the KAP survey are also covered by DDG RE operations.

Herat Province: Herat, Injil, Guzara and Karukh districts
A total of five districts were planned to be included; however due to the deteriorating security, the teams could not be deployed as planned to Gulran district and the most impacted communities. Data was collected from: Six IDP locations, four returnee locations, and five communities including two impacted communities. As with Kabul, seven of the villages covered by the KAP survey are also covered by DDG RE operations.

3.3 METHODOLOGY

The baseline/KAP survey is comprised of primary data collected mainly through individual questionnaires. The KAP data collection, conducted in the three provinces of Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar, has been supplemented by focus group discussions. Primary data has been cross-analysed with secondary data collected through a continuous desk review of other available data.

Individual questionnaires

Twoindividual questionnaires consisting of structured and standardised questions(cf. Annex A and B) were designed: One for the baseline solely looking at recent returnees, and another for the KAP survey looking at community members, IDPs and returnees residing in the targeted communities. For both questionnaires the following is valid. The main target groups were: Children between the ages of 6 and 11, young people between the ages of 12 and 17, and adults above 18 years of age. The questions followedbest practice recommendations.[9] The questionnaire was furthermore drafted with a view to previous KAP surveys undertaken by the Mine Action programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) in 2004-2005 and 2009-2010, respectively.As such, the questionnaire encompasses questions pertaining to assessing knowledge and inquiring regarding attitudes and behaviour as well as perceptions regarding mines/ERW. The questionnaire was field-tested and went through multiple reviews by DDG Technical Advisors and DMAC; all feedback was incorporated into the finalised questionnaire. All MAPA IPs received the research design and draft questionnaires in order to provide recommendations; however, only one IPs shared feedback, which was incorporated.

Focus group discussions

The KAP survey included focus group discussions (FGDs), which were conducted with children (6-11), youth (12-17) and adults (18+)of both sexes and belonging to the target groups of community members, IDPs and returnees in addition to members of specific livelihoods groups such as scrap metal collectors and farmers (cf. AnnexesC-E). Enumerators identified members from the identified target groups through community liaison and organised FGDs with a maximum of 10 participants in each.The FGDs were based on a qualitative, semi-structured interview guide that included open-ended questions regarding knowledge and attitudes and perceptions regarding mines/ERW;safe/unsafe behaviour; livelihood options available in the community; perceptions regarding at-risk groups and activities putting specific groups of people at risk; and ways of increasing awareness and spread safety messages. The FGDs were intended to further probe issues that were considered difficult to fully capture through standardised questionnaires, including stated/revealedbehavioural preferences with regards to reporting.

Secondary data

A desk review of secondary information informed the design of the primary data collection, including:

- Research design, including drafting of questionnaire and interview guides

[9] IMAS, *Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 2, Data Collection and Needs Assessment*, 2005; UNICEF, *Emergency Mine Risk Education Toolkit*, 2008.

- Objective and scope of the baseline/KAP
- Identification of target groups
- Identification of geographical areas
- Overview of the situation and context
- Overview and analysis of other relevant data, including casualty data

The secondary data reviewthus, includedan analysis of the findings of previous KAP surveys conducted in Afghanistan, as well as other relevant surveys and assessments. To ensure accuracy, secondary data was collected on an on-going basis throughout the baseline/KAP survey process.

3.4 SAMPLING

Baseline sample size calculation

Predefined criteria dictate who enters the Encashment Centres (registered returnees) and Transit Centres (unregistered returnees) to receive services, including cash benefits. As such, a convenient and readily accessible sample of returnees was available. However, due to the absence of comprehensive statistical data regarding the sites, it was not possible to undertake probability sampling; instead, the research employed quota sampling. Quota sampling permits an obtainable cross-section analysis and a sufficient representation of the target population – here broken into four groups: minor males and females in addition to adult males and females. Interviewees were selected in a random manner and on the basis on the pre-determined quota;thus,before interviewing them the enumerators had to determine whether they are valid for the study; i.e. whether they counted towards the quotas.

For the returnees' baseline, questionnaires were filled by interviewing the targeted respondents in each location before they received RE. A total target of 1,065 questionnaires was set for all locations combined; the target was set on the basis of the expected return movements, both voluntary and involuntary, from Pakistan and Iran, respectively.

While session number, number of people (disaggregated) attending sessions, location and session settings vary within and between the RE projects, the main constant for RE remains the target population.The target population proportions for this sampling exercise is based on target level in DDG's August 2017 project proposal to UNOPS entitled *Provision of Mine/Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) Risk Education in Transit and Encashment Centres for Returnees in Afghanistan* (UNOPS Ref.: AFG/UNMAS/CANADA-20808/2017/001); i.e. a target of 600,000 direct beneficiaries. These targets were in turn set in line with the humanitarian projections of returnees for 2017 under the Humanitarian Response Plan and the Protection Cluster's estimations.

The target was broken down according to disaggregated targets (age and sex). The confidence level for this sample calculation was set at 95% for the total sample, corresponding to a 95% certainty that each respondent's specific answer was to the best of their knowledge. The confidence interval was set to 3; the total percentage of respondents who responded to each answer is representative of +/-3 of the population who share the same characteristics as the age/sex group, i.e. recent returnees.

The baseline sample size was as follows:

Target group	**600,000**	**Sample size**	**1,065**
Men (18+ years)	95,000	16% of target	170
Women (18+ years)	104,000	17% of target	181
Boys (5-17 years)	204,000	34% of target	362
Girls (5-17 years)	197,000	33% of target	351

Table 1: Baseline sample size

The sample was distributed proportionately between the project locations in line with projected RE outputs and the age/sex distribution outlined in table 1. The distribution was as follows:

- Kabul: 125 respondents
- Nimroz: 258 respondents
- Nangarhar: 323 respondents
- Kandahar: 359 respondents

KAP survey sample size calculation

- The sample was calculated on the basis of on-going DDG RE projects. Under CSSF funding in Kabul and Herat, the number of direct Risk Education beneficiaries was estimated to be at least 15,000 in 30 'Spoke' sites; however, the number of families settled in the Kabul spoke sites alone was estimated at 37,350, which equalled approx. 261,450 individuals.[10]Under CHF funding in Jalalabad, the number of direct Risk Education beneficiaries was estimated at 13,671 conflict affected individuals.[11]
- The sample size was calculated on the basis of a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 3; with 28,671 RE beneficiaries, the sample size was set at 1,029questionnaires in total or 343questionnaires per location[12] distributed equally across the three target groups ofIDPs (33%), returnees (33%)and community members (33%).
- Gender representation: 50 % male, 50 % female target in every location.
- Age group targeting: 50% children and youth, 50% adults in each location.

The KAP sample size was as follows:

Target group	**Sample size**	**1,029**
Boys (5-11 years)	15% of target	154
Girls (5-17 years)	15% of target	154
Adolescent men (12-17 years	15% of target	154
Adolescent women (12-17 years	15% of target	154
Adult men (18-59 years)	15% of target	154
Adult women (18-59 years)	15% of target	154
Elderly men (60+ years)	5% of target	52
Elderly women (60+ years)	5% of target	52

Table 2: KAP sample size

KAP survey Focus Group Discussions

A numberof FGDswith a maximum of 10 respondents per group were plannedacross the three KAP survey locations:

i. Children: Minimum 2 FGDs in each location
ii. Youth: Minimum2 FGDs in each location
iii. Adults: Minimum2 FGD groups in each location
iv. Local authorities: Minimum 1 FGD in each location[13]
v. Community leaders, including elders: Minimum 1 FGD in each location[14]

[10]Based on the formula that a family comprises an average of 7 persons.
[11]The number of beneficiaries anticipated to be reached in Jalalabad under CHF funding.
[12]This is in line with the most recent KAPB+ survey undertaken in Afghanistan in 2009-2010, in which 160 questionnaires were collected per location.
[13]FGDs were conducted separately for male and female groups if and as needed.
[14]Ibid.

Enumerators were closely liaising with DDG operational staff, including the RE/IM Coordinator and DDG Field Officers, in order to determine the actual number of FGDs to implement in each location. Such flexibility was built into the process, in order to allow for adding FGDs if and as needed, e.g. when specific at-risk groups,such as scrap metal collectors were identified during the community entry, community liaison and data collection phases. A breakdown of the 52 FGDs conducted in the three provinces can be found in Annex E.

Comparative summary of survey design

The baseline and KAP surveys constitute one, integrated exercise but due to the differences in objective and target groups as well as actual collection of data, they were designed differently to ensure that comprehensive data could be collected. For easy comparison, the survey designs are juxtaposed in the summary below.

	Baseline	**KAP survey**
Target group(s)	Recent returnees	Community members IDPs Returnees
Locations	Kabul, Nimroz, Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces	Kabul, Nangarhar and Herat provinces
Methodology	Standardised questionnaire	Standardised questionnaire FGDs
Enumerators	DDG RE personnel	External enumerators (non-DRC/DDG staff)
Sample size	1,065	1,029

Table 3: Summary of survey design

3.5 SELECTION AND TRAINING OF ENUMERATORS

The baseline data was collected by DDG RE teams, which had been locally recruited and deployedin the ECs and TCs in the planned baseline locations. The RE teams were trained by the DDG RE/IM Coordinator *in situ* and they were monitored by the DDG Field Officers while conducting the data collection. DDG Field Officers provided weekly updates on progress of the data collection. No significant challenges were encountered as the integration of data collection into on-going and well-established operational procedures allowed for easy monitoring and corrective action, if and as needed.

The KAP data was collected by enumerators who were recruited *ad hoc* and, thus, were not DRC-DDG staff. DDG recruited local enumerators to ensure that they have the relevant languages skills, sociocultural understanding and are accepted in the localities.DRC-DDG announced the casual positions in the three provinces and applicants had to go through regular recruitment procedures before being issued temporary contracts. The recruitment took two months as it was difficult to identify suitable candidates; especially Nangarhar proved a difficult location to recruit enumerators in. The training for all three teams took place in Kabulon 4-5 October 2017. The teams were immediately deployed to the three provinces, where they were monitored by the DDG Field Officers, supported by the DRC Area Managers. The DDG RE/IM Officer received daily updates from the Enumerator Team Leaders, as well as weekly progress reports from the DDG Field Officers. The DDG RE/IM Officer was responsible for monitoring the data collection, including taking corrective action if needed, and therefore travelled to all three locations to monitor activities.

3.6 DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT

The data collection training outlined where and how to gather and validate primary data, in addition to establishing how data should be managed and used. Further, it outlined research ethics, including how to collect data from minors and uphold respect for confidentiality and privacy.

PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION

BASELINE

Data collection for the returnees' baseline took place in UNHCR Encashment Centres in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar as well as in IOM Transit Centres in Torkham, Nimroz and Kandahar. The baseline questionnaires were administered by DDG RE teams funded by UNOPS. Data collection commenced on 20 September and was concluded on 8 November 2017.

KAP SURVEY

A total of 15 enumerators collected primary data for the KAP survey in three locations: Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad. The duration of data collection was approximately three weeks in each location, commencing on 8 October and concluding on 30 October 2017, with three teams of enumerators deployed simultaneously. Each data collection team consisted of one team leader and four enumerators. The team leaderwas responsible for checking all questionnaires and FGD forms, as well as overseeing the FGDs.Each data collection team was gender balanced, striving for 50:50 male/female.

The enumeratorsconducted FGDsand the Team Leaders detailed notes on the range of responses provided by the informant and provided data for entry into the data management platform.

DATA MANAGEMENT

All collected primary data was provided to the Data Entry Clerk who validated and entered it into the data management platform. DDG's national RE/Impact Monitoring (IM) Senior Officer provided quality control for the data management process.

DATA ANALYSIS

An expatriate RE Technical Advisorcarried out the data analysis on the basis ofthe aim and objectives of the baseline/KAP survey, including theidentified main target groups: Returnees, IDPs and host communities. A gender and diversity lens was applied to ensure that factors such as age, gender, sociocultural and socioeconomic status were fully taken into account during the analysis.

RESEARCH ETHICS

The entire baseline/KAP survey process was designed to meet ethical and human rights standards, including:

- Be empowering and participatory
- Be based on the informed consent of the participants, providing clear information and allowing participants to choose not to participate without penalty
- Facilitate the effective participation of women and excluded groups
- Take into consideration cultural, religious and other identity differences when planning and implementing the process
- Respect the human rights of those providing the information and data and ensure the well-being of enumerators and community liaison teams, thus minimising any risks involved in the collection of data

The data collection processadopted*Do No Harm*principles to avoid causing any harm or injury to respondents. As such, the potential impact on both participants and the broader community throughout the research cycle from planning through to dissemination was taken into consideration.

The following guiding principles underpinned the data collection:

Informed consent: Thebaseline/KAP surveywas conducted with respondents aged six years or above only. Enumerators were carefully instructed to ensure that adult respondents volunteered to participate in the

survey and were always provided the option of non-response. Adult respondents' consent to participate was registered on the first page of each questionnaire. With child respondents, permission was first secured from a parent, teacher, guardian or other responsible adult who had to check the questionnaire to document that they had granted permission. Enumerators were trained to provide sufficient knowledge and understanding of the nature of the proposed evidence generating activity to respondents before commencing the survey. In practice, this meant that teams would inform local authorities and community leaders before starting data collection. Further, enumerators carried a letter from DMAC explaining the purpose of the exercise; in one case, the letter from DMAC was delayed by two days, however, the enumerators did not commence data collection until the letter had been received and shared with the appropriate authorities and stakeholders.

Confidentiality: Thebaseline/KAP survey ensured that the confidentiality of respondents was respected. No personal information was requested from any respondents and anonymity was emphasised throughout the process. This was emphasised both during the training and monitoring of the enumerators.

Ethical data collection: The two questionnaires, the FGD guides and the data collection protocol were comprehensively reviewed by DDG Technical Advisors, DDG Operations personnel and DMAC, in addition to undergoing field testing. This was done to ensure that thebaseline/KAP surveyaccurately considered the cultural and socio-political contexts. Only questions appropriate for the setting, and according to what is ethical, moral and responsible, were included in the survey. Any questions that were deemed too sensitive to include were removed from the survey in advance of data collection. During the data collection enumerators would closely liaise with DDG RE teams and community leaders to ensure that interviews took place in locations that were deemed safe and appropriate for all target groups, including women and children; e.g. enumerators would not interview children without the permission of a responsible adult.

3.7 ACCESS AND COMMUNITY ENTRY

DDG RE teams were operational in the three locations and were utilised to conduct and support on-going community liaison efforts. Through community liaison, the RE teams ensured that local authorities, community leaders, security forces and other relevant stakeholders and potential gatekeepers were fully aware and supportive of the activities. Community liaison also servedto carefully manage expectations, grant access to the selected sites and communities as well as ensure safe conduct of activities.

3.8 SAFETY DURING DATA COLLECTION

As some of the sites in which data collection took place were affected by on-going insecurity, including armed conflict, DDG applied and adhered to the following operating principles in order to ensure the safety of enumerators and respondents:

- All enumerators received a full briefing on safety and security in the field.
- The DRC-DDG safety team remained engaged throughout the entire process and was closely liaising and advising enumerators, either directly or through DDG Field Officers. The DRC-DDG safety team further reviewed and approved of the data collection plans prior to deployment.
- All activities were to be carried out at times and places that were deemed safe and convenient for both survey team members and respondents.
- All respondents were carefully briefed and asked for permission for the interviews to take place. The enumeratorshad to make sure that the respondents understood why the interview was happening, and how the collectedinformation would be used.
- Since questions related to community safety and security might be considered sensitive, the enumeratorswere instructed to protect the respondent by not recording on paper any personal details, ensuring him/her that the interview was fully anonymous, etc.

- For all primary data collection activities, guidelines were provided to each enumerator as part of the training to inform best practices for the KAP survey, provide guidance on introducing the assessment, managing expectations, protocols on protecting respondents, describing the interview techniques etc.
- Enumerators were trained to provide a consistent explanation of who DDG is, what DDG does, why the data was being collected, and how it would be used.
- Clear stipulations were made to all enumerators about the working hours for data-collection; i.e. no activities during hours, which might be considered insecure, or at times when there were on-going security events in the vicinity.
- Enumerators were furtherinstructed on what to say if they were contacted by armed groups:
    - What to say if they were asked what they were doing.
    - To hand over questionnaires if requested to do so, and to not aggravate armed groups
- Direct DDG staff always carry their identity card and a letter from DDG explaining the activities being carried out.
- Enumerators who were not DDG staff carrieda letter from DDG explaining the activities that were being carried out. The letter was shared with DMAC who through its field officers issued an official letter approving the data collection. The enumerator teams carried the letter to the district level authorities to ensure that they were fully informed and supported the data collection.

3.9 CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS

A number of challenges and constraints impacted on all the phases of the baseline/KAP survey. A general constraint was the limited,dedicated human resources to oversee the day to day implementation of the entire process, including Quality Control (QC) of the data collection and data entry, as well as the analysis, presentation and reporting on findings.

Additional main challenges and constraints are accounted for in the following:

Planning phase

The baseline/KAP was originally planned to be implemented in the Summer of 2017 but delays in finalising research design and questionnaires – due, in part, to allowing sufficient time to invite feedback from relevant Technical Advisors, DMAC and the wider MAPA IPs – meant that the recruitment of enumerators only commenced on 30 July 2017. Finding suitable enumerators with the correct background and experience in conducting social research and surveys has been challenging,especially in Nangarhar. Despite, DDG having disseminated the recruitment announcement through its channels and through DMAC, it took time to identify qualified candidates.
With the Ramadan break, and additional restraints in finding the right profile of enumerators who could access different communities, in addition to the stretching of internal support functions including those of the HR department to support the expanding RE teams, as well as enumerators, the recruitment of the 15 enumerators, including Team Leaders, was only concluded on 5 October 2017.

Implementation phase

The baseline data collection took place in ECs and TCs, in which DDG was already operational and where respondents could be conveniently and safely accessed. As such, the enumerators encountered no significant challenges while collecting the baseline data. However, safety considerations, including on-going armed violence and insecurity, restricted the KAP enumerators from reaching all districts. Further, internal DRC-DDG policies for payment of transportation, materials and verifications needed in line with the internal control requirements resulted in slight delays given the short span of implementation.

The implementation of the FGDs presented a number of challenges. As seen in Annex E, no FGD was conducted for local authorities alone in Kabul; instead local authorities were part of FGDs conducted with community leaders and general community members. All but one FGD were separated into male and

female groups, due to sociocultural considerations. The FGDs for children and youth were sometimes overlapping, as it was difficult to separate target groups in some locations, e.g. children/youth in IDP camps, or groups of children/youth who collect scrap metal. In such cases, the FGD has been registered under the age group, which represented the majority. In Nangarhar, the enumerators were struggling with organising and conducting FGDs, and failed to conduct specific FGDs with local authorities and community leaders; although a few community leaders were included in the FGDs conducted with broader segments of the communities.This points to shortcomings in oversight and support, including additional training and community liaison/entry support; this is difficult to address with the security constraints hampering access to the field by expat Technical Advisors or senior national staff from other areas. However, additional on the ground monitoring could perceivably have ameliorated some of the challenges.

Language posed an additional challenge in terms of technical oversight; enumerators and DDG RE teams spoke limited English and the data collection took place entirely in local languages; Dari and Pashto. This required a lot of the DDG Operational team, which had never been part of implementing such an exercise. Ideally, DDG Field Officers and DRC Area Managers should have been specifically trained prior to even designing the baseline/KAP, but the short time frame allocated for the exercise and field-work made this difficult.

Data management process

The baseline/KAP was designed by an international RE Advisor; however, the enumerators and respondents interacted in local languages, Dari and Pashto. A Data Entry Clerk, managed by the DDG RE/Impact Monitoring Officer who also managed the RE teams,was tasked withchecking and entering the Dari/Pashto questionnaires into a database in English. An interface was then designed by the DRC IT section. As such, data entry and the establishment of a fully operational database from which statistics could be extracted took just over a month (November 2017). Consequently, despite concluding data collection by the end of October, analysis of the data could only commence in Early December.

The same constraints affected the FGDs: The FGD guides were drafted by the DDG RE Technical Advisor in English and translated into Dari and Pashto by the DRC in-house translator. However, once the FGDs had been concluded, they had to be translated back into English to allow for analysis. As the DRC in-house translator was unavailable, an outside translator was contracted. Only when the full FGDs had been translated, did comprehensive Quality Check (QC) take place – at which point it was difficult to make clarifications if needed.

Once analysis commenced, it became apparent that QC had been lacking in some cases; consequently, the database needed to be cleaned up before extraction of data for analysis could take place. The QC shortcomings were mainly due to language challenges, as all data was collected in Dari/Pashto, but also due to operational demands, which pulled human resources away from the baseline/KAP exercise.

In order to counter and correct data, which could be considered misleading, it was endeavoured to clean up and remove incomplete and faulty questionnaires from the overall database. The findings presented in the following are, thus, considered validand representative of the target groups in the areas covered.

In summary, the initial timeframe and resources planned were not sufficient to conclude both the KAP and baselines within the planned timeframe. Ensuring maximum quality on similar exercises requires additional dedicated quality assurance layers and not to be mainstreamed to existing operational or Quality Assurance Staff given the demanding nature of these tasks, and the expanded needs to follow up on additional teams within multiple locations at time. In the future, DDG will factor in these common challenges, to ensure that both program and support staff are better positioned to respond to any challenges on the ground including major leaves, delays in identifying suitable candidates or deteriorating

security and limited access, as well as additional time for training and data checks during and after the exercises.

4. PREVIOUS KAP SURVEYS: A DESK REVIEW

4.1 INTRODUCTION

A total of four surveys have been conducted to assess Mine Action programming, in particular Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in relation to RE in Afghanistan:

1) Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan: KAP Survey, 2004
2) Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan: KAPB Survey, 2005
3) Attitudes towards Mine Action: An Afghan Women's Perspective, 2009
4) Mine Action Activities KAPB+ Survey, 2009-2010[15]

The previous survey findings and recommendations were reviewed as part of the preparation of the 2017 DDG baseline/KAP survey. The review was, thus, expected to support the drafting of the 2017 research design, including methodology considerations and finalisation of questionnaires. As such, the review did not solely consider previous findings in terms of knowledge levels, the outcome of delivered RE, prevailing attitudes with regards to mines/ERW and stated behavioural preferences, but also assessed previously applied questionnaires and methodologies.

4.2 KEY FINDINGS

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES

None of the previous KAP surveys made use of qualitative methodologies such as FGDs, participant observations or semi structured interviews and as such did little to triangulate or probe the primary data. Sampling guidelines, particularly background information on how enumerators would identify respondents, are lacking. It is also not clear how enumerators were trained and whether the questionnaires were field tested prior to rolling out the full survey.

QUESTIONNAIRES

Previous questionnaires, particularly in 2004 and 2005, were quite simple and seemed to over-interpret some findings; e.g. Q1: "Do you know what mines and UXO are?" For 2004, the only options for answers were "yes" and "no" with the addition of "if yes, can you describe them". The analysis concluded that since 86% stated that they knew what mines/UXO were, it demonstrates that "Mine Risk is well known by most interviewees".

Both the 2004 and the 2005 questionnairesmade extensive use of closed questions: "Are mines/UXOs currently a problem to you and your family, affecting your normal life?" however, answers provided were not further probed through e.g. FGDs.

Further, the questionnaires required all questions to be replied to,but did not include "no response" as an option.

The 2004, 2005 and the 2009/2010 survey all included questions, which investigated important aspects of people's attitudes and beliefs; however, some of the questions were biased or leading. This is elaborated further in the following.

MINE RISK EDUCATION LEVEL

All previous KAP surveys concluded that the Mine Risk Education Level (MREL) in Afghanistan generally is high; most respondents indicated that they know about mines/UXO and the effects.

[15] Reports are available at DMAC's website http://dmac.gov.af/publications/mine-erw-risk-education/

> *"the population seems to have a good level of knowledge and sound practice with regard to mine risk, in particular when people have received MRE" (Mine Action Activities KAPB+ Survey, 2009-2010: 52)*

The previous KAP surveys unanimously point to a correlation between participation in RE sessions and MREL: When people, regardless of age and gender, participate in RE, their MREL is higher. Men usually have higher MRELs than women, which is explained by sociocultural factors. Boys and men have higher MRELs; however, they are also more often represented in casualty statistics than girls and women, thus indicating that MREL is not the only factor explaining unsafe behaviour.

An important point to note is that the surveys unanimously indicate a correlation between MREL and casualty numbers.

In 2005, the key sources of RE were established as NGOs, mass media (BBC/radio, television broadcast), informal social networks (parents, relatives, and friends) and schools. A high number of respondents (27%) answered "other" to the question on RE sources;other sources of RE were specified as including encashment centres (45%), "own experience" (25%), adults that received information from children who received MRE at school (15%), and information in mosques (10%). These findings were somewhat corroborated by the 2009/2010 survey, which also indicated that people received RE through "clinics" and community volunteers. None of the previous surveys investigated, which sources were considered the most trusted by the respondents.

ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

The 2009/2010 KAP Survey indicates that there might be a correlation between recent experiences of violent conflict and fatalism regarding mines/ERW accidents: Accidents have more to do with external forces "beyond one's control" than individual behaviour. This is an important insight, when it comes to addressing risky behaviours.

However, investigating attitudes and beliefs are exceptionally difficult through solely qualitative methodologies, especially when – possibly for practical reasons – providing respondents with options for answering. It is difficult to conclude if respondents actually believe that destiny/fate plays a significant role, or whether they simply tried to give what they considered the preferred answer rather than state their actual belief.

> *"It is important to bear in mind that the data might be influenced by a certain bias. Interviewers reported that in some cases interviewees who were unsure about what to say tended to give the answers they thought the interviewer wanted to hear i.e. yes. The majority of respondents are illiterate and many stated that they had never been asked their opinions in a survey before." (Mine Action Activities KAPB+ Survey, 2009-2010: 53)*

Further, both the 2005 and the 2009/2010 surveys utilised leading questions when investigating why accidents happen, in that enumerators were allowed to read the options to the respondent:

> *"Do you believe everything happens because of: (You can read answers; tick what the person mentions): a) Choice, b) Lack of knowledge, c) The destiny/Fate, d) God's will, e) Other (specify)" [sic] (Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan: KAPB Survey, 2005: 78)*

> *2009: "In your opinion, who is responsible for the mine incident? (You can read the options; tick what the person mentions): Yourself – Demining organisation – The government – Destiny – Others (specify)"(Mine Action Activities KAPB+ Survey, 2009-2010: 60)*

The 2005 survey also looked at the feelings generated by mine accidents: Accidents often stir up feelings of fear, typically among people in 11 – 20 years age groups. The feeling of fear has a significant correlation with the belief that everything happens due to "lack of knowledge". Among people aged 30-40 years and above the age of 40, the most prevalent feeling, in case of a mine accident, was one of sadness. Thesurvey concluded that this correlated with the belief that everything happens because of "God's will". These different feelings between different age groups bring attention to the "trauma mechanism", as such:

> *"Trauma mechanisms create attitude based on the environment of risk. Extraordinary situations, such as war, raise collective stress to its highest level, characterized by devastating destruction and losses of such a scale, that they cause the upheaval of social structures and the social functions of society. Experiences show that war, suffering and the difficulty of those affected by war and its destruction, in any form, cannot be forgotten even when these people find themselves in a safe environment and the danger of war ceases. So, every mine causality stirs up again the trauma mechanism that influences feelings. In Afghanistan, the old people who remember the long war experience and think life events derive from external forces are saddened and resigned whilst the young and educated who have less memory of the war think the situation can be changed through human action."(Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan: KAPB Survey, 2005: 53)*

This is an interesting hypothesis, which should be further investigated, as it may provide insight into how RE messages should be tailored to specific target groups, taking their lived experiences into account.

PRACTICES

Higher numbers of males than females (both children and adults) have received RE. Despite having a lower MREL, females are less represented in casualty figures. Thus, the previous KAP surveys all agree that a low MREL is not the only factor explaining dangerous or risky behaviour. Rather, social, cultural and, particularly, economic factors seem to play a big role; this is demonstrated by the fact that while most respondents are fully aware of the risks involved with venturing into dangerous areas, they indicate that they would still do so to ensure the survival of themselves and their families. It should also be noted that while most respondents are fully aware of the risks involved with entering into dangerous areas, a high percentage still indicate that they would rush to help, if a family member laid injured in a minefield.

Further, previoussurveyfindings point to the apparent neglect of mine danger; most respondents in high-risk areas are completely aware of the mine/UXO danger and potential effects, but they have lived with the risks for so long that the KAP surveys conclude that the threat is seen as "latent and somewhat concealed". The analyses do not seem to consider the possibility of people living in high-risk areas having developed their own coping strategies.

A majority of the respondents in the 2004, 2005 and 2009/2010surveys seemingly belongs to the risk-taking categories of either misinformed or intentional: While most know about mines/ERW, including areas likely to be contaminated, and about markings of hazardous areas, they still indicate wrong behaviour. This may be an indication of economic necessity, which forces an individual to disregard danger in order to ensure the survival of his/her household. Whether the unsafe behaviour is a result of conscious or subconscious – the report consistently refers to "subconscious ignoring" – is less important than to understand what makes people intentionally take risks, and how can we support them in identifying safe alternatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of still-relevant key recommendations can be drawn from the previous MAPA KAP surveys:

- As concluded by the 2009-2010 report,even if they have received RE, many people will continue to take risks if their livelihoods or their families' safety depend on it. For that reason, RE should be combined with a determined effort to remove explosive weapons and, when clearance is not possible, efforts to help people identify alternative, safer livelihoods and coping strategies.

- Operational priorities should be guided by where the needs are more acute in terms of saving lives and limbs. In some cases, this may mean that life-saving and APMBT commitments do not overlap, as Anti-Personnel (AP)-mines cause far fewer accidents than ERW and PPIEDs.

- Where people knowingly take risks, it is not enough to simply pass on messages that "mines are dangerous" or to "stay on the roads, out of the fields". Safety messages and encouraged safe behaviour should take people's realities into account, in order for beneficiaries to feel and be able to act on them.

- Passing on the one-size-fits-all safety messages to highly diverse at-risk groups disregards the fact that many people are intimately familiar with the explosive threats and, in many cases, have developed alternative coping mechanisms or 'mine smartness'.[16]

- RE messages should acknowledge and build on the knowledge and "common sense" already present in communities and help people find alternatives, when forced by circumstance to take risks.

[16] 'Mine smartness' was coined in a 2003 article to denote the local responses, including knowledge, logic and everyday practices, to explosive threats. Based on, inter alia, a 1997 evaluation of risk education in Afghanistan, the article concluded that risk education programmes will – continue – to fall short of their intended impact for as long as they fail to take into account that 1) mine-affected people generate their own broadly effective means of offsetting explosive threats, and 2) "people take risks for reasons that make sense to them" (Neil Andersson and all, 'Mine Smartness and the Community Voice in Mine-Risk Education: Lessons from Afghanistan and Angola'. In: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 5, The Future of Humanitarian Mine Action, October 2003.

5. CASUALTY ANALYSIS

5.1 OBJECTIVE

The main objective of undertaking a casualty analysis is to understand who the mine/ERW victims are: What are their age and gender? Where did the accident take place? What were the victims doing when they were involved in the accident? Etc. Only by understanding who the victims are, and how the accidents happened, is it possible to tailor RE interventions to directly address the most at-risk categories.[17]

The casualty analysis, undertaken in the fall of 2017, furthermore sought to create a more in-depth understanding of why casualty numbers have been, and continue to be, on the rise in Afghanistan.This is particularly interesting, seeing that the national mine action programme is close to 30 years old, and immense efforts have been undertaken to build awareness of the explosive threats and associated safe/unsafe behaviours. Consequently, one hypothesis, which the casualty analysis sought to test, was that many casualties fall victim as a result of intentional, or forced, risk-taking as they struggle to make a living for themselves and their families.

5.2 CASUALTY DATA IN AFGHANISTAN

Mine/ERW casualty data has been recorded in Afghanistansince 1 January 1978 and the full Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) dataset comprises over 30,000 entries.A casualty isa person who is injured or killed by a landmine, ERW or other victim operated device such as PPIED.The IMSMA database for Afghanistan includes reports submitted by MAPA IPs, MACCA/DMAC, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other key stakeholders; however, contributions to the casualty database have at times fluctuated or ceased.[18]IMSMA data confirm that Afghanistan remains one of the countries most affected by ERW and IEDs, and as a result sees one of the highest numbers of explosive weapons casualties in the world.

For the purpose at hand, the analysis focuses on casualty data from 2009 to date. The data has been broken into two historical periods:

I. 2009-2014: From when MAPA undertook the last KAP survey in 2009 until the drawdown of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and hand-over of full security responsibility to the Afghan national security forces at the end of 2014. A total of 3,849 casualties were reported and recorded in the IMSMA database during this period.

II. 2015-2017: From the beginning of the Resolute Support Mission (RS), the NATO-led training, advisory and support mission, on 1 January 2015 until today.[19] A period marked by substantial increases in security incidents and civilian casualties. A total of 5,217 casualties were reported and recorded in the IMSMA database in this period.

As concluded in the MAPA KAP surveys undertaken in 2004-2005 and 2009-2010, casualty numbers were declining, which led to previous KAP surveys concluding that RE interventions were effective. However, as is evident from figure 2, which includes data going back to 1 January 2001, casualty numbers have been steadily climbing since 2014; something that has led DDG to consider assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of current RE interventions and ways to improve them.

[17] Cf. the five at-risk categories: The Unaware, the Uninformed, the Misinformed, the Reckless, and the Intentional.
[18] As, is the case with previous major contributors such as ICRC and ARCS, who stopped sharing casualty data with IMSMA in 2008.
[19] IMSMA database as of 13 October, 2017.



Figure 2: Country-wide casualties 2001-2017

Between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2014, a total of 3,849 casualties were reported and recorded in the IMSMA database, and while drops in casualty numbers were observed prior to the last MAPA KAP survey 2009-2010, casualties started to climb again – particularly from 2013.



Figure 3: Casualties disaggregated by age and sex 2009-2014

Looking at casualty data from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2014, two immediate trends can be identified. Firstly, males are killed and injured to a far greater extent than females; this goes for both children and adults. Secondly, a sudden increase in casualty numbers can be observed for all sexes and ages in 2014; however, while all groups were increasingly at-risk, menover the age of 18 were injured or killed by explosive weapons four times as often in 2014 compared to the previous three years (cf. figure 3).



Figure 4: Type of device causing casualties 2009-2014

While 2009-2014 overall saw a steady reduction in Anti-Tank (AT) and AP-mine induced accidents, as well as infinitesimal accidents caused by cluster munitions, ERW continued to be a major source of accidents. 2013 onwards, marked the appearance of PPIEDs in the threat landscape and, consequently, a sharp increase in casualty numbers. In fact, by 2014 PPIEDs caused more accidents in Afghanistan than any other explosive weapon (cf. figure 4).

The negative trend of increasing numbers of explosive weapons casualties has continued with 2015 and 2016 setting new records and, at the time of analysis, 2017 set to be close to on par with the staggering casualty numbers in 2016. A total of 5,217 casualties were reported and recorded in the IMSMA database in the past three years (cf. figure 5).



Figure 5: Casualties disaggregated by age and sex 2015-2017

Boys under the age of 18 and adult men continuously constitute the vast majority of victims; however, girls and adult women are increasingly represented in the casualty data in the second period of analysis (2015-2017). In fact, while women over the age of 18continue to represent the smallest portion of casualties, the

number of adult women casualties have doubled or tripled in the period of 2015-2017 compared to 2009-2014. This trend is also evident when looking more closely at the social status of the casualties:



Figure 6: Social status of casualties 2009-2014 and 2015-2017

According to the IMSMA data (cf. figure 6), community members, which includes so-called host communities, constitute the vast majority of casualties. The casualty data invite at least one big surprise: IDPs, nomadic populations and returnees from outside of Afghanistanare not overly represented among the victims; although most RE attention has been and continues to be allotted to these groups, as they are seen as more at risk from explosive weapons than other social groups.

However, it is unclear how data collection teams determine the social status of victims or survivors; e.g. if a person lived outside of the country, or even was displaced inside the country, but is now residing in what would be considered her/his place of origin, it is unclear what this person's social status is determined. As no guidelines for determining the social status of victims exist, casualty data collection teams are seemingly left to make their own valuations, which in turn impact the validity of data.



Figure 7: Type of device causing casualties 2015-2017

As illustrated by figure 6, PPIEDshave continued to cause the highest number of accidents in 2015 and 2016; however, ERW induced accidents have seen an almost exponential increase since 2015 and by October 2017, accidents caused by PPIEDS and ERW, respectively, were almost on par.Since 2015, no casualties stemming from cluster munitionaccidents were recorded but 2015-2017 saw a slight increase in AP- and AT-mine induced accidents compared to 2011-2014. Another way to illustrate this trend is to disaggregate casualty data according to the explosive weapons involved (cf. figure 8):



Figure 8: Type of device causing casualties disaggregated by sex and age

It is clear that different sex and age groups are not exposed to the same level of risk from all weapons; boys under the age of 18 historically were and continue to be overwhelmingly at risk from ERW, while men over the age of 18 are more at risk from PPIED than any other sex and age group – although PPIED are the leading cause of increasing casualty numbers among all age and sex groups.

In an endeavour to better understand, not only who is most at risk, but how individuals or groups put themselves in harm's way, either knowingly or unknowingly, it is critical to take a closer look at the activities at the time of accident:



Figure 9: Activities putting boys and male adolescents (under 18) at risk

As illustrated by figure 9, boys and adolescent males under the age of 18 constitute the most at risk group of civilians who historically get injured during recreational activities or while tending to animals/livestock –

both typical activities for this group. It is important to note, though, that boys and adolescent males are increasingly at risk while travelling. Both findings correspond to the fact that ERW followed by PPIEDs are the main causes of accidents among this group. One surprising finding is the decreasing trend of boys and adolescents getting injured and killed when collecting scrap metal – an activity otherwise considered being central to intentional risk-taking.



Figure 10: Activities putting girls and female adolescents (under 18) at risk

Girls/adolescents (under 18) get injured/killed to a much lesser extent than boys but when they do, it is often also while undertaking recreational activities or travelling (cf. figure 10).

For both males and females under the age of 18, there is a significant and, compared to previous years, increasing trend of unknowns or blanks; i.e. no record of what they were doing at the time of accident.[20] This is troublesome, as it hampers efforts to tailor RE interventions and, thus, address specific risk-increasing activities.



Figure 11: Activities putting men (over 18) at risk

The data corroborates the increasing trend of men getting injured while travelling; something that is in line with the finding that the explosive weapons causing the highest number of casualties among adult males are PPIEDs. As for males under the age of 18, it is surprising to see how the collection of scrap metal is not

[20] According to an email from DMAC dated 5 December 2017, "unknown" indicates that the data collection team did not have/collect correct information, while "none" and "blank" indicate that information was not provided by data collection team.

further represented among the activities undertaken at the time of the accident (cf. figure 11). Additional data collection measures, including comprehensive guidelines for interviewing survivors or victim's families, would be needed to establish if casualties were in fact not collecting scrap metal or whether they were e.g. undertaking another activity, but happened to also collect scrap metal when the accident happened.



Figure 12: Activities putting women (over 18) at risk

Adult women are historically represented in the casualty data to a much lesser extent than any other age and sex group: In 2009, adult men got injured or killed six times more often than adult women;in 2017, adult men got injured or killed 5.3 times more often than adult women. However, recent years have seen ever-increasing adult females falling victim to explosive weapons, especially PPIEDs. This corresponds to the finding that women are increasingly killed and injured while travelling, with household chores the second most common *known* activity at the time of the accident (cf. figure 12). However, as with boys and girls under the age of 18, there is an immense body of unknowns.



Figure 13: Type of device vs. activity at time of accident (1)

Cross referencing the activity at the time of the accident with the type of device causing the accident confirms the trend that ERW and PPIED are involved in the bulk of accidents, regardless of activity (cf.

figures 13 and 14). However, the gaps in data remain evident as especially PPIEDs involve a lot of "unknowns".



Figure 14: Type of device vs. activity at time of accident (2)

Similarly, disaggregating casualties by sex and age and cross referencing with device causing casualties allows for firmly concluding that all groups are mainly injured and killed by ERW and PPIED (cf. figure 15).



Figure 15: Type of device causing casualties - sex/age disaggregated

Unsurprisingly and as illustrated by figures 16 and 17 below, significant provincial variances can be observed in terms of civilian casualties, mainly corresponding to the prevalence and dominance of armed opposition groups (AOGs).



Figure 16: Type of device disaggregated by region



Figure 17: Casualties by province 2015-2017

The provincial differences are interesting when considering on-going and planned Mine Action interventions, RE as well as Non-Technical Survey (NTS)[21] and clearance, as the provinces in which DDG and other IPs operate may not correspond to the provinces, which see the highest numbers of casualties. The reasons for this are manifold and includes consideration of existing assets but, mainly, reflect access restrictions caused by insecurity and considerations in terms of personnel safety. However, it should give cause to consider whether remote delivery modalities, especially in terms of RE interventions, should be considered in order to reach most at-risk beneficiaries with potentially life-saving RE messages.

[21] Non-technical Survey refers to the "refers to the collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritisation and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence". International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 08.10, First Edition (Amendment 2, March 2013)

Taking a closer look at select provinces, which were selected on the basis of having the highest numbers of casualties in the periods reviewed and, in most cases, consistently seeing high levels of conflict allows for establishing further regional trends (cf. figures 18 and 19). Despite seeing relatively few mine/ERW casualties, Kabul and Nimroz provinces were included due to on-going DDG operations and the fact that the DDG 2017 baseline/KAP survey was implemented in those provinces.



	Balkh	Farah	Faryab	Ghazni	Ghor	Hilmand	Hirat	Kabul	Kandahar	Kunduz	Nangarhar	Nimroz	Paktika	Uruzgan	Zabul
<18	42	76	117	143	31	183	72	21	250	53	93	19	66	105	164
<18	0	11	20	23	16	56	13	4	75	21	12	5	12	19	16
18+	69	101	122	153	134	334	69	15	459	55	67	58	105	176	123
18+	5	20	17	39	24	71	20	0	55	5	12	10	12	21	35

Figure 18: Sex/age disaggregated casualties by province 2015-2017



Figure 19: Activity at time of accident by province 2015-2017

As demonstrated, the IMSMA casualty data allows for an in-depth understanding of the changing threat landscape in Afghanistan, which, in turn, should form part and parcel of (re)designing RE and other interventions to accurately tailor messages and delivery modalities to the most at risk populations. A main modality for RE is school-based[22] – e.g. in the form of direct RE sessions delivered by accredited teams, in the form of training of teachers to deliver RE to their classes, or by delivering RE through child-to-child or

[22] IMAS 12.10: Mine/ERW Risk Education, 2ndEd., Amendment 2, June 2013.

peer-to-peer. Therefore, it is important to assess whether children can be reached in schools, i.e. whether children actually attend school (cf. figure 20 below).



Figure 20: Did children under 18 years go to school when they were involved in an accident?

While it may be expected that data is missing or lacking for certain groups, or that missing data regarding e.g. social groups of casualties carry over to missing data for other aspects about the casualties, such as whether they had received any RE prior to their accident, the sheer scale of "unknowns" for community members is surprising.



Figure 21: Did victims receive RE prior to accident?

For the period of 2009-2017, only 364 out of the total 9,066 entriescomprehensively included information (yes, no, once, regularly, unknown) on whether casualties had received RE prior to their accident; otherwise the information is missing (cf. figure 21). For 87 casualties out of these 364, it is "unknown" whether they had received any previous RE – a slight improvement to simply leaving it blank.The gap remains when cross referencing with social status (cf. figure 22); even for community members who are considered to be somewhat more accessible than e.g. nomads, information is missing. Looking more closely at the registered data reveals differences between the qualitiesof data submitted by individual IPs; e.g. Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) appears to be the most prolific organisation to record whether victims had received RE (265 out of the 364), while MACCA collected the information in 31 cases, and MCPA did it

in 40 cases. However, a cross check of IMSMA with DDG records revealed irregularities; though it is challenging to establish the cause of the irregularities without full insight into IMSMA data management protocols. What stands is that for 8,702 casualties between 2009 and 2017,it is not possible to establish whether they had received RE or not, and thus the casualty data cannot support the evaluation of the effectiveness of provided RE.



Figure 22: Social status vs. previous RE

The trend of lacking or incomplete data collection seems to increase over time and has serious implications for planning, evaluating and, if needed, adjusting RE interventions.

5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

TRENDS IN CURRENT CASUALTY DATA

The analysed casualty data covering the period 1 January 2009 until 13 October 2017 establish the following trends:

- The majority of victims are boys/adolescents (under the age of 18) and men (over the age of 18);
- The majority of victims are community members (settled/host communities);
- Boys/adolescents (under 18) get injured during recreational activities, while tending to animals/livestock and while travelling;
- Girls/adolescents (under 18) get injured/killed to a much lesser extent than boys but when they do it is often also while undertaking recreational activities or travelling;
- Men (over 18) surpassed boys in casualtynumbers in 2016. While casualty numbers among men have dropped in 2017, it is still very high;
- Men particularly get injured/killed while travelling or when passing/standing nearby;
- Women (over 18) represent the smallest portion of casualties; however, the number of adult women casualties have doubled or tripled compared to 2009-2014;
- Women overwhelmingly get injured while travelling, followed by doing household work;
- Returnees and IDPs are not highly represented among victims;
- The main devices causing accidents during recreational activities are ERW;
- The main devices causing accidents while tending to animals are ERW; and
- The main devices causing accidents during travelling are PPIED followed by ERW.

GAPS IN CURRENT CASUALTY DATA

- The data is not comprehensively disaggregated according to age groups: 0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 18-59 and 60+. Apparently, it is possible to disaggregate the data – however, such data was not made available for the purpose of this analysis;
- Activity at the time of accident is often not accurately registered and, in some cases, it is not registered at all;
- The social group is not adequately registered; there is a large group of “unknowns” and “blanks”;
- It is often not registered whether victims had ever received Risk Education; and
- Information regarding children’s and adolescents’ educational attainment is often missing.

6. FINDINGS OF 2017 RETURNEES' BASELINE AND KAP SURVEY

6.1 RETURNEES' BASELINE

A total of 1,065 baseline questionnaires were filled with recent returnees who had passed the border from either Iran or Pakistan into Afghanistan. The sex ratio of respondents was 55% female and 45% male.



Figure 23: Baseline respondents disaggregated by sex and age group

Respondents were targeted in line with planned targets for on-going RE projects. These target recent returnees from Pakistan and Iran and data collection was undertaken by gender-balanced DDG RE teams.



Figure 24: How long have you been away from Afghanistan?

Returnees had generally been gone for a long time; a third has been gone for more than 20 years. Half (50%) said that they had no education, while 20% listed primary school and 12% secondary school as their highest educational level. The main languages spoken by the returnees were Pashto (60%), Dari 27% and Uzbek 8%. The vast majority of respondents (74%) said that they planned to return to their place of origin.

When asked whether they had ever received any information about the dangers of landmines and ERW, only 12% clearly said yes, while therest said no, could not remember or did not provide an answer. Of the

few respondents who indicated that they had received RE, the majority elaborated that they received RE by DDG RE teams at the border, or so-called Zero-Point, as they crossed into Afghanistan.



Figure 25: Have you ever received information about the risks of landmines or explosive remnants of war?

In order to determine the Mine Risk Education Level (MREL) and which category of at-risk or risk-takers they belong to, all respondents were asked the same questions. For knowledge, attitude and practices questions, respondents could pick multiple options but possible answers were not provided to the respondents; instead, enumerators were instructed to check all applicable replies.



Figure 26: Where are landmines and ERW most likely to be?

Despite the vast majority stating that they had never received any RE, there seemed to be an awareness of the correlation between previous battle areas and the likely presence of mines/ERW. Respondents exhibited common sense, but clearly lacked information as evidenced by the high number of people replying “don’t know” to questions regarding recognising potentially dangerous areas.



Figure 27: What are clues to identifying a dangerous area?

There seemed to be some awareness of the most common and international markings, but most respondents indicated that they had no knowledge of either local or international ways of marking dangerous areas.



Figure 28: Do you know in which ways people may have marked a dangerous area?

Not surprisingly, very few respondents hadheard about the Afghanistan hotline number for reporting suspicious items and areas, and the few who indicated that theyknew of it,mainly said that they got the information at the Zero-Point during a RE session. One concerning finding,is that while 130 of the recently returned respondents explicitly stated that they had received RE previously, only 54 said that they had heard about the hotline number; or approximately 41% of those who had previously received information about the dangers of mines/ERW.

When turning to questions pertaining to attitudes among recent returnees, it is apparent that the prevailing attitudes do not necessarily reflect the realities of the casualty data.



Figure 29: Who do you think is most at risk from landmines/ERW?

It is worth considering the inclusion of casualty data as part of the RE sessions, in order to challenge misconceptions and reinforce e.g. the fact that adult men are one of the most at-risk groups.



Figure 30: Why do you think people risk going into areas with landmines/ERW?

Most respondents were unsure of why people may risk entering dangerous areas, but there seemed to be some awareness of the fact that there might be a link between livelihood activities and risk-taking. However, very few respondents indicated that people might be at risk when travelling, even as the casualty data indicate otherwise.

When delving into practices and behaviours, the answers provided by the recent returnees indicated a lack of understanding of what is safe and unsafe behaviour.



Figure 31: What will you do if you encounter a landmine or ERW?

As illustrated by figure 31, most respondents indicated that they did not know what to do if they encountered a mine/ERW. Even more disconcerting was the number of people who indicated that they themselves would try to dispose of an explosive weapon. This is additionally concerning as respondents may have provided preferred answers about their practices and behaviour, rather than revealing what they actually would do.

The main rationale for providing RE to recent returnees is that people who have spent extended periods of time – in some cases their entire lives – outside of Afghanistan are either uninformed or completely unaware of the explosive threats, which they may encounter when entering and travelling through the country.A key RE message for recent returnees is, thus, how to ensure that they can move safely through new or unknown territory. In this regard, it is noteworthy that half of the recent returnees indicated that they did not know how to avoid mine/ERW accidents if moving to an area that is new to them.



Figure 32: If you are going to an area that is new to you, how can you avoid a landmine/ERW accident?

There is, thus, a well-established need for RE, though RE messages should be tailored to therevealed knowledge and misconceptions as well as preferred and revealed attitudes and actions into account.



Figure 33: What will you do if you think you are in a minefield?

Questions on suspected minefields echo questions included in previous MAPA KAP surveys; such questions may be considered speculative but still indicate whether respondents have knowledge of safe behaviour.



Figure 34: What would you do if you saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield?

The stated preference of moving inside a suspected minefield, either to run away or to run to someone's assistance, corresponds to previous KAP findings in Afghanistan and indicate a continuing need to address misconceptions and bring about a better understanding of safe and alternative behaviours to take if suspecting to have entered a dangerous area.

6.2 KAP SURVEY

A total of 1,039 baseline questionnaires were filled in with community members, IDPs and returnees, including people living in areas currently or previously impacted by mines/ERW. The sex ratio of respondents was 49% female and 51% male.A total of 52Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in all three locations with children, youth and adults – mainly divided into gender specific groups – ranging from housewives over elders to village leaders. Each FGD had a minimum of six and a maximum of 10 participants.

For questions pertaining to knowledge, "other" responses than those pre-typed on the questionnaire were captured. "Other", thus, covers a wide range of responses – they have been noted in the following when a significant amount of respondents provided such explanations.



Figure 35: Age group distribution

The vast majority of respondents considered their economic situation either average (40%) or poor (36%).

41% of respondents said that they had no education, while 27% indicated primary school and 20% secondary school as their highest educational level.



Figure 36: Highest level of education

One third of respondents below 18 years do not attend school; however, over half said that they go to school every day. These numbers were similar to the FGD participants under the age of 18.



Figure 37: School attendance for <18 years old

When asked about whether they had ever received any information about the dangers of landmines and ERW, a third or 32% of respondents said yes while the majority said that they had never received RE and fewsimply did not know. Almost equal numbers of males and females had received RE. Among the FGD participants under the age of 18, slightly more men and boys than women and girls indicated that they had previously received RE.



Figure 38: Have you ever received any information about the dangers of landmines and ERW? (1)

Similarly, the respondents, which had previously received RE, were almost equally distributed between children, adolescents/youth and adults while the elderly were underrepresented. While the data do not allow for establishing why the elderly have received RE to a lesser extent, it may be speculated that this is due to a variety of factors, including the prolonged conflict and the fact that the elderly are less mobile than other groups and, thus, may not access RE sessions to the same extent.



Figure 39: Have you ever received any information about the dangers of landmines and ERW? (2)

The respondents who said that they had previously received RE were asked to provide details; most received RE from a mine action organisation, in school, or from the radio.

As with the returnees' baseline, all respondents were asked the same questions to ascertain their knowledge level, or MREL, as well as knowledge retention. On knowledge questions, respondents were able/allowed to provide multiple answers but were not provided with answer options. To test their basic knowledge of mines/ERW, respondents were asked not asked if they knew what mine/ERW are – which was one of the closed questions included in the 2005 KAP survey – but were openly asked if they knew what mines/ERW can do and what may cause them to explode. Similarly, for the FGDs questions were formulated openly and interviewees were asked to elaborate on their answers.



Figure 40: What makes a mine/ERW explode?

The majority of respondents seemed to be aware that mines/ERW are victim operated as 52% said mines/ERW can kill, 41% said they can injure, 3% had no idea what mines/ERW can do. This corresponded to the FGD participants where all groups seemed to have a high understanding of what can cause mines/ERW to explode – this was even true to groups where all said that they had never received any RE.

Further, there seemed to be a high understanding of the dangers of areas associated with fighting and roadsides in general.



Figure 41: Where are mines/ERW most likely to be?

However, 11% did not know what the clues are to identify dangerous areas – and even more disconcerting was that there were no apparent differences in the answers provided by all respondents (cf. figure 42, green graph) when compared to the answers provided by respondents who indicated that they hadreceived RE(cf. figure 42, blue graph).Further on this, when crosschecking findings with areas in which DDG has provided RE it was apparent that respondents were still not sure – especially in villages in Herat where DDG has provided RE there were a significant number of respondents who said that they did not know how to potentially identify a dangerous area.

For the respondents who provided additional or other responses to the question on where mines/ERW are likely to be, all mentioned either mountains 54% said that mines/ERW were located in the mountains.

As for the FGD participants, especially adults were eager to share their thoughts on potentially dangerous areas, which included mountains, pastures and dumping sites. Interestingly, FGD participants voiced similar ideas regardless of whether they lived in mine/ERW-affected areas.



Figure 42: What are clues to identifying a dangerous area? All respondents (green graph) vs. respondents with previous RE (blue graph)

Anunderlying assumption was that knowledge retention can support the evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency and quality of provided RE. As such, a working assumption that there would be a discernible difference in the answers provided by people who had received RE and answers provided by people who had never received RE. However, as evidenced by the data collected through questionnaires and FGDs, people seem to have a general idea of what mine/ERW are and what they can do – regardless of having received RE. Further, FGD participants generally had some idea of safe behaviour.



Figure 43: Do you know in what ways people may have marked a dangerous area? All respondents (green graph) vs. respondents with previous RE (blue graph)

Although only 32% reported that they had received some kind of information about the dangers of mines/ERW, there seemed to be a high awareness of certain markings; 66% mentioned a red sign as one way in which dangerous areas may have been marked.This trend was repeated when cross referencing with areas where DDG has provided RE, although it was not established whether the respondents had received

RE from DDG: The majority of respondents mentioned a red sign; however, in Herat 24% stated that they did not know how dangerous areas might have been marked. As for the focus group participants, the interviewees who had previously received RE seemed to be mainly aware of markings using red and white stones.



Figure 44: Do you know of any mine/ERW victims in your community?

16% of respondents stated that they knew of mine/ERW victims in their communities and the vast majority had never encountered mines/ERW. This may be seen as an indication that respondents may be minimally exposed to explosive weapons; however, given the negative security situation and the resulting access restrictions, which impeded data collection in some targeted areas, it is impossible to determine whether this is in fact the case. More people in Herat and Nangarhar were aware of casualties in their communities, something that was supported by the FGDs and are in line with the casualty analysis findings, which demonstrate that the number of people injured or killed in Kabul province is small compared to most other provinces in Afghanistan (cf. figure 17).



Figure 45: Have you ever encountered mines or ERW?

The vast majority (83%) of respondents said that they had never encountered mine/ERW. This meant that many respondents had to speculate in terms of what they would do if in a suspected dangerous area.

Reporting of suspicious or dangerous items is considered a key indicator of changing attitudes and safe behaviour. In that regard, it is positive to observe that 79% of respondents who said that they had encountered mines or ERW also stated that they had reported the items.Another importantinsight was sharedby some of focus group participants: Interviewees who reported that they relied on scrap metal collection as a main or sole livelihood strategy indicated that they would still collect scrap metal even if it looked suspicious.



Figure 46: If yes, did you report it to anyone?

Another discouraging finding is that despite 32% said that they had received some form of information regarding mines/ERW; only 12% said that they had heard about the hotline number. Only 55 or 5% of all KAP respondents explicitly said that they had heard about the hotline number during RE or from a mine action organisation; 21 respondents explicitly said they had been informed to call the police (119).



Figure 47: Have you ever heard of the hotline number? All respondents

Adding to the discouraging findings, is the fact that only 27% of the respondents, who stated that they had received some form of RE, knew of the hotline number while a staggering 62% said that they had never

heard of it.This trend was repeated when cross referencing with villages in which DDG has provided RE; in fact, an overwhelming majority stated that they had never heard of the hotline number.

Some focus group participants indicated that they knew of the police hotline (119) but not the DMAC hotline.For the 15 FGDs undertaken in Heart, only in one did participants explicitly talk about the hotline number while FGD participants talked explicitly about reporting to the police in 8 or just over half of the Herat FGDs. In this regard, it is relevant to consider whether efforts should be made to unify the hotlines and have only one number – ideally an easy number to remember such as 119.



Figure 48: Have you ever heard of the hotline number? Respondents with previous RE

This is a finding that ought to lead to contemplation within the MAPA but also with the appropriate authorities. Further, it gives DDG cause for evaluating the RE delivery and making adjustments as needed.



Figure 49: Who do you think should receive information about the risks of mines/ERW?

Respondents' sense of who is most at risk from mines/ERW seemed to be in line with, at least, some of the findings of the casualty analysis. There was no discernible between the attitudes of all respondents and respondents with previous RE. However, during the FGDs most interviewees clearly stated that women and older girls are far less at risk than men and boys as women are mainly in or close to their homes:

"Women don't go anywhere or come out of the houses … men face mine risks mostly." (adult male FGD, Herat, 25 October 2017)

"In these types of incidents women are less affected than men and children" (adult female, FGD, Nangarhar, 25 October 2017)

Focus group respondents further drew a clear link between intentional risk-takers and the groups they considered most at-risk; in every case interviewees indicated a correlation between livelihood activities and men followed by boys as the ones most at-risk. However, most saw children overall as having the greatest need for RE, as they are likely to pick up dangerous items in the belief that they may be toys.



Figure 50: Who do you think are most at risk from mines/ERW? All respondents (green graph) vs. respondents with previous RE (blue graph)

The groups considered most at risk are also the ones, respondents feel should be prioritised by RE interventions. An interesting overlap between the baseline and the KAP data isthe belief that nomads are a particular at-risk group – something that is not corroborated by the available casualty data; however, this may be due to the fact that casualty data is lacking. Another interesting finding is that girls are considered at risk to a much higher extent, and almost as much as adult men, than reflected in the casualty data. Men are considered to be less than twice as much at risk compared to girls, although men constitute four times as many casualties than girls (cf. figure 5). 32% of the respondents who provided additional/"other" responses said that the people most at risk are those who are unaware or "illiterate" when it comes to the dangers of mines/ERW.



Figure 51: Have you ever seen anyone touching mines/ERW or entering a dangerous area?

A significant portion of the respondents avoided answering the question regarding observed risky behaviour; this may be due to perceived sensitivity surrounding the question but may also simply be a matter of people either not living close to contaminated areas or not being aware of which areas that might be dangerous. In this regard, it is important to note that many respondents indicated that they think that people are often not aware of which areas are dangerous.



Figure 52: Why do you think people risk going into areas with mines/ERW? All respondents (green graph) vs. respondents with previous RE (blue graph)

As with the returnees' baseline, very few of the KAP survey respondents correlated "travelling" with risk taking; instead, collection of scrap metal and various livelihoods activities were perceived as carrying a greater risk. Despite the casualty data analysis not demonstrating that collection of scrap metal leads to increased accidents, anecdotal evidence may indicate otherwise.

> *"Two families are internally displaced in our village. The family children are collecting old metals and collecting explosives too" (adult male IDPs in FGD, Nangarhar, 24 October 2017)*

"Village children collect these items to earn money" (boys in FGD, Nangarhar, 25 October 2017)

"I collected these items but the buyer did not buy them from me … Most of our friends are collecting these items for money" (boys in FGD, Nangarhar, 28 October 2017)

Considering the gaps identified in the available casualty data, it may not be sufficient to fully establish which livelihoods activities that are more certain groups of people at risk. Additional data needs to be collected, e.g. through re-interviewing of survivors or victims' families. RE teams could also be utilised to collect information as part of their community liaison efforts.

Respondents didaccurately point to "playing" as a main reason for risky behaviour, which indicate an attitude of considering children to be more at risk – something which can and should be leveraged in the design and delivery of RE messages.

Delving into behaviour, respondents seemed to accurately identify at least some safe behaviour. When asked about how they can avoid mines/ERW accidents when going into a new or unknown areas, almost half of the respondents stated that they would ask locals where is safe and where is unsafe. This corresponded to findings from areas in which DDG has provided RE; however, in villages in Herat 35% of respondents said that they did not know how they could move more safely in new areas.



Figure 53: If you are going into an area that is new to you, how can you avoid accidents involving mines/ERW?

It does appear as if people generally have their wits about them and indicate quite a lot of common sense – or mine smart – answers. This is supported by the FGDs, in which focus group participants in all locations and or all ages and sexes continuously appear to have at least some basic MREL – despite not all having received any RE. However, it may also be that some respondents state their preferred answers in which case additional data collection, e.g. through participant observation, may be needed to better establish revealed preferences.

In an attempt to uncover revealed preference, two questions from the previous MAPA KAP surveys were recycled. As previously mentioned, questions regarding minefields can seem overly abstract, particularly when people are unlikely to come across one as is the case in some of the DDG project locations. Furthermore, "what would you do if…" questions are inherently speculative. Nevertheless, even if respondents either consciously or subconsciously offer their stated rather than revealed preference, the answers ought to provide insight into prevailing attitudes.



Figure 54: What would you do, if you thought you were in a minefield?

While it is positive that many respondents, including the ones who had previously received RE, stated that they should shout for help, the answers indicate a prevailing misconception: 34% would run away/go back if they thought they were in a minefield. In fact, respondents indicated a higher inclination towards moving around in a suspected minefield – either by retracing their steps or by running away/going back – than towards stopping/standing still.



Figure 55: What would you do if you saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield?

Adding to this, 21% stated that they would rush to someone's rescue, a similar finding to previous MAPA KAP surveys. When cross referencing with areas in which DDG has provided RE, the same trend appeared with 15% in Kabul, 36% in Herat, and 24% in Nangarhar saying that they would retrace their steps if they thought they were in a minefield and18% in Kabul, 18% in Herat, and 7% in Nangarhar saying that they would run to someone's assistance in a suspected minefield.

While the stated preference to run to help an injured friend or family member indicates unsafe behaviour, it is a classic example of why it is insufficient to simply tell people what to do – and what not to do. People need acceptable alternatives.



Figure 56: What would you do if you found a mine/ERW close to your house or in your area?

The majority of respondents indicatedthe correct, safe behaviour of warning others if they found a mine/ERW close to their home; however, during the FGDs it became clear that many people – especially in Herat where participants in 7 out of 15 FGDs explicitly emphasised marking as a primary cause of action andbut also to some extent in Nangarhar where participants in 3 outs of 13 FGDs emphasised that they would mark the item before they would report it.Adult men and women, as well as boys talked about marking dangerous item; however, no girls suggested this as a course of action they would take if they found a dangerous item.

> *"I will mark [the item] first and then inform the village leader." (boys in FGD, Herat, 30 October 2017)*

> *"We must mark the area with stones." (boy in FGD, Nangarhar, 24 October 2017)*

This regional trend may, at least in part, be due to the fact that the respondents in Nangarhar and Herat in general lived in closed proximity to contaminated or suspicious areas and in more cases knew (of) people who had been killed or injured; thus, they had a more direct experience of mines/ERW than respondents in Kabul.

In another FGD nine boys, eight of whom said that they had previously received RE, were asked to discuss how they could avoid accidents:

> *"We must keep away from mines, mark the area and inform others" (boys in FGD, Herat, 25 October 2017)*

This is disconcerting as RE teams are not qualified to teach proper marking techniques and the safe behaviour to be encouraged is to spend as little time around a dangerous item as possible; this includes moving stones around and overall lingering.

According to the questionnaire respondents only 31% indicated that they would report a suspicious item. Even in villages where DDG has provided RE, the bulk of respondents would warn others but very few would report dangerous items. However, when inquiring about reporting during the FGDs many people said that they would report – though preferably to trusted persons such as village leaders: In Herat participants in 11 out of 15 FGDs mentioned village leaders when asked who they would report dangerous items to, while in Nangarhar this was the case in 11 out of 13 FGDs.It is difficult to determine why this is;

however, it may be speculated that while people have been told to report to the hotline number, they may not be able to do so, e.g. due to the costs involved or due to mistrust in national authorities or security providers. The lack of trust was a recurring theme in FGDs:

> *"Currently we cannot trust anyone. There is no trust and belief among people" (adult male FGD, Herat, 26 October 2017)*

On the other hand, another recurring theme in the FGDs related to trust revolved around who people trusted, most prominently village elders: In Herat, in all of the 15 FGDs conducted participants talked about how they looked to trusted people, especially village leaders and elders but also parents, teachers and Mullahs for important information; the same trend was observed for both Kabul and Nangarhar.

> *"In our village Mullahs and village leaders have more trust and influence. We trust them to transfer important information to us" (men in FGD, Kabul, 23 October 2018)*

> *"The village council should inform us. Elders have most influence and trust to deliver information." (women in FGD, Kabul, 28 October 2017)*

Elders themselves seemed to be keenly aware of the responsibilities they were entrusted with:

> *If we see a mine we have to inform the government to annihilate them. In case we find out that the area is dangerous we assign a person there to guard the area so that people don't enter the area, mark the surrounding area and inform the authorities (elders FGD, Herat, 25 October 2017)*

In order to investigate prevailing perceptions regarding mines/ERW, respondents were read statements and asked to say whether he/she: 1) Strongly disagreed, 2) somewhat disagreed, 3) neither agreed nor disagreed, 4) somewhat agreed, or 5) strongly agreed. 30% of KAP survey participants indicated that they either strongly or somewhat agreed to being aware of mine/ERW contamination in their area. The ones who either strongly or somewhat agreed to this question were asked follow up questions pertaining to their perception of the impact of landmine/ERW contamination.



Figure 57: "I am aware of landmine/ERW contamination in the area where I live"

Of the respondents who were aware of mine/ERW threats in their area, 60% stated that they thought most community members in contaminated areas behaved safely. This was corroborated by FGD participants; however, many also pointed out that people who had never received RE and even people who had received RE would touch dangerous items if their livelihoods depended on it.



Figure 58: "People in my community always behave safely with regards to mines/ERW"

It comes as little surprise that the majority of respondents who perceived of themselves as living in contaminated areas, expressed concerns for their own or their family's safety.



Figure 59: "I am concerned about my family's safety or my own safety because of mines/ERW"

Further, 64% indicated that livelihoods activities were negatively impacted due to perceived contamination. This corroborates the recommendation that RE cannot solely look to pass on standardised RE messages. Instead, a tailored approach is needed to accurately address individual needs and concerns, as well as allow beneficiaries to find workable, safe alternatives.



Figure 60: "Agricultural activity, grazing, hunting or collecting natural resources in my community is negatively affected by mines/ERW"

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 CATEGORISATION OF AT-RISK AND RISK-TAKING GROUPS

In order to assess the quality of current RE interventions, including communication strategies and methodologies, the baseline/KAP survey set out to explore to what extent recent returnees, IDPs and host/settled community members belong to specific at-risk or risk-taking categories as set out by IMAS Best Practice[23]:

1. *The Unaware*: those who do not know about the danger of mines or ERW; this category typically includes very young children;
2. *The Uninformed*: those who know about mines or ERW, but do not know about safe behaviour; this category typically includes children or the elderly;
3. *The Misinformed*: those who have been given poor information about safety or believe that s/he knows all about landmine/ERW (former soldiers/front line fighters);
4. *The Reckless*: those who know about mine safe behaviour, but ignore it; this category typically includes adolescent boys playing with ERW;
5. *The Intentional*: those who have no option but intentionally adopt unsafe behaviour; this includes especially male youths or adults farming or collecting scrap metals in suspected hazardous areas.

As demonstrated by **the baseline findings**, only few ofrecent returnees to Afghanistan are completely unaware of the dangers of explosive weapons; however, they are often either uninformed or misinformed. Further, considering that many people are injured or killed by mines/ERW while travelling, some returnees should be considered to be intentional, as they simply have no choice than to move through potentially dangerous areas.

Asfor **the KAP findings** with host communities or settled populations, it is clear that there is a high awareness of the dangers of mines/ERW – even among people who have not received formal RE. This underscores a general trend of very few people who are completely unaware. The bulk of boys, girls, men and women seem to not only be aware of mines/ERW, including where they are likely to be located and what actions they can take; however, people generally lack comprehensive or, perhaps rather, relevant information about safe behaviour. Even among people who have received RE, stated behaviours are sometimes unsafe.

One of the objectives of the KAP, including the casualty data analysis, was to test the hypothesis that risk-taking may be intentional as people struggle to make ends meet. As such, itwas endeavoured to asses to what extent the remaining landmine/ERW casualties are a result of intentional, reckless or misinformed risk taking. With the current gaps in casualty data, it is difficult to firmly conclude.However, keeping both previous and at-hand KAP survey findings in mind, it may be speculated that at least some risk-taking is driven by people being intentional, reckless or misinformed as to the threats around them.

In this regard, and in keeping with the concept of ‘mine smartness’, it is worthwhile to consider if we need a sixth category of at-risk or risk-taking groups to capture that many people in Afghanistan are *inured*, i.e. accustomed to the threat: They know a lot and have at least some correct information and they are neither reckless nor intentional, but rather are desensitized to the risk posed by mines/ERW. As such, due to having been exposed to or having lived with the threats for so long that they consider the risk minimal. Further, the devices causing half of all current casualties are PPIEDs and among the common activities at the time of the accident are “travelling” or “passing by”. For the latter, it is virtually impossible with the currently available data to determine the risk-taking categories.

[23] IMAS, Best Practice Guidebook, 2005.

Additional data collection, e.g. through re-interviewing of survivors or victims' families may be needed, to establish whether this is the case; however, it is evident that current RE interventions are insufficient to counter the negative trend of rising casualties.

7.2 KNOWLEDGE AND RISK EDUCATION LEVELS

Previous MAPA KAP surveys found that people in general had a high level of knowledge regarding what mines/ERW are and what they can do. This still seems valid – even among people who have not received any formal RE. Common sense and 'mine smartness' are clearly factors, which should be taken into account in the design of RE interventions, rather than assuming that most people, including returnees and IDPs – regardless of whether they have received any form of RE – need a full briefing on mines/ERW.

Despite the fact that both the baseline for recent returnees and the KAP survey looking at community members, IDPs and returnees who have settled in the three targeted provinces of Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar confirmed a seemingly minimum level of knowledge, or common sense, regarding what mines/ERW are and can do, both exercises also identified important gaps in knowledge which needs to be addressed:

Reporting and hotline number

Unsurprising, recent returnees to Afghanistan do not know the hotline number, which is an obvious reason for providing RE at the border crossings as well as at ECs and TCs. Whether recent returnees remember the hotline number two weeks or longer after they received RE is unknown; just as it is also unknown whether recent returnees have the means to actually report to the hotline number.

However, community members, IDPs and returnees who have settled, either temporarily or more permanently, in Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar also have limited knowledge, or recollection, of the hotline number. This is even the case for people who have previously received RE. People seem to rather remember the Police emergency number (119), which may, at least in part, be due to the fact that it is a well-established and much easier to remember number.

Further, children, adults and the elderly emphasise that they would report suspicious items to trusted people, especially village leaders, elders, teachers, parents and Mullahs.

In this regard, it should be considered to establish an easier, three-digit and potentially toll-free Hotline number; a number which can easily be memorised – even for children as it can be put into e.g. a song. Further, it should be considered how to establish a network of informants in high-impacted areas, e.g. village leaders and other trusted people, who are in regular contact with DMAC and/or the MAPA IPs that are operational in the area.

How to stay safe when travelling to or through unknown areas

Travelling is one of the activities that directly cause the increase in casualties among boys, girls, women and men from all social groups. However, as demonstrated by the findings of both the baseline and the KAP, many people do not consider travelling a particularly risky activity. Furthermore, especially recent returnees are unsure how they can stay safe when travelling to or through unknown or new areas.

Safety messaging should include information about the specific threats, i.e. ERW and PPIED, which people may encounter when travelling. Further, it should be considered to include information about casualty numbers and activities at the time of accident – mainly during RE sessions for young people and adults – to counter the misconception.

When delivering RE to recent returnees, the message of "ask local where is safe and unsafe" should be more prominent, e.g. by delivering the message at both the start and end of the session. An idea discussed among MAPA IPs is to make regularly updated hazard maps accessible at e.g. ECs and TCs and in RE sessions; however, hazard maps do not accurately capture recent battle areas, PPIEDs and suspected IED minefields. As such, hazard maps might distort the perception of where is safe and where is unsafe and continue the focus on AP and AT mines in a context where ERW and PPIED constitute far greater risks.

Knowledge levels

The baseline for recent returnees was intended to assess knowledge levels, rather than knowledge retention, when entering Afghanistan for the first time in perhaps more than 10 or 20 years.

The KAP survey endeavoured to assess knowledge levels both among people who had received RE and people who had not; for those, who had previously received RE the retention of knowledge was furthermore assessed. As demonstrated in the previous, no substantial differences in knowledge levels were discerned between people who said they had not received RE and people who said that they had received RE. Furthermore, some people who had received RE were still unsure of safe behaviour.

Educational practice is that learners, especially children, have varying focus spans depending on their motivation. Consequently, one-way presentations should not take too long as members of the audience may lose interest or become disengaged, thus not absorbing information.

The DDG Global RE SOP emphasises three fundamental RE messages:

1. **Don't touch** landmines or other ERW
2. **Don't go** into dangerous areas.
3. **Report**.

If participants, regardless of age, sex, social group or livelihood, only remember three pieces of information when leaving a RE session, these should be it.

7.3 ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

When analysing the findings on attitudes and behaviour, it should be kept in mind that the majority of the respondents either do not live in areas, which are currently contaminated, and/or have never encountered mines/ERW. For the same reason the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) quotes Machiavelli:

"People do not truly believe in anything until they have had actual experience of it."

Similarly for the baseline/KAP survey, it should be kept in mind that many respondents may have stated their preference, but the answers provided may not accurately reveal what they would do in practice. Although the FGDs tried to take this challenge into account, they had their limitations as outlined in the section on challenges and constraints. Ideally, people's daily practices should not solely be talked about but, rather, observed. As such, any future endeavours to uncover attitudes and, especially, behaviour should – to the extent possible in terms of technical capacity and safety/access considerations – employ a more radical mixed methodsapproach, including qualitative data collection such as participant observation.

Even so, attitudes regarding mines/ERW *inter alia* offer insight into who people consider most at risk and, thus, whether they are likely themselves to adopt safe behaviour; if people do not consider themselves – or (specific) members of the family to be at risk – then they may be less likely to make changes in their daily lives. Both the baseline and the KAP data indicates that boys are considered to be most at risk, followed by nomads, men and soldiers. However, as demonstrated by the casualty data, men are almost equally prone

to become victims as boys, while nomads constitute a very low percentage of the casualties. As such, it is important to ensure that men attend RE and that RE is tailored to counter a perception that men may be slightly less at risk.

Few respondents consider "travelling" to be a risky activity; however, as demonstrated by the casualty analysis, the vast majority of accidents happen when people, especially adults of both sexes, are travelling. RE interventions should take this into account and ensure that communication strategies and methodologies specially target people on the move. A first step should be to design RE materials that accurately address recent returnees and other people on the move, who will likely be passing through unknown areas, rather than utilising the same RE materials for all at risk audiences. A further recommendation is to consider how to reach people on the move in areas where no RE teams are operating. Among the approaches to consider are radio/broadcast based RE, e.g. by integrating safety messages into existing public service messaging or by designing radio plays, which depicts "recognisable" situations.

As for children, most respondents consider them mainly at risk where playing or undertaking various chores, including collecting firewood and water. However, also children are to a high degree injured while travelling – something which people do not seem to consider. RE materials should accurately address this.

A key indicator of behaviour change is whether people report dangerous items and areas. As indicated by both the baseline and the KAP data, the vast majority of people are not aware of the hotline number, and even when they are, many seem hesitant to report items to the hotline. When it comes to reporting, it seems that most prefer to report to a trusted and known authority such as the police or community leaders. Consequently, it should be considered how reporting through e.g. community leaders can be formalised, e.g. through identification and training of key leaders who in turn can form a link between affected communities and the Mine Action authorities.

A significant number of people indicate that they would move around, if they suspected that they themselves were in a minefield, or if a family member laid injured in a minefield. Such unsafe behaviour needs to be addressed with due consideration of *actionable* and *realistic* courses of action. Passing on the message of "stand still, don't move" to people who have no other choice than to move is simply not working.

7.4 QUALITY, EFFICACY AND EFFICIENCY OF RISK EDUCATION

The KAP data was cross-referenced with people who said that they had previously received some form of RE, including people living in areas in which DDG has been operationally active in providing RE. The objective was togain additional insight into the quality of RE delivery; more specifically, knowledge retention and stated changes in attitudes and behaviour. In this regard, it is obvious that basic RE messages are either not fully conveyed or not fully understood – or a combination of both.

Among the disconcerting findings are:

- Far too many reply "don't know" to questions, such as "What can landmines and explosive remnants of war do?" which should be easy to answer after receiving RE.
- The majorityof people who have received RE state that they have not heard of the hotline number.
- A significant number of people would not report a suspicious/dangerous item.
- A significant number of people do not know how to avoid accidents if going to areas, which are new to them.
- Many people indicate that they would move around in a suspected minefield – either by running away or retracing their steps.
- Similarly, many people say that they would run to someone's help in a suspected minefield.

- If finding a dangerous item close to their home, many would warn others (which is good) but few state that they would report it.

These findings point to shortcomings in terms of quality assurance and monitoring; the two central activitiesto ensure that RE is effective and efficient, including guiding revisions in terms of training of team, methodologies and materials.

The baseline/KAP survey did not investigate whether people may lack reporting capacities. Such anecdotal insights would be helpful to assess if people are actually able to report. It is recommended that pre/post RE session monitoring should not just assess whether people know of safe behaviour but, indeed, whether they are practically able to act safely.

In conclusion, people in Afghanistan have varying degrees of 'mine smartness' and correct/incorrect information regarding explosive weapons, they are at risk due to a multitude of activities, and they have pre-existing attitudes which impact on how they perceive and act on received information. Consequently, having one set of RE materials and passing on the same standard safety messages in a one-size-fits-all manner to all target groups is neither relevant nor effective.

7.5 TARGET GROUPS, MESSAGES AND METHODOLOGIES

The UNICEF MRE Handbook (2008) outlines the following fundamental questions, which should be answered when planning, designing and implementing RE interventions in addition to forming part of an on-going evaluation and, when needed, adjustment of RE interventions in order to keep them relevant:

- *Who* is especially at risk?
- *Where* are they especially at risk?
- *When* are people at risk and when should RE be delivered?
- *What* explosive hazards pose the greatest risk?
- *Why* are people coming into contact with explosive hazards?
- *How* can those at greatest risk be reached most efficiently by RE messages?
- Is anyone else addressing risk at the local level and if so, how?

The casualty analysis offers some insight into who is especially at risk; however, prevailing attitudes among baseline/KAP survey respondents to some extent contradicts the casualty data, e.g. nomads are barely represented in current casualty data (cf. figure 6) but are considered as one of the social groups most at risk by both recent returnees (cf. figure 29) and people who have been in Afghanistan for most, if not all, of their lives (cf. figure 50). It is essential to tailor RE messages to accurately address e.g. people who are travelling and host community adult males; in this regard, it needs to be considered if the most at-risk categories are reached in the most efficient and appropriate manner.

A reoccurring theme in the FGDs was that children and adults of both sexes look to people whom they trust to get important information: Village leaders were repeatedly mentioned as someone people would seek awareness from, but also teachers, parents and Mullahs – and consequently schools and mosques – were considered first stops for knowledge and advice.

Thus, in order to reach the most at-risk and needy beneficiaries, additional modalities of delivering RE should be considered, including using Community Volunteers and working through community structures by identifying the most trusted resource persons for each target group, e.g. teachers and community leaders. In this regard, specific materials and training packages need to be developed and standards should be reflected in AMAS and IP Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Once the right people have been identified, it should be considered how they can best be utilised and supported in passing on RE messages, e.g. as Community Volunteers (CVs). In this regard, the following key actions are recommended: Defining selection criteria for CVs, designing Training of Trainers (TOT) for CVs, training and specifically accrediting IPs to work with CVs, and designing RE materials to be utilised by CVs.

The MAPA RE guideline outlines a certain sequence when conducting direct RE; the first topic to be covered is recognition of AP and AT mines.However, most accidents are caused by ERW and PPIED. Recognition of ERW (items) follows as per the RE guideline.

> *"Mines have been cleared from this area. In the past, there were mines, which were killing and injuring people but since demining organisations cleared the area, no one is in danger anymore." (male adults, including metal collectors, in FGD, Kabul, 22 October 2017)*

The overemphasis on AP and AT mines is potentially counterproductive to efforts of decreasing casualty numbers. Instead, RE messages should take into account that most people are killed or injured while they are playing or travelling. As such, it may be better to emphasise recognition of dangerous areas and safe behaviour when travelling to and/or through unknown territory rather than blanket recognition. After all, RE beneficiaries should receive information relevant to their needs.

> *"Magnetic (vehicle-born IEDs) mines affect us as well, because we don't know anything about them." (male adults in FGD, Kabul, 23 October 2017)*

A looming issue, which is currently neither incorporated in the current MAPA strategy or by DDG RE efforts in Afghanistan despite the recognition of its implications, is that half of all casualties are killed or injured by PPIEDs. Although additional risk assessments and analyses are needed, it is recommended to start planning for how to address this, and how RE methodologies and materials could be adapted to this increasing need.

It is, thus, recommended to review and field test existing RE materials to gauge their applicability to the most at-risk groups and their efficiency in achieving a decrease in casualty numbers. Such a review together with the casualty analysis and findings of previous KAP survey and the at-hand DDG baseline/KAP survey should input into a comprehensive MAPA RE Strategic Plan clearly outlining primary and secondary target groups and how to bridge tailored RE messages to each identified at-risk and risk-taking category.

The RE strategy should furthermore consider how RE teams should be (re)trained in order to achieve the objective of reaching the right people with the right information. It should be kept in mind that RE materials are only as good as the facilitators or trainers using them. As such, it is recommended to review the Afghanistan Mine Action Standards (AMAS)for RE to ensure that sufficient provisions are made for ensuring comprehensive training, monitoring and QA of RE activities.

In continuation hereof, it is recommended that accreditation and QA procedures are reviewed to assess whether they accurately ensure that MAPA IPs and other stakeholders continuously evaluate and, when needed, adapt RE interventions and retrain RE teams. QA of RE should ensure a more technical assessment of RE session content, interaction and methodology, rather than the predominant current focus on procedural factors, such as the presence and usage of activity cards, or session setup and duration, etc.

7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING CASUALTY DATACOLLECTION, MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Understanding who is most at risk, why and when s/he is most at risk, whether s/he knowingly enters into risky situations and, if yes to the latter, why this is key to designing and implementing appropriate and relevant RE interventions. Therefore, continuous collection, management and analysis of casualty data are quintessential.

It is recommended to put in place acomprehensivedata management process. DMAC should lead the development and implementation of national guidelines, which all MAPA IPs should adhere to, including:

- Guidelines for how data should be collected, including how data collectors/enumerators should be trained, to ensure that data are collected in a uniform manner.
- Guidelines for quality control and verification of collected data by a) the team leader, b) the IP Information Management Officer or, alternatively, the IP Operations Manager, and c) the IMSMA Information Management Officer.
- Guidelines for how to ensure that incomplete IMSMA accident and victim forms are revised and missing or incorrect information are collected.
- Continuous quality control, verification and, when needed, clean-up of the IMSMA database.

Standards for the collection of casualty data should build on best practice, including:

1. Being, and be seen as, impartial and reliable;
2. Having clear, transparent definitions and inclusion criteria;
3. Having a transparent methodology with robust, multiple-stage checking procedures;
4. Beingconnected to local communities;
5. Using multiple sources;
6. Publishing disaggregated incident/individual level information; and
7. Being open to correction, or the addition of new information.[24]

Further, for each incident/accident, the following should be accurately filled in: one accident form and one victim form per one victim – thus, one accident report should have accident reports for each victim of that particular accident attached.

To improve on the quality and, hence, usability of the casualty data, the collection of additional information should be considered on the IMSMA accident and victim forms:

- How was the data collected? Who was interviewed? If the casualty was not interviewed directly, who was interviewed in his/her stead?
- Contact information of the person(s) interviewed should be included for potential follow-up.
- Additional questions to consider including: a) How far from his/her home, did the victim have the accident, and b) what is the size of the community in which the accident happened.

As casualty dataare fundamental to monitoring and evaluating the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of RE, continuous and comprehensive analysis should be undertaken. A Terms of Reference outlining the responsibilities of the various MAPA partners would be helpful in this regard. Further,the accurate analysis of and response to casualty trends should be reflected in MAPA and individual IP strategies.In this regard, it should be considered to use a dashboard system to improve on data accessibility and usability.

Finally, it is recommended to expand on the collection and systematically sharing of casualty data and ensure that data is collected in a well-coordinated manner. Currently, data on civilian casualties in Afghanistan is collected and compiled by a number of actors and stakeholders, and some data might overlap or nor be shared. In this regard, it should be considered to unify civilian casualty data collection,

[24]Taken from: Oxford Research Group, Good Practice in Conflict Casualty Recording: Testimony, Detailed Analysis and Recommendations from a Study of 40 Casualty Recorders, Paper 1: 'An Overview of the Field', October 2012. Available on: www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/casualty_recording_practice_ collection

which applies a multiplesource and multiple actor methodology but integrate all findings in one injury surveillance system.

ANNEXES

A:RETURNEES' BASELINE QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR DATA ENTRY USE ONLY	
Questionnaire Serial Number	Data entry clerk's initials
Date of data entry (date/month/year)	Comments

FOR ENUMERATOR USE ONLY	
Date	Location
MRE team	Interviewer name

INTRODUCTION
1. Introduce yourself to the informant and explain who you are, the organisation youwork for and that the purpose of the interview is to collect information, which will allow us to improve our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities. 2. Ask for information about the person you are going to interview. Explain that participation is voluntary and all information is confidential (therefore his/her name will not be asked for). 3. Do not read answers to the informants – circle the answers he/she provides. If the informant provides an answer, which is not listed, make sure to note it.

PERMISSION

Are you happy to participate in this survey?	
Yes	No
For respondents under the age of 18: Do you as parent or guardian give permission for him/her to participate in the survey?	
Yes	No

1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Sex of respondent				
a) Male		b) Female		
1.2 Age of respondent				
a) 6-11	b) 12-17	c) 18-59	d) 60+	
1.3 Household size				
a) 1-4	b) 5-9	c) 10-14	d) 15+	
1.4 What is the highest educational level that you have reached?				
a) No education	b) Primary school	c) Secondary school	d) Madrasah	e) Technical / vocational school
f) Higher level	g) Religious education	h) University	i) Refuse to answer	j) Other (specify)
1.5 What are the main languages that you can speak?				
a) Pashto	b) Dari	c) Uzbek	d) Turkman	
e) Pashayi	f) Balochi	g) Other (specify)		
1.6 What is your province and district of origin?				
1.7 How long have you been away from Afghanistan?				
a) Less than a year	b) 1- 4 years	c) 5-9 years	d) More than 10 years	
e) More than 20 years	f) Don't know	g) No response	h) Other (specify)	
1.8 Are you planning to return to your place of origin? Do you know if your family is planning to return to your place of origin?				
a) Yes	b) No	c) Maybe / undecided		
d) I can never return	e) No response	f) Other (specify)		
1.9 If not planning to return to your place of origin, where do you plan to go? Do you know where your family is planning to go?				
1.10 What will you do for a living when settled?				

2 KNOWLEDGE

2.1 Have you ever received information about the risks of landmines or explosive remnants of war?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.1.1 If yes, when and from whom?			

2.2 What can landmines and explosive remnants of war do?					
a) Kill	b) Injure	c) Nothing	d) Don't know	e) No response	f) Other (specify)

2.3 What makes a landmine or explosive remnant of war explode?					
a) Touching	b) Handling	c) Stepping on it	d) Moving it	e) Throwing things at it	f) Kicking it
g) Pulling a wire	h) Fire	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.4 Where are landmines and explosive remnants of war most likely to be?					
a) Trenches	b) Battle areas	c) Military posts	d) Checkpoints	e) Abandoned houses	f) Overgrown areas
g) Around airport	h) Roadsides	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.5 What are clues to identify a dangerous area?					
a) Damaged vehicles	b) Damaged houses	c) Remains of ammunition	d) Remains of weapons	e) Overgrown vegetation	f) Unused resources
g) Abandoned area	h) Animal carcass	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.6 Some places that are mined or have explosive remnants of war have been marked. Do you know in what ways people may have marked a dangerous area?					
a) Red sign	b) Red flag	c) Red and white stones	d) Blue and white stones	e) Branches	f) Crossed sticks
g) Circle of stones	h) Pile of stones	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.7 Have you ever heard of the hotline number for reporting landmines and explosive remnants of wars to the demining authorities?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.7.1 If yes, from where?			

3 ATTITUDE

3.1 Who do you think are most at risk from landmines and explosive remnants of war?					
a) Men	b) Women	c) Boys	d) Girls	e) Farmers	f) Hunters
g) Nomads	h) Soldiers	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

3.2 Why do you think people risk going into areas with landmines/explosive remnants of war?					
a) Farming	b) Herding	c) Hunting	d) Collecting firewood	e) Playing	f) Travelling
g) Don't know the area is dangerous	h) Collecting scrap metal	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

3.3 What would you do if you find a landmine or explosive remnant of war?					
a) Burn it	b) Dispose of it	c) Remove it	d) Find another path	e) Keep going	f) Warn others
g) Report it (specify to whom)	h) Don't know	i) No response	j) Other (specify)		

4 BEHAVIOUR

4.1 If you are going to an area that is new to you, how can you avoid a landmine/explosive remnant of war accident?			
a) Only using well-known paths	b) Asking locals where is safe	c) Keep away from suspicious areas	d) Don't know
e) No response	f) Other (specify)		

4.2 What would you do if you think you are in a minefield?				
a) Run away / go back	b) Keep going	c) Stop / stand still	d) Shout for help	e) Retrace my steps
f) Don't know	g) No response	h) Other (specify)		

4.3 What would you do if you saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield?				
a) Run to help them	b) Run away	c) Call for help	d) Get an expert (deminer)	e) Don't know
f) No response	g) Other (specify)			

- END OF QUESTIONNAIRE -

Thank the informant for his/her time and again explain that the information will be used to improve on our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities.

B:KAP SURVEYQUESTIONNAIRE

FOR DATA ENTRY USE ONLY	
Questionnaire Serial Number	Data entry clerk's initials
Date of data entry (date/month/year)	Comments

FOR ENUMERATOR USE ONLY			
Name of enumerator	Date of survey	Serial number	
Province	District	City/town	Village/community
Exact location/venue		Beneficiary type (community people, IDP, returnee)	

INTRODUCTION
1. Introduce yourself to the informant and explain who you are, the organisation you work for and that the purpose of the interview is to collect information, which will allow us to improve our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities. 2. Ask for information about the person you are going to interview. Explain that participation is voluntary and all information is confidential (therefore his/her name will not be asked for). 3. Do not read answers to the informants – check or circle the appropriate replies and write down the answers he/she provides. If the informant provides an answer, which is not listed, make sure to note it.

PERMISSION	
Are you happy to participate in this survey?	
Yes	No
For respondents under the age of 18: Do you as parent or guardian give permission for him/her to participate in the survey?	
Yes	No

1 RESPONDENTDETAILS

1.1 Sex of respondent					
a) Male			b) Female		
1.2 Age of respondent					
a) 6-11	b) 12-17		c) 18-59	d) 60+	
1.3 Household size					
a) 1-4	b) 5-9		c) 10-14	d) 15+	
1.4 How do you perceive the economic situation of your household?					
a) Very poor	b) Poor	c) Average	d) Good	e) Very good	f) Don't know
1.5 What do you do for a living?					
a) Government salary	b) Teacher	c) Farming	d) Animal husbandry	e) Shop keeper	f) NGO employee
g) Military / police / ANSF	h) Scrap metal collection	i) Tailoring	j) Housework / housewife	k) Unemployed	l) Refuse to answer
m) Other (specify)					

1.6 What is the highest educational level that you have reached?				
a) No education	b) Primary school	c) Secondary school	d) Madrasah	e) Technical / vocational school
f) Higher level	g) Religious education	h) University	i) Refuse to answer	j) Other (specify)

1.7 For respondents under the age of 18 only: how regularly do you currently attend school?			
a) I do not attend school	b) 1-2 days per week	c) 3-4 days per week	d) 5 or more days per week

2 KNOWLEDGE

2.1 Have you ever received information about the risks of landmines or explosive remnants of war?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.1.1 If yes, when and from whom?			

2.2 What can landmines and explosive remnants of war do?					
a) Kill	b) Injure	c) Nothing	d) Don't know	e) No response	f) Other (specify)

2.3 What makes a landmine or explosive remnant of war explode?					
a) Touching	b) Handling	c) Stepping on it	d) Moving it	e) Throwing things at it	f) Kicking it
g) Pulling a wire	h) Fire	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.4 Where are landmines and explosive remnants of war most likely to be?					
a) Trenches	b) Battle areas	c) Military posts	d) Checkpoints	e) Abandoned houses	f) Overgrown areas
g) Around airport	h) Roadsides	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.5 What are clues to identify a dangerous area?					
a) Damaged vehicles	b) Damaged houses	c) Remains of ammunition	d) Remains of weapons	e) Overgrown vegetation	f) Unused resources

g) Abandoned area	h) Animal carcass	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)

2.6 Some places that are mined or have explosive remnants of war have been marked. Do you know in what ways people may have marked a dangerous area?					
a) Red sign	b) Red flag	c) Red and white stones	d) Blue and white stones	e) Branches	f) Crossed sticks
g) Circle of stones	h) Pile of stones	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

2.7 Have you ever heard of the hotline number for reporting landmines and explosive remnants of wars to demining organisations?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.7.1 If YES, from where?			
2.8 Are there any health facilities close by your home?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.9 Do you know of any mine/ERW incidents or victims in your community?			
a) Yes	b) No	c) Don't know	d) No response
2.9.1 If, YES, please elaborate: When did it happen? Who was involved? What happened? Any follow up?			

3 ATTITUDE

3.1 What would you do if you encounter a landmine or explosive remnant of war?					
a) Burn it	b) Dispose of it	c) Remove it	d) Find another path	e) Keep going	f) Warn others
g) Report it	h) Mark the area	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)	

3.2 Have you ever encountered landmines or explosive remnants of war?		
a) Yes	b) No	c) No response
3.2.1 If YES, did you report it to anyone?		
a) Yes	b) No	c) No response

3.2.2 If YES, who did you report it to?				
a) Hotline number	b) NGOs	c) Authorities	d) Police	e) Military
f) Elders	g) Parents	h) No response	i) Other (specify)	

3.2.3 If NO, why did you not report it?

3.3 Who do you think should receive information about the risks of landmines or explosive remnants of war?						
a) Men	b) Women	c) Boys	d) Girls	e) Farmers	f) Hunters	g) Nomads

h) Soldiers	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)

3.4 Who do you think are most at risk from landmines and explosive remnants of war?						
a) Men	b) Women	c) Boys	d) Girls	e) Farmers	f) Hunters	g) Nomads

h) Soldiers	i) Don't know	j) No response	k) Other (specify)			
3.5 Have you ever seen anyone touching landmines/explosive remnants of war or entering a dangerous area?						
a) Yes		b) No		c) No response		

3.6 Why do you think people risk going into areas with landmines/explosive remnants of war?				
a) Farming	b) Herding	c) Hunting	d) Collecting firewood	e) Collecting scrap metal
f) Playing	g) Travelling	h) Don't know the area is dangerous	i) Don't know	j) No response
k) Other (specify)				

4 BEHAVIOUR

4.1 If you are going to an area that is new to you, how can you avoid accidents involving landmines/ERW?				
a) Only using well-known paths	b) Asking locals where is safe	c) Keep away from suspicious areas	d) Don't know	d) No response
f) Other (specify)				

4.2 What would you do if you think you are in a minefield?					
a) Run away / go back	b) Keep going	c) Stop / stand still	d) Shout for help	e) Retrace my steps	f) Don't know
g) No response	h) Other (specify)				

4.3 What would you do if you saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield?					
a) Run to help them	b) Run away	c) Call for help	d) Get an expert (deminer)	e) Don't know	f) No response
g) Other (specify)					

4.4 What would you do if you found a landmine or explosive remnant of war close to your house or in your area?					
a) Burn it	b) Remove it	c) Warn others	d) Nothing	e) Don't know	f) No response
g) Ask for help to remove it (specify from whom)					
h) Report is (specify to whom)					

5 PERCEPTION

Explain that you will now read a few statements and ask the informant to say whether he/she

1. Strongly disagree
2. Somewhat disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat agree
5. Strongly agree

5.1 I am aware of landmine/explosive remnants of war contamination in the area where I live				
1	2	3	4	5
People who respond either 4 or 5 should be read the followingstatements				
5.2 I am concerned for my family's safety or for my own safety because of landmines/explosive remnants of wars				
1	2	3	4	5
5.3 People in my community always behave safely with regard to landmine/explosive remnants of war				
1	2	3	4	5
5.4 Agricultural activity or grazing or hunting or collecting natural resources in my community is negatively affected by landmine/explosive remnants of war				
1	2	3	4	5
5.5 I am unable to access services or infrastructures because of landmine/explosive remnants of war contamination				
1	2	3	4	5
5.6 I use the land to make a living				
1	2	3	4	5
5.7 My ability to earn money from the land is negatively affected by landmine/explosive remnants of warcontamination				
1	2	3	4	5
5.8 Some people would enter dangerous areas in order to collect needed resources or to make money for their family				
1	2	3	4	5
5.9 I would enter dangerous areas in order to collect needed resources or to make money for my family				
1	2	3	4	5
5.10 People can be stopped from going into areas with landmines/explosive remnants of war contamination				
1	2	3	4	5
5.11 Better access to livelihoods would stop people from going into areas with landmines/explosive remnants of war				
1	2	3	4	5

– END OF QUESTIONNAIRE –

Thank the informant for his/her time and again explain that the information will be used to improve on our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities.

C:KAP SURVEY FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE: CHILDREN AND YOUTH

FOR DATA ENTRY USE ONLY	
Serial Number	Data entry clerk's initials
Date of data entry (date/month/year)	Comments

FOR ENUMERATOR USE ONLY			
Name of enumerator		Date of FGD	
Province	District	City/town	Village/community
Exact location/venue			
Type of audience: Children in/out of school, children in host communities, internally displaced children, returnee children, etc.			

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduce yourself to the focus group participants and explain who you are, the organisation you work for and that the purpose of the interview is to collect information, which will allow us to improve our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities.
2. Explain that participation is voluntary and all information is confidential (therefore names will not be asked for.
3. Explain that it is important to share opinions freely – and to respect the opinion of others.
4. Ask open questions and allow the focus groups to freely deliberate and discuss.
5. Make comprehensive notes and make sure to capture the main points.
6. Ask probing questions if the focus groups are unclear or if responses are not fully understood.

RESPONDENT DETAILS

#	Sex (male/female)	Age	Education details: Grade / out of school	How long in the community?	Previous RE (yes/no)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Q1) What do you think these items (show posters of landmines/ERW) can do?

Q2) Can you tell me what you would do if you saw one of these items?

Q3) Would you tell anyone if you found one of these items? Who would you tell?

Q4) Have you or anyone in your community ever touched or collected any of these items (see the posters)? If yes, who and why?

Q5) Have you ever heard of any children or young people who had an accident with any of these items (see the posters)? If yes, can you tell us what happened? What was the boy/girl doing when the accident happened?

Q6) How can accidents involving these items be avoided?

Q7) Who do you ask when you have important questions?

Q8) What kind of activities do you undertake during the day?

Q9) Would you like to add anything else?

– END OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION –

Thank the participants for their time

Remember to manage expectations and not make any promises for follow up action

Recap on how information will be used to improve on our work to minimise the dangers posed by mines/ERW

Close the discussion

D:KAP SURVEY FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE: ADULTS

FOR DATA ENTRY USE ONLY	
Serial Number	Data entry clerk's initials
Date of data entry (date/month/year)	Comments

FOR ENUMERATOR USE ONLY			
Name of enumerator		Date of FGD	
Province	District	City/town	Village/community
Exact location/venue			
Type of audience: Local authorities, community leaders, specific livelihood groups (e.g. scrap metal collectors)			

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduce yourself to the focus group participants and explain who you are, the organisation you work for and that the purpose of the interview is to collect information, which will allow us to improve our work to minimise the dangers posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to Afghan communities.
2. Explain that participation is voluntary and all information is confidential (therefore names will not be asked for.
3. Explain that it is important to share opinions freely – and to respect the opinion of others.
4. Ask open questions and allow the focus groups to freely deliberate and discuss.
5. Make comprehensive notes and make sure to capture the main points.
6. Ask probing questions if the focus groups are unclear or if responses are not fully understood.

RESPONDENTDETAILS

#	Sex (male/female)	Age	Occupation	How long in the community?	Previous RE (yes/no)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Q1) Are any of these affecting your community (show posters of landmines/ERW)? How are they affecting your community?

Q2) What are the livelihoods options available to people in your community?

Q3) Do you or anyone in your community collect any of these items (see the posters)? If yes, who and why?

Q4) Have you had any accidents involving any of these items in your community during the past 2 years? If yes, can you describe what happened, who was involved, how it happened? If there were any accidents, did people get injured? If yes, what kind of injuries? Who provided medical assistance?

Q5) Why do you think that accidents involving these items happen?

Q6) What would you say are the activities that put adults at risk from accidents involving these items? Are there any differences between men and women? Are any specific occupational groups more at risk?

Q7) What would you say are the activities that put children at risk from accidents involving these items? Are there any differences between boys and girls, and between children of different ages?

Q8) Tell me about the ways in which the community handle the threat from these items? What do community members do if they come across any of these items?

Q9) Do you have any ideas for how to decrease the risk? Do you have any ideas for how mine/ERW accidents can be avoided?

Q10) What are the best ways to spread awareness in your community? Who are perceived the most trusted and/or

influential individuals in your community? Who do you trust to share important information with you?

Q11) Would you like to add anything else?

– END OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION –

Thank the participants for their time

Remember to manage expectations and not make any promises for follow up action

Recap on how information will be used to improve on our work to minimise the dangers posed by mines/ERW

Close the discussion

E: LIST OF FGDS

KABUL				
S/N	**Date**	**Participants**	**Number**	**Location**
1	21 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs, village elders, cart owners, metal collectors, animal owners, shopkeepers and local workers	10	Sharak Khorasan, Dakhodaidad, 16th District
2	21 Oct 2017	Male children and youth	10	Sharak Khorasan, Dakhodaidad, 16th District
3	22 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives, IDPs	7	Taimani Camp, 4th District
4	22 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, IDPs, out of school	6	Taimani Camp, 4th District
5	22 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs, metal collectors, cart workers and workers	6	Taimani Camp, 4th District
6	22 Oct 2017	Male children and youth	6	Taimani Camp, 4th District
7	23 Oct 2017	Female elders	7	Alokhail, 16th District
8	23 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, in and out of school	6	Alokhail, 16th District
9	23 Oct 2017	Male adults, returnees, metal collectors, animal guards, farmers, elders and village workers	9	Alokhail, 16th District
10	23 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, returnees, metal collectors	8	Alokhail, 16th District
11	24 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives	6	Dashte Padola, Chelsetton, 7th District
12	24 Oct 2017	Female youth, out of school	6	Dashte Padola, Chelsetton, 7th District
13	24 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs	8	Dashte Padola, Chelsetton, 7th District
14	24 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, IDPs	10	Dashte Padola, Chelsetton, 7th District
15	25 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives	6	Saia Benee, Bagrami
16	25 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, in and out of school	6	Saia Benee, Bagrami
17	25 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs and farmers	7	Malik Ghafoor, Saia Benee, Bagrami
18	25 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, IDPs	8	Malik Ghafoor, Saia Benee, Bagrami
19	26 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives	7	Shaieed Moor, Gosfand Dara, Bagrami
20	26 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, IDPs, metal collectors and shepherds	7	Shaieed Moor, Gosfand Dara, Bagrami
21	26 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs, village elders, farmers, construction workers, cart workers, shepherds and shopkeepers	9	Shaieed Moor, Gosfand Dara, Bagrami
22	27 Oct 2017	Male adults, shepherds	7	Alokhail, Bagrami
23	28 Oct 2017	Adult females, animal owners	6	Jelga, Dowazda Emam, Paghman
24	28 Oct 2017	Adult males, community people	8	Jelga, Dowazda Emam, Paghman
HERAT				
S/N	**Date**	**Participants**	**Number**	**Location**
25	22 Oct 2017	Male and female children, host community, IDPs, in and out of school	10	Shaidaee
26	22 Oct 2017	Male adults, workers, unemployed, students	10	Shaidaee
27	23 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives, teachers, toiler	10	Karizak, Engeel
28	23 Oct 2017	Male elders	6	Karizak, Engeel
29	24 Oct 2017	Male elders and authorities	8	Naghan, Firqa Street, Engeel
30	24 Oct 2017	Female elders	8	Naghan, Firqa Street, Engeel
31	25 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, in and out of school	9	Said Abdullah Mukhtar, Engeel
32	25 Oct 2017	Male adults, workers, drivers, unemployed, students	10	Said Abdullah Mukhtar, Engeel
33	26 Oct 2017	Female adults, house wives and students	10	Almedee town, Jebrail, Engeel
34	26 Oct 2017	Adult males and village leader	10	Jebrail, Engeel
35	29 Oct 2017	Female youth, returnees, in school	10	Mujaheddin Town, 12th District
36	29 Oct 2017	Male youth, returnees, in school	8	Mujaheddin Town, 12th District
37	30 Oct 2017	Male children, returnees, in school	8	Jalal Abad Village, Engeel
38	30 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, metal collectors, in and out of school	10	Shaidaee Camp, Engeel
39	30 Oct 2017	Adult males, ranchers, unemployed, head of village	7	Jalal Abad, Engeel
NANGARHAR				
S/N	**Date**	**Participants**	**Number**	**Location**

40	24 Oct 2017	Female adults, returnees	10	Peer Sahib village, Daman, Bahesood
41	24 Oct 2017	Male adults, IDPs	8	Peer Sahib village, Daman, Bahesood
42	24 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, community members	8	Peer Sahib village, Daman, Bahesood
43	24 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, returnees	9	Peer Sahib village, Daman, Bahesood
44	25 Oct 2017	Female adults, community members	9	Darbang, Kama
45	25 Oct 2017	Male adults, farmers	9	Darbang, Kama
46	25 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, community members	8	Darbang, Kama
47	25 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, community members	8	Darbang, Kama
48	26 Oct 2017	Male adults, returnees	8	Khojas Nareng Bagh, Sultanpor, Sorkhroad
49	26 Oct 2017	Female children and youth, returnees	10	Khojas Nareng Bagh, Sultanpor, Sorkhroad
50	26 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, community members, in and out of school	8	Zulum Abad, Sorkhroad
51	28 Oct 2017	Female adults, community members	8	Zulum Abad, Sorkhroad
52	28 Oct 2017	Male children and youth, metal collectors	8	Sorkhroad Dwo Saraka, Sorkhroad