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Afghanistan

National mine awareness evaluation (MAE)

Neil Andersson, Charles Whitaker and Aparna Swaminathan

AFGHANISTAN

THE 1997 NATIONAL MINE AWARENESS EVALUATION

Neil Andersson, Charles Whitaker and Aparna Swaminathan CIETinternational November 1998

Table of Contents

Map of Afghanistan with sites cover page
Table of Contents $\ldots \ldots \ldots i$
List of Tables ii
List of Figuresii
Terms used iii
Acknowledgments iv

SUMMARY

Coverage of mine awareness programmes v
Knowledge of minesv
Time trends vi
Type of injury vi
Mine security vi
Mine smart behaviour vi
Reporting of mine incidents vii
Mine committeesvii
Endogenous mine smart systems viii
Recommendations viii

The baseline indicators x	ii
---------------------------	----

INTRODUCTION

Background 1
The UNOCHA Mine Action Programme 1
UNOCHA partners 2
The CIET mine smart framework 7
A measured approach to mine awareness 10
Statement of purpose 11

METHODS

The MAE cross-design	11
The sample	12
Process: activities and deliverables	13

The study population	14
Endogenous mine smartness	15
Mine events and social costs	21
Time trends of mine events	21
Child injuries and death	22
The BBC and mine awareness	
Coverage	24
Impact	24
Children and the BBC	27
Direct mine awareness training	
Coverage	28
Impact	30
Participation	36
Reporting	37
Training of children	39
Programme synergies	41
Household food economy	43
Recommendations	44
Curricular reform	45
Combine direct training and BBC	45
Focus on women	46
Endogenous mine smart systems	48
Mine action tracking & results orient	ed
management	49
Bibliography	51
Technical Annexes	52

List of Tables

Tab	le	Page		List of Figures	
The	baseline indicators	xii	Figu	ire Page	3
1	UNOCHA partners	. 6	Map	o of 96 sites cover pag	ge
2 3 4 5 6 7	Population and household data Physical injuries of mine victims Audience and radio use Impact of New Home New Life Supporting mine smart behaviour The effect of training	 15 20 24 25 35 35 	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Coverage of mine awareness partners Time trends in communities CIET model of mine smartness Demographic structure (MAE 1997) 1 Demographic structure (MICS 1996) 1 Reasons for going into mined area 1 Household activities at risk 1 Main thing needed for mine smartness 1 Local solutions to mine problems 1 Who promotes mine awareness 1 Have you heard about mines from	v vi 7 14 14 17 18 18 18
8	Food supply and reserve	43	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	Who best helps to understand2Rate of mine incidents2Time trends in 86 communities2Mortality and injury from mines2Urban/rural contributions to trends2What was s/he doing at the time2Time trends and the BBC2Main lessons from the BBC2Which story do you remember best2Children: What did you learn2Coverage of MA partners2Wife's source of information2Time trends in partner communities3Coverage in mined areas3Mine security and direct training3	20 21 21 22 23 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 33

28

29 30

31 32

33

Did not learn anything (region) 34 Main lessons in affected areas 34

To whom would you report39% who would not report39

Farmers who go into known fields 41 How likely is an accident 42

TERMS USED IN THIS REPORT

Terms are listed to assist readers; they are specific for this report and may differ in other situations

ACBL	Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines					
ARI	Ansar Relief Institute (formerly the Refugees Relief Group of Ansar)					
ATC	Afghan Technical Consultants					
BBC AED	British Broadcasting Corporation Afghan Education Drama					
CBMAP	Community-based Mine Awareness Project					
CIET	Community Information, Empowerment and Transparency, group of non-profit NGOs charities and institutes dedicated to building the community voice into planning (http://www.ciet.org)					
Food security	Sufficient food and prospects of sufficient food. In this survey several indicators were used, including sufficient food last week, food purchase and sale/trade of household goods for food					
НІ	Handicap International					
IDPs	Internally displaced people in the area a) since the war began and b) for less than four years					
LEP	Landmine Education Programme, an initiative of Save the Children Federation, Inc, USA					
MAE	Mine awareness evaluation					
MAPA	Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan					
МСРА	Mine Clearance Planning Agency					
МСР	Mine Clearance Programme					
MDC	Mine Detection Dog Centre					
OMAR	Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation					
RRGA	Refugees Relief Group of ANSAR					
SC/US	Save the Children Federation Inc. USA					
SCS	Sentinel community surveillance, sentinel community surveys, CIET methods					
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance					
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan					

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We gratefully acknowledge the important contributions of the 9,124 heads of household who described their experience. Nearly 500 mine /UXO victims provided information on the circumstances of their accident. We are also grateful to the 849 men who participated in 86 focus groups, the 915 children who joined in 86 group interviews and 42 women in the seven women's focus groups.

The success of this evaluation rests with the 39 field workers who laboured diligently, frequently in difficult conditions. Special recognition is due to the three field coordinators and nine supervisors for their effective facilitation.

The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA) field staff contributed considerably in the feedback workshops, as did the BBC Afghan Education Drama Project, Save the Children Federation Inc, Handicap International and the Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation.

Between the fieldwork in December 1997 and the report to UNOCHA on 4 May 1998 (revision 6 July), there were substantial advances in the coverage and programme content of each of the partner organisations. For this reason, little is made of exact coverage levels of the UNOCHA implementing partners. More emphasis is placed on the obstacles and opportunities.

Technical support for fieldwork, analysis and reporting was provided by Charles Whitaker, Aparna Swaminathan and Neil Andersson; the present report does not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations or of its implementing partners in Afghanistan.

The 1997 Afghanistan mine awareness evaluation was commissioned and partly funded by UNOCHA.

THE AFGHANISTAN MINE AWARENESS EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The purpose of the 1997 Afghanistan national mine awareness evaluation (MAE) was to estimate the *coverage* of awareness activities and the effectiveness of different training modalities in terms of levels of knowledge, behaviour and reduction of risk. It aimed to provide a baseline for measuring the impact of mine awareness initiatives, while building local skills and a community interface that encourages sustainability. It examined the performance of four UNOCHA partners in mine action in Afghanistan: the BBC New Home New Life programme, OMAR, Save the Children Federation USA and Handicap International. The data produced and the operational interface with the communities can facilitate fine-tuning of mine action over the coming years, benchmarked across to a reduction in the social costs of land mines. A flexible mine action tracking scheme is proposed to promote results-based management of mine action.

Coverage of the UNOCHA mine awareness programme: Mine awareness training of the direct training organisations is convincingly concentrated in the areas where more land mine/UXO victims live. No less than 42% of the sample live where direct mine awareness training was conducted - although not all of these received direct training. Only 7.6% of respondents (10.5% in mine affected areas) indicated they had received direct training. No less than 22% of all respondents said their children had received mine awareness education in school. Some 59% of the householders (54% in mine affected areas) said their wives had no source of information on mine awareness. Around one in 20 household respondents (6.3%) knew of a mine committee, supposed to be a mainstay of the awareness programmes of two of the direct training Figure 1 partners.

Some 43% of householders said they did not own radios: nonetheless, 49% of all households said they listen to the BBC "with ease" and, of these, 93% listen to the soap opera New Home New Life. The actual coverage including partial access to radios of relatives and neighbours is probably higher: "listenership with ease" was used to estimate the likely coverage from a mine awareness stand-point. Figure 1 shows the coverage of direct training and the BBC.

Knowledge of mine fields: Roughly one in ten households (9%) thought there were mines where,

Evidence base of the evaluation

57,287 people in 9,124 households

486 mine victims 42 women in 7 focus groups 849 men in 86 focus aroups 915 children in 86 group interviews

Coverage of mine awareness partner programmes Direct training and BBC



according to the MAPA informants, there were none. Some 73% of respondents who knew areas were affected said these had been marked with red stones.

Time trends in mine/UXO events: After an increase corresponding with the return of refugees and internally displaced people in 1992, there has been a marked fall-off in the number of mine/UXO events (deaths or injury of an individual) reported by households interviewed in late 1997 (Figure 2). The sites where direct training occurs do not show the same decline (dotted line) as is seen in sites where no direct training occurs; there is even a suggestion of an *increase* in numbers of mine/UXO events (individuals affected) in these

Figure 2

Time trends in communities of direct training programmes (number of events that happened each year) contrasted with communities where there no UNOCHA partner works



communities over recent years. The time trend of among those who listen to the BBC is quite different: their risk of suffering a mine or UXO accident dropped markedly after 1994, when the programme started including mine awareness messages (portrayed in Figure 18, in the body of the report).

Type of injury: There is evidence of a transition in type of injury where the direct training partners work. Since the programmes began (1991 for OMAR and April 1996 for SC/US and HI), there has been an increase in injuries to the upper limbs in programme sites compared with non-programme sites. In part, this is because the awareness training was targeted to the worst off sites, many of which have since been cleared of mines but perhaps leaving some UXO. Another part of the explanation could be that some components of the current mine awareness training include "mine stuff" – the technical details of the different types of mines – perhaps stimulating interest in how they work and how they are disarmed. It is possible that this type of education leads to increased interest or confidence in handling mines, unintentionally encouraging people to tamper with them¹.

Mine security: People with mine awareness education have a measurably greater sense of "mine security". Considering only those respondents from communities known to be affected by land mines, someone exposed to both training and the BBC was significantly more likely to feel he could never be affected by a mine accident than someone who heard the BBC alone or someone who had received neither type of education (44% compared with 39% and 23% respectively). Among those receiving direct training in mined areas, 42% said they learnt about alternatives to entering or using the mined areas.

¹ The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) does not train for removing or disarming mines. The programme has a policy of destruction of mines *in situ* for reasons of safety and quality assurance.

Mine smart behaviour: Those who received both direct training and messages through the BBC were significantly less likely to think someone other than a professional deminer was brave to go into a mine field. In this survey, one per cent of households (n90) had someone who had attempted "informal demining". This practice of informal demining was prominent in the 1994 survey² as a risk factor for mine accidents; it seems to have all but disappeared by 1997.

Considering only those who knew the mines to be there, people who had both received direct training and who heard the BBC programme were

Five characteristics of mine smartness

- 1. People do things differently to be safer from mines;
- 2. They are aware of mines/UXOs in their community;
- 3. Mine smart people tell others about the dangers;

4. Mine smart people believe events are sufficiently noteworthy to warrant *reporting,* and

5. People see it as a way of *building security* in their lives and community.

significantly less likely to go into a given field known to be mined, than those who had only heard the BBC or those who received education from neither source. This difference in risk taking is not easily explained as an effect of poverty or occupation, since the additive effect of exposure to the BBC and direct training remains in particular occupational and social groups, like the unemployed, farmers or traders. Four of the seven women interview groups said the main reasons people went into mined areas was a lack of knowledge about the dangers or presence of mines. A women's group suggested that one might knowingly go into mined areas to commit suicide.

Reporting of mine incidents: The foundation stone of a preventive strategy is to give weight to every single incident. A specific performance criterion for the MAPA is the rate of accurate reports from high risk areas. In this survey, most say they would report to the malik or mullah (55%) or the shurra (18%); 24% say they would report to the mine action agency in the area. Those who received both training and

messages through the BBC *New Home New Life* were significantly more likely to report a mine event; someone who heard the BBC but did not receive training, in turn, was more likely to report than someone who received no mine awareness education.

Mine Committees: There were many communities which "officially" had mine committees where neither respondents nor focus groups recognised their existence. Overall, 6.3% (n574) of household respondents said they knew of a mine committee. Whatever their theoretical coverage (the 6.3% were scattered through 34% of the sample communities), this is probably an indicator of *effective* coverage of committees at the time of the evaluation.

Does direct training work?

UMine-smart behaviours (avoidance strategies) are improved in sites where SC/US is active

U Someone in a partner site is more likely to learn from the BBC than in a site with no UNOCHA partners (85% compared with 74%)

Y Mine events are more common in sites that had direct training, and have *increased* there since the programmes began

YCommunity participation is not facilitated; very few people know about mine committees and most depend on external initiation of mine action

² Andersson N, Palha C, Paredes S. Social costs of land mines in four countries. British Medical Journal 1995,311;718-721.

Excluding places where less than 1.5% of respondents among the 100-120 interviewed in each site had heard of a mine committee, 16 out of the 86 communities (19%) had a committee, covering a sample of 1705 people. In the 16 communities with this minimal recognition of the existence of a committee, respondents were significantly more likely to suggest sharing information with other community members (17% compared with 9%). It seems plausible that committees, where these exist, could increase the social currency of mine awareness in some way. Asked how the mine committee helped them to behave safely in mined areas, 80%^{nu} of the 6.3%^{nu} who recognised committees said they were helpful. Despite this positive marker, not many saw committees as the main way when asked "how to improve mine smartness"; only 5.6% of respondents spontaneously suggested starting mine committees. When asked "How do you think people here can solve the problem of mines?", only 0.4% suggested starting a mine committee.

The enquiry into the functioning of mine committees raises a question of definition; for at least one implementing partner, a "committee" might be a single mine awareness promoter they trained. Community members probably think of a committee as several people. In the present evaluation, this more usual interpretation was used, particularly because of the interest in how mine smartness might tie into questions of governance.

Increased participation and endogenous mine-smart systems: MAPA explicitly promotes "community participation" and involvement in the establishment of community-based priorities for threat elimination projects. From the present evaluation, this aspect of the programme is yet to mature. For example, in mine affected areas, 37% of participants in direct training sessions said they could not ask questions during the training. There are only weak suggestions of direct training finding multiplication factors between different partners' programmes and delivery modalities. Although 78% in mine affected areas said they could explain their training to others, only 0.6% say they "tell others" after receiving training.

In the communities themselves, there is a continued and explicit reliance on externally motivated initiatives; when asked what was needed to improve mine-smart behaviour, 74% of respondents said courses were the main thing needed to improve awareness and, to solve the problem of mines, 22% say "keeping contact with demining agencies" is the main way.

It is hard to talk of community participation while excluding more than 50% of the population, the women. The UNOCHA programme at the time of this evaluation made little attempt to reach women, even given the constraints in Afghanistan today. Since the evaluation, a tiny woman-to-women direct training programme has been started by OMAR in Kabul, where it is not most needed but where funding is available. This complements OMAR's longer standing women's classes in clinics and home tents in IDP camps. This is symbolic of what needs to happen in the country at large.

Summary recommendations

Broadly speaking, there is evidence to suggest that MAPA does contribute to reduction of the risk of mines and UXOs (it is targeted to the worst-off areas, it is associated with an increased confidence, knowledge of the presence of mines, mine smart behavior and reporting of mines). More importantly, it does this under extremely difficult field conditions and a culture that is not at all conducive to evidence-based planning. The contribution to risk reduction, however, is not evenly spread between the partners and, like many if not all successful programmes, there is space for improvement.

1. Curricular reform

There is convincing evidence that the direct training delivery mode and content behind the current baseline rates should be overhauled as a matter of some urgency. A revision was already under way, at least on paper, by the time of this evaluation. All three direct training partners had interesting and even impressive proposals for renovation of their curricula. The following is intended, therefore, more as a checklist of what should be happening than as new recommendations.

a. A shift is needed from the current supply-led "sharing what we know about mines" to evidence-led promotion of mine-smart behaviour. Despite the best motivation in the world, what the demining agencies know so well is not the foremost substance of mine-smart behaviour. A renewed focus on local evidence of risk – just who was doing what when afflicted by the mine/UXO – could make a more fertile substrate for direct training.

b. The perplexing association between direct training and tampering with mines/UXOs could be related to a curricular emphasis on mine stuff (technical details on the type of mines, their respective capabilities and how they work). A new and more productive focus for direct training might be, for example, how to convince others about mine-smart behaviour ("How would you explain this to your wife and children?")

c. The delivery mode employed in most direct training in Afghanistan is currently being transformed. There is considerable awareness in UNOCHA and its implementing partners that the classic expertdelivery "classroom" lecture is outmoded. There is a need for a more interactive process based more on the experience of participants, encouraging questions (37% of respondents in mine affected areas said they could not ask questions during direct training sessions) and participation in solutions.

2. Combine local training and the BBC

Direct training combined with the BBC proves to be more effective than either of these modalities on its own. It makes sense to promote the complementarity between these two educational thrusts. UNOCHA is already involved in the script development process, and coordination of the timing and content of BBC broadcasts and direct training initiatives. The soap opera is complemented by educational compilations, single story extracts that are combined with relevant interviews, and made available to agencies involved in training and awareness programmes. A cartoon magazine offers the soap opera in print, making it easy for listeners to refer to. These materials could be used in direct training exercises.

3. Focus on women

Consistent with a wide range of development objectives, several channels are currently being opened to include women in mine awareness training. Only in part is this a question of getting them the information they need on mines; just as important is the *fact* that they are getting the information, that they are seen to be sufficiently important to be targeted with the information.

a. In addition to its women's classes in health

...programme synergy

 those with BBC and direct training were more likely to report a mine incident less likely to think it brave to go into a minefield less likely to go into a known minefield had more confidence

- those with direct training were more likely to tamper with mines – but this effect is to a large extent neutralised by listening to the BBC. clinics and home tents in IDP camps, OMAR has launched, thus far at symbolic levels of coverage and only in Kabul, its woman-to-women direct training programme. This could have early lessons for rollout to a level where it could have an impact on mine awareness.

b. Men in focus groups and household interviews said that they themselves could be an information channel for women to learn more about mines and UXO. This could be addressed with the development of messages that men can pass on to their wives and daughters. These could be mutually reinforced through a combination of BBC and direct training. It may be possible to facilitate and even to augment this channel of communication if mullahs were to advocate protection of women from mines as part of religious duty; some mullahs interviewed in this evaluation said clearly that this was the case.

c. Access to radios: The BBC is currently the most important and effective channel to inform the socially isolated women in Afghanistan about mine awareness. Yet 43% of households had no radios. If it was possible for the supply of radios to target women in mine affected areas, this could pay substantial dividends. Despite well founded reservations on the matter, in this survey lack of batteries was only rarely given as a reason for not listening to the radio. There is considerable international experience with battery-free windup radios.

d. The 915 children interviewed showed a lively interest in the subject of mines/UXOs, and they offer an inexpensive and socially acceptable channel of communication to their mothers and sisters. Child-to-child and child-to-community initiatives could conceivably be added to the programmes offered by each of the implementing partners. School-based programmes do have the disadvantage of leaving out the girls, since they do not attend school. Given the added coverage gained for the cost, this evaluation considers that school-based child-to-family programmes might be a valuable complement. By drawing attention to the gender issues in landmine events, it may be possible to stimulate mine smartness among boy children while at the same time reiterating and thereby reinforcing the value of women.

4. Reinforce endogenous mine-smartness systems

One of the groups of baseline indicators used in this evaluation had to do with passing on the messages of mine awareness to others. In the main, little priority was given to this by respondents. It is possible that the land mine issue is so "obvious" – a feature of living in Afghanistan for the last two decades – that people are not in the habit of talking about it or developing their endogenous coping and smartness systems.

In each of the communities, there are endogenous reference points of mine smartness. Some 70%^{nu} of respondents said they informed the mullahs, maliks and shurras when they became aware of any mine events. Of those who said there was someone in their community promoting mine awareness, 73%^{nu} said it was the mullah. One in every six (17%) said they had heard about mines from the mullahs, but only one in ten say the mullah best helps them to understand mine smartness. These key local opinion makers have often been left out of the loop in much of the mine awareness training. HI has a strong position in favour of linking mine awareness with the local religious structures; a consistent approach on this issue by all the mine awareness agencies could pay high dividends for the programme.

One of the main mechanisms for reinforcing messages after the direct training by mine awareness trainers, is through the formation of mine committees. HI and OMAR both have this as a strong part of their programmes. In practice, the committees are not widely recognised by the communities and there is a

need to revisit the implementation process for establishing and maintaining mine committees. The loose definition used by HI - a teacher or a mullah can be the one-person "committee" – may be the closest to a working approach in the present conditions in Afghanistan. The idea should be to link any training opportunity with an endogenous resource, perhaps setting aside the notion that committees are possible or sustainable.

Perhaps the foundation for an endogenous mine smart system is income generation. There is ample evidence in this evaluation to link mine/UXO events to limited economic opportunities. Although it may not initially seem the obvious line of action of a mine awareness agency, development and particularly communication about income generation alternatives should be considered. In discussing the results of this evaluation, it was suggested by the BBC team that they look at ways to do this through the media available to them. To make a contribution in the domain of alternative income generation, it is not necessary that an agency actually open credit schemes or hire vocational trainers. There is a role for a communications initiative focussing on alternatives.

5. A mine action tracking system

Each of the partners has an internal review or supervisory monitoring process that complies with the letter if not the spirit of their agreement with UNOCHA. Voluminous data are available on the activities carried out and the numbers of people contacted by mine awareness activities. In all three cases, the sheer scale of reported activity is impressive. However, the data were difficult to interpret and more difficult to relate to programme impact. The present evaluation, for all the positive results, demonstrates how an impact is not always the one expected.

Any evaluation carries a risk that not all will turn out to be as it should do. The fact that UNOCHA undertook this evaluation speaks of its commitment to programme transparency and to optimal use of its programme resources. The challenge now will be to keep the door open for change, to encourage the partners to act on the actionable results of the evaluation, to benchmark the progress and to hold up the gains as these are achieved.

If the programme can be retooled to address more fully the issue of mine smartness, the tools exist to monitor progress in changing attitudes and practices. The use of these results to guide programme implementation and continued adjustment is the substance of results-based management of mine smartness.

- **The baseline**: The present baseline establishes indicators of awareness and strategies to promote mine smart behaviour.
- **Participation of mine affected communities and individuals in the process**: the method used in the MAE and in CIET's mine action tracking (MAT) approach is to obtain data in a way that precipitates effective local action. There is a need for ongoing community input for developing locally effective communication channels to promote mine safety.
- **Benchmarking progress**: On-going monitoring of mine affected communities through repeat surveys of these communities allows the MAT to detect gains, "levelling-out" or ineffectiveness of mine action initiatives. Decreases in mine injuries and land loss, as a consequence of mine awareness and mine clearance activities, can help to re-target operations.

D. Delivery mode and content will

determine whether programme has

influence via endogenous system or

separately

- Mine action end points: There will not be an end to the need for mine action in Afghanistan in the immediate future. From a donor's point of view, however, it is necessary to detect levelling out of gains of programmes -- as repeat surveys detect a falloff of gains of awareness training. Thus, ineffective programs can be stopped and effective ones reinforced in order to optimise investments.
- Social audit and governance: Strong messages about results-based management can be conveyed from systematic monitoring of the impact of mine action. Registering of every case gives them importance; in this way case, messages can be conveyed about the social and human value of women and children.

Figure 3 The CIET model of mine smartness

- A. Several local factors build smartness
- people see their neighbours affected
- local promoters draw their attention to risks
- they might have a strong sense of security
- they may do a risk-benefit analysis, weighing up



Baseline indicators of mine smartness

These baseline indicators are established with an explicit view to followup. As programmes address mine smartness with increasing effectiveness over time, it should be possible to demonstrate change in a wide range of these indicators. Where possible, weighted estimates are used, which in some cases produces a slightly different figure to the unweighted estimates in the main text. A fuller list of weighted indicators is provided in Table A27.

The sample	
	17% urban, 76% rural and 7% in IDP camps ^{nu}
	486 mine victims ^{nu} 42 women in 7 focus groups ^{nu} 849 men in 86 focus groups ^{nu} 915 children in 86 group interviews ^{nu}
Endogenous mine smartness	 73% consider none of their daily household activities risky^{nw} 85% say no-one promotes mine awareness^{nw} 36% say warning others is the main solution^{nw}
Coverage of mine awareness programmes	
Radio use	
Have you heard about mines from	
Source that best helps you understand safety	
Is the area marked (red stones)	\ldots
In the direct training	
Wife's source of information on mines and,	of the remainder 59% say their wives had no source ^{nu} 16% say New Home New Life ^{nu} 3% say children ^{nu}
Main mine awareness lessons learned	

Impact

Mine victims	4.8% of households had at least one affected ^{nu} 486 victims, details on 471 ^{nu} 75% under 35 years ^{nu} 90% male ^{nu}
Activity at time of mine accident 600 4	% of children were herding, gathering or in agriculture ^{nu} 9% of adults were herding, gathering or in agriculture ^{nu}
Mine smart behaviour	
Difference in behaviour after direct training	$\dots \dots 10\%$ say they will not enter a marked area ^{ma}
Reasons for going to mined area	
Household food economy	
Participation	
Mine committees	
What is needed to improve mine smartness	
How people can help solve the problem	
Risky household activities due to mines	
Reporting	
Reporting mines	

The 1997 Afghanistan Mine Awareness Evaluation

Background

Mines and UXOs are the enemy of humanity Male focus group, Obeh, Herat, 1997

Afghanistan is said to be one of the most mine affected countries in the world, with an estimated 777 square kilometers of land contaminated by an unknown number of

land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)³. By the end of 1997, 324 square kilometers were identified as high priority areas, with immediate impact on people's lives such as residential areas, commercial areas, agricultural land, irrigation canals, roads and grazing areas⁴. Of the 324 square kilometers of priority area, 133 square km had been cleared. The rate of clearance has been around 20 square kilometers per year, going up to 32 square kilometers in 1997.

This is the legacy of the Soviet occupation and the war between Afghan government troops and the Mujahedeen. "Mines were not only used for conventional military purposes, but as a part of the Soviet strategy to depopulate villages to prevent effective support for the Mujahedeen. Mines were...laid in houses, irrigation systems, agricultural land and grazing areas, as well as conventional military purposes on roads and around military establishments. The widespread presence of mines is recognized as one of the main obstacles to the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of the war-torn country."⁵

The unexpected and dramatic expansion of the Taliban movement affected the mine action programme in Afghanistan in several ways. On the positive side, the expansion provided access to formerly high security regions south of Kabul and Bagrami. This allowed the identification of a 100 square kilometers of high priority mined areas for clearance. Recent fighting between the northern alliance and the Taliban is estimated to have contaminated at least 14 square kilometers of this area. Further contaminated areas are likely as access is gained to the front lines established in Badghis and north of Kabul⁶. While the situation opened new areas to the local people, the fighting in 1996 added to the mines. Many of the new minefields were laid to restrict access along major routes to Kabul city. These routes are essential for the supply of food and fuel to Kabul. The Programme cleared these routes as a priority measure.

The UNOCHA Mine Action Programme

UNOCHA's Mine Action Programme began in 1989, known initially as the "Operation Salaam" Demining Programme. Later the initiative developed into the UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme (MCP), conducting mine clearance in Afghanistan and offering mine awareness training in country and to refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and at border crossing points. In mid-1997, the Programme officially became known as UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA), to reflect its breadth and the integrated nature of its activities.

In recent years, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines provided a spur to international interest in land mines. This campaign has renewed focus on the problem in Afghanistan, resulting in more NGOs becoming involved in mine action in Afghanistan. These new players have developed and delivered

³UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme Annual Report. UNOCHA 1997

⁴ UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme Annual Report UNOCHA 1997 p.1

⁵ Mine Clearance Planning Agency Report of the National Survey of Mines. MCPA 1993, foreword

⁶ UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme Annual Report UNOCHA 1996.

differing approaches to mine action expanding the breadth and depth of activities in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the programme focus shifted from "demining" to "mine action" with more emphasis on empowering communities and the development of a national capacity to manage the mines problem in Afghanistan⁷.

Thus the goals of the mine awareness component of the Mine Action Programme were expressed as:

- to make mine awareness education available to Afghan people, refugees awaiting repatriation and any person visiting or working in Afghanistan;
- to establish and maintain a system of community-based committees that can provide a broadbased, sustainable education on mines. The system must be able to educate target groups on the threat, threat avoidance strategies, and reporting of contamination and other mine action related data; and
- the development and maintenance of a system for reporting the location of areas contaminated by mines and other explosive devices.

Some of the *strategies for mine awareness* include:

- Continuously develop and carry out education and information initiatives for vulnerable groups at all levels through media broadcasts and decentralized projects.
- Continuously develop and support community-based mine awareness projects focused on empowering local communities to carry out mine avoidance strategies, high risk area reporting procedures and the maintenance of high risk area warning systems.
- Provide high quality threat awareness education to all target groups including local communities, returning refugees, staff of aid organizations, visitors, etc.
- Develop and support an institutional mine awareness capability.

Performance indicators set by the mine awareness programme include:

- the number of people who receive mine awareness education;
- a reduction in injuries attributable to the application of avoidance strategies;
- increased participation in self-help programmes for mine awareness and involvement in the establishment of community-based priorities for threat elimination projects; and
- increase in the quantity of accurate reports of high risk areas.

UNOCHA partners

NGOs with extensive and growing experience make up the operational network of UNOCHA's mine awareness programme. Table 1 provides a summary of information collected though structured interviews (Annex) and literature provided by each of the partner organisations.

Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS)⁸

The ARCS was funded through UNOCHA until the first quarter of 1996, providing mine awareness education through school and government offices in Kabul. Due to military and political events, the

⁷ UNOCHA Mine Action Programme Corporate Strategy, 1997. Background.

⁸Interview with Mr. Mohammed Akbar Ferozi (Manager) and Dr. Hakimi (Director and ICRC Liaison), Kabul, September 1997

project was not able to achieve anticipated results⁹. It operates only in Kabul, following a programme similar to that of OMAR. It is now funded by the ICRC.

Ansar Relief Institute

Formerly known as the Refugees Relief Group of Ansar (RRGA), the ARI works in the border exit stations (BESs) in Dogharoun, Gargharouk and Milak on the border with Iran. It is thought that returning refugees might spread their knowledge and awareness of mine risks. The project sought to expose huge numbers (500,000 in 1996) of returning refugees to mine awareness. Attempts were made to identify these in the present evaluation. In 1997 they trained 150,000 trainees. The logistical and practical difficulties of traveling to Iran excluded ARI from the institutional review phase of the evaluation. Returnees trained by their schemes were, however, contacted in the sentinel communities. Following the monitoring mission of the Director of UNOCHA in July 1998, support for the ARI project will be wound down and cease by December 1998.

BBC-Afghan Education Drama Project¹⁰

The popular *New Home New Life* radio soap opera was launched in 1994 with prominent land-mine themes. The programme promotes the safe return home of displaced people and refugees, and the resumption of essential economic activities. A special focus is the reduction of the civilian casualties caused by carelessness or ignorance. Another objective is to enhance good relations between Afghan communities and the demining teams. In addition it includes a range of messages on health, education, agriculture, income generation, environment, gender equity, conflict resolution, security and mine awareness. The messages are reinforced through a comic book introduced by this project. National radio broadcasts the programme in Pashto and Dari, three times a week.

The soap opera messages are reinforced by topical documentary radio programmes that cover all aspects, including the necessary technical details, of themes explored in *New Home New Life*. These educational radio features also go out on a weekly basis in both Dari and Pashto, from the BBC Persian and Pashto Services. The programme includes interviews with people inside Afghanistan, mine victims and experts on demining and mine awareness. The soap opera is further complemented by educational compilations, single story extracts that are combined with relevant interviews, made available to agencies involved in training and awareness programmes. A cartoon magazine offers the soap opera in print, making it easy for listeners to refer to. Key messages are given in simple language and bold format, to facilitate understanding by children and those with limited literacy.

Handicap International (HI)¹¹

Working in the south of the country, HI uses a two-tiered community-based approach whereby their *nomaindas* train mines committees, who in turn are intended to reinforce local mine awareness with the support of locally formed mine committees. The major programme of HI is its pilot Community-based

⁹ ARCS 1996 Annual Report, p. 6.

¹⁰Interview with Director, Mr Shirazuddin Siddiqi, Peshawar, 10 November 1997.

¹¹ Interview with Mr Roland Prevot, the Mine Awareness Co-ordinator (Ice Factory in Kandahar), 6 November 1997.

Mine Awareness Project (CBMAP). This pilot began on 1 April, 1996 in the Dand District of Kandahar, and was funded by UNHCR, Stichting Vluchteling and UNOCHA. The project has established some 48 mine committees which have provided awareness education and contributed to improving mine incident and minefield data collection in the target areas.

Important to targeting of the HI programme is that CBMAP communities were identified on the basis of local community representatives willing to deliver and capable of coordinating mine awareness messages to their communities. Some 48 of these committees had been formed by the evaluation at the end of 1997, a handful of them in communities included in the panel of evaluation sites. To the end of June 1998, well after the completion of the field evaluation, the project had established some 304 mine "committees" (of which 278 were still active by that time). There is discussion of expansion of the number of mine committees into other districts of Kandahar and placing more emphasis on the nomad communities.

Part of HI's programme involves the adaptation of teaching methods to the Taliban Islamic context. In 1996, according to its Annual Report, HI reported training 25,103 people in one of the most highly contaminated districts of Afghanistan (UNOCHA Annual Report, 1996, p6-7). The training content and delivery mode are in essence lectures, with strong emphasis on types of mines. There is a monthly reporting process that allows for continued contact with the "committees". The tasks of the community-based trained volunteer mine committees include:

- inform all newcomers (nomads, returnees) about the mine situation in the area
- provide mine awareness information to the community on a regular basis
- gather information on mines/UXOs and mine accidents in the area; communicate them to UNOCHA
- refer patients to orthopaedic and prosthetic workshops
- possibly help someone out of a mined area and provide first aid for injury
- possibly conduct, in cooperation with demining agencies, very basic demining operations

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)¹²

OMAR conducts mine awareness training through 14 mine awareness teams. In 1996, these teams reportedly provided mine awareness to approximately 218,000 people. In doing so, OMAR distributed mine awareness notebooks, mine posters, silkscreens, mine identification books and mines visual story books. The materials were designed to assist people who have received training to subsequently provide information and education messages to other family members and friends. For 1997 the target number for training was 300,000 people.

Another approach used by OMAR is to establish volunteer committees in selected high priority areas throughout the country. The community based approach is intended to improve the quality of mine awareness messages and to develop a capacity to continue education long after the initial trainers have left contaminated areas. It should also provide the basis for increased and improved involvement of communities in other mine action activities such as the identification and reporting of mined areas and the establishment of local priorities for further mine action assistance.

Recently the OMAR "expert delivery" format of community lectures has come under revision to facilitate a more community-friendly approach. OMAR pays local "volunteers" US\$50 per month for three months,

¹² Interview with Mr. Zekria Payab, Operations Officer OMAR, Peshawar, 10 November 1997.

which allows them to get started at short notice and to demonstrate an active programme during this intensive start-up period. Sustainability is the key issue, as trainers withdraw from the community and the recruits go back to earning a living from other sources. One third to one half of the UNOCHA support for OMAR was spent in the central region, though activities were funded in the east, south, west and north.

Save the Children Federation (USA)¹³

SC/US conducts landmine education sessions for children through a variety of mechanisms:

If we involve children in the process, we can expect success. If we save children, they will save us. *SC/US, Kabul*

Emergency Response Team: 15 male facilitators,

including one Kuchi (nomad)/IDP team, work in four of the highly mined areas of Kabul City. In each of these areas, SC/US opened a sub-office to provide a presence in high risk areas. The Kuchi/IDP team works in the eastern part of Kabul and other Kuchi/IDP settled areas. These teams conduct two sessions a day, each about two hours in duration. Facilitators operate in pairs and follow a lesson plan for each session. As part of the lesson plan, one facilitator shares his or her own experience of being injured in a mine explosion (many trainers are themselves mine/UXO victims). During the course of a year, to reinforce the messages, children might participate in several sessions.

Hospitals and Clinics: landmine education is one of a number of psycho-social/creative activities which 18 female facilitators conduct in four hospitals and eight clinics in Kabul City. The curriculum covers 4-5 sessions, each an hour in length. In each of these sessions, children do separate activities related to the risks of mines/UXOs. Children have the opportunity to participate in several sessions; as in-patients, they might be participants for several consecutive days.

Children's Network: This network is a pilot project which uses child-to-child teaching methods to transfer landmine education messages. Two female facilitators and 14 volunteers, called branch leaders, conduct one sessions a week with groups of children in one of the districts (District 9). Their curriculum follows that used in hospitals and clinics by SC/US, but with the inclusion of more creative activities such as reciting poems, story-writing, and role plays.

Safe playgrounds: As of September, 1997, 15 playgrounds in mine/UXO-free areas had been constructed for children in Kabul City. SC/US reported training 42,073 beneficiaries in the first half of 1997 and hoped to reach a target number of 126,000 children by the end of the year. Until the advent of the Taliban, it also had programs in 77 schools in the city where they had reportedly trained 60,000 children between the ages of 5 and 18 years. Before the Taliban, 156 teachers were trained in the schools to conduct mine education. SC/US provided educational materials to those schools. SC/US now concentrates on community-based methods, including mobilising formal and informal leaders for awareness activities. Given the geographic focus in Kabul, the impact should be measurable on the school population.

Table 1 Summary of UNOCHA partner organisations in mine awareness

¹³information from Save the Children Federation's *Landmine Education Semi-annual Report (January-June, 1997), Landmine Education Program Teacher's Guide 1996;* interviews with Mr. Asmaie and Ms. Sarah Warren of SC/US in Kabul, Sept 1997.

Organisation	Programme	years of opera- tion	Operational jurisdiction	Curriculum materials	Target audience	Location of training
Afghan Red Crescent Society	- Mine awareness classes - Volunteer Council Programme (sim. OMAR)	Since 1996	Kabul	Same as OMAR but no committees are formed.	- students and workers	- school and government offices
Ansar Relief Institute (formerly the Refugees Relief Group of Ansar)	Mine Awareness Trainin g		Since 1994 in five sites, and since 1996 in Dogharoum, Gargharouk and Milak	- silk screens, posters, notebooks distributed to trainees	- refugees returning to Afghanistan	Classes given at exit posts and border Iran- Afghanistan
BBC - Afghan Education Drama Project	New Home New Life soap opera	Since 1994	International radio broadcast	 short messages in soap opera story lines monthly comic books to reinforce messages special issues of cartoon magazine radio documentary and audio educational compilation 	- general population/ regional Afghan audience	
Handicap International	Community Based Mine Awareness Programme (CBMAP)	Since April 1996	Southern Afghanistan- Kandahar Prov (Dand, Arghandab, Panjwai, Maiwan Argistan, Spin Boldak, Shah Wali Kot, Shega, and Maruf Districts), Zabul Province, Nimroz Province (8 districts from December, 1997)	wooden mine set, blackboard, chalk, a set of posters, a prodder and painted stones; story- telling, victims' testimonies, drama, radio programs, teaching by mullahs of the danger of mines (as Islamic duty)	community; nomadic tribes	subject to agreement with community leaders
Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)	- Mine awareness classes - Community- based mine education and avoidance program volunteer council programme	Since 1991	12 mobile teams operating throughout the country, funded by AETF and Novib	 lessons, announcements in mosques, seminars in schools, newspapers and local radio, billboards, distribution of free publications and exhibitions in markets mine models, printed silkscreen, posters, brochures, mine identification note books, mines visual story books 	community, refugees	 schools, markets and other public spaces border crossing points used by returning refugees
SC/US	 land mine education -children's network -safe playground - Research & Evaluation team collects events (see p 43) 	Since 1996	High priority UNOCHA designated areas: Districts 5,6,7 and 9 in Kabul City	 photographs were used (not any more) -passport for participation in the awareness session - activity cards - game boards, dot-to-dot - memory games - presentation by trainers 	- children ages 5 to 18 years	- in mosques hospitals and clinics -schools (not since 1996)

The CIET mine smartness framework¹⁴

The mine-smart framework developed for this survey identifies the different types of information gathered (Figure 3). Mine awareness is a complex phenomenon, requiring site- and situation-specific information from [Mine awareness] is a vital issue for us and for the coming generation. We must have enough information about mines to save ourselves. *Male focus group, Dand, Kandahar, 1997*

D. Delivery mode and content will

determine whether programme has

influence via endogenous system or

separately

in-depth study at the community level. The model used here has several components: there are factors that influence behaviour at the *household level*, there are *programmes* that attempt to raise mine awareness (curriculum, materials, methods, aims of programmes) and there is the *training content and style* in mine awareness (what they teach, how they teach, how they feel about their work).

Figure 3 The CIET mine-smart model

A. Several local factors build smartness

- people see their neighbours affected
- local promoters draw their attention to risks
- they might have a strong sense of security
- they may do a risk-benefit analysis, weighing up



¹⁴ Andersson N. The socio-economic costs of anti-personnel mines. *An agenda for mine action*. Ottawa. Round table presentation 2 December 1997.

Male focus group, Kabul City, Kabul, 1997

A. Household (endogenous) factors

Experience with mines: The occurrence of a mine event affecting someone in the household is likely to have a strong effect on the survivors. By

in the household is fect on the survivors. By

Mines don't recognise between friend and enemy.

the same token, affected neighbours might also leave a series of indelible lessons, adding up to changed behaviour. Has anyone in the household been injured by mines? Do they know anyone else who has been?

Local promoters of mine awareness: Are there people in the community who teach mine awareness and promote safe behaviour in mined areas? Is there anyone in the community to whom people can report the presence of mines/UXOs/suspicious objects?

Common sense: Knowledge of the consequences -- the possibility of injury and death -- of going into a mined area, and of the signs that an area may be mined or contaminated by UXOs, should play some role in discouraging risk taking.

Occupation: Some occupations are more risky than others; for example, an agricultural worker would be expected to have higher risk than an urban teacher

or office worker. In some parts of Afghanistan, eking out a living is so difficult that people are obliged to take risks to obtain anything they might sell. This concern can be captured by questions like: Does anyone in the household have to go into a mined area in order to earn a living? Does anyone in the household collect metal scraps from UXOs to sell?

We cannot convince them not to go there. It's their poverty that makes them go there. Their hunger is another cause. Some of these people who go there say that death is better than their lives... giving advice is useless. It won't solve their problems, until it is solved in other ways.

Male focus group, Hesarshahi Camp

Macho models: Bravado or feigned lack of fear

exact a high price. Some of this can be captured with the questions: Do members of the household think it brave to go into a mined area or play with mines and UXOs without training?

Never happen: A big part of risk taking is the contention that "it could never happen to me". How likely do members of the household think that a mine accident can happen to them? Are they aware of the extent of mining in their community? Do they know where the mined areas are?

B. Exogenous or programme influences

"Mine stuff": A starting proposal in this evaluation is that the content of the awareness training might be based more on what trainers know than on what people need to learn. It is easy to share models and pictures of mines and to list different types of mines. It remains to be seen just what impact this knowledge will have in the reduction of mine events. "Mine stuff" refers to the mechanical and technical aspects of mines. It can be accessed by questions like: How do the programmes make people aware of mines/UXOs (e.g. pictures, models, silk screens)? How do they teach about the dangers posed by mines and UXOs?

Local risks: Perhaps a contrary approach to "mine stuff" is the inclusion of specific local dangers -- essentially risk analysis of recent events. This can be summarised by questions like: Do programmes teach about the dangers of mines and UXOs in the communities where they hold mine awareness training? How?

Alternatives: It is easy to tell people not to go here or there, not to do this or that. It requires more skill and perhaps commitment to try to develop the alternatives; where else, for example, might cooking fuel be obtained? Do programmes make people aware of alternatives to going into a mined area? What are the alternatives they promote (maps, income generation)?

Local gains: People who go into mine fields, knowingly taking risks, do so on the basis of a cost benefit analysis. They plan to get something (wood, scrap metal, short-cut) in return for the risk they take. If there is to be a change in behaviour, people need a more immediate sense of the gains of being "smart". Do programmes instill in people that practising safe behaviour in mined areas and areas with UXOs is beneficial for them?

Signs, BBC, lectures and games: The modality of training is crucial to success. The months immediately prior to the evaluation saw a flowering of different techniques, including games and participatory exercises, to complement the classic lecture format of delivery. What teaching aids are used to teach about mine stuff, local risks, alternatives and local gains?

C. Trainers

Know risks/gains: Any awareness programme will depend on the knowledge resources of those doing the training. Where trainers are actually trained as de-miners, what they know about is mines, not necessarily how best to avoid the risks. Are the trainers aware of the risks (general and local) of mines? Do they know of alternative options of going into the mined area?

Curriculum: There is considerable international experience with different modalities of direct training, although very little by way of formal evaluation of what works and what does not. Afghan direct training agencies are justifiably proud of the effort that has gone into their curriculum development. Necessary as it its to draw on this wealth of experience, mine/UXO risks change from place to place and over time in one place. What is the main content of training used by the trainers to teach mine awareness? How flexible is this to adaptation to take into account local conditions?

Materials: What are the materials (signs, games, etc.) that trainers use to teach mine awareness? What do they think about these materials in teaching mine smartness (effectiveness, practicality, etc.)?

Delivery: If trainers receive their training through lectures, and are shown the occasional model or picture of a landmine, they are likely to reproduce this in their own work. How were the trainers trained? How do they carry out their training? What are the problems they encounter in the communities?

Follow-up/support: What support have the trainers received since beginning their work with the parent organisations? Do they think this is enough? How can it be improved? How often do they go back to the communities after the initial training? How often do they communicate with the parent organisations? What motivates their work?

Mine smart behaviour

The term "mine awareness" describes what direct training attempts to achieve: changed behaviour. Endogenous mine smart "systems" are more likely to be effective. They are also more cost efficient and sustainable, and coincide with a broad range of development objectives. Mine smartness is the outcome of successful awareness training. It has at least five identifiable and measurable characteristics:

1. People change their daily activities and *do things differently* to be safer from mines and UXOs;

2. They are *aware* of incidents and signs of mines/UXOs in their community and when travelling;

3. Mine smart people *tell others* (spouses, children, relatives, neighbours, newcomers to their community) about the dangers of mines and UXOs and show them how to recognise and protect themselves from mined areas. They also *call for action* to be taken to clear the mines and UXOs, either by trained community members or deminers and battle area clearance teams;

4. Mine smart people believe events are sufficiently noteworthy to warrant reporting, and

5. They see mine smartness as a way of *building security* in their lives and community.

A measured approach to mine awareness

The 1994 CIET¹⁵ study includes the experience of some 33,000 households, as well as 200 focus group discussions with landmine victims, documenting the human dimensions of this human catastrophe. In Afghanistan, NGOs and international organisations have designed and implemented a variety of mine awareness programmes. With its cultural and topographical variation, each region has distinct needs for information sharing about risk and resilience, different channels for communication and different peculiarities of the target groups. It is seldom appropriate to opt for the same training modalities (posters, signs and talks at local schools) across all communities. One of the findings of the original four-country land mine impact assessment was just how specific these needs are. For example, the most effective channels in some parts were likely to be the radio (BBC); in other parts, the mullahs were thought by focus groups to play the key role. This specificity of "what works" also probably changes over time.

One contribution of the methodology is its ability to provide reliable "operational accounting" of programme impact. Planning efforts can then be focussed where they are most likely to have an impact and programme gains can be tracked from year to year. Not only can this help to determine appropriate operational end-points and exit strategies for mine action, but technologies and skills for optimizing the impact of the ongoing operation can be left with trained Afghan nationals. This contribution to sustainability could have important implications for emerging governance processes in the country. In 1997, with UNICEF support, a 96-community multiple indicator baseline was completed in all five UN operational regions of the country¹⁶. In addition to the data this offers for relief agencies, this has helped

¹⁵ Andersson N, Palha C, Paredes S. Social costs of land mines in four countries. British Medical Journal 1995,311;718-721.

¹⁶ Andersson N, Whitaker C and Paredes S. The 1996-7 Afghanistan multiple indicator survey. CIET/UNICEF, Peshawar 1998

to establish a field capability in Afghanistan that can be operationalised at short notice.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The terms of reference for the evaluation specified the overall objective as being: "To examine and provide advice on the effectiveness of current mine awareness projects under the UNOCHA Mine Action Plan (sic - subsequently MAPA) and to develop recommendations on future directions for the mine awareness component based on sustainability and community involvment".

This evaluation will estimate the *coverage* of awareness activities and the effectiveness of different training modalities in terms of levels of knowledge, behaviour and reduction of risk. The work will be carried out in a way that provides a baseline for monitoring awareness projects, while building local skills and a community interface that encourages sustainability. If repeated, impact assessment cycles can monitor improvements in mine awareness as education initiatives are fine-tuned, benchmarked across to a reduction in the social costs of land mines.

Performance indicators set by the MAPA in its agreements with its partners include:

- 1. Coverage: the number of people who receive mine awareness education;
- 2. Impact: a reduction in injuries attributable to the application of avoidance strategies;
- 3. Participation: increased participation in self-help mine awareness and involvement in the
- establishment of community-based priorities for threat elimination projects; and
- 4. *Reporting:* increase in the quantity of accurate reports of high risk areas.

These four areas of performance were used to examine the performance of the overall mine awareness programme. At the outset of the evaluation, it was intended to produce "standalone" assessments of each of the partners. As the results turned out, the performance of each of the partners is intimately bound up with the other partners. Consequently, in this report, they are handled together as a *programme*, rather than as isolated projects.

The evaluation covers all mine affected areas in the UNOCHA programme (four of the five UN regions, excluding the North). It covers urban and rural settings, and several IDP camps. It does not, however, adequately deal with the issue of the nomads, who are at considerably higher than average risk because of their lifestyle. When the evaluation was conducted, the nomads had not come down from the mountains to their more accessible winter quarters.

Methods: the MAE cross-design

No single method is adequate for the complex task of evaluating mine awareness in Afghanistan. The toolbox developed for the four-country mine survey was adapted for the Afghanistan MAE. It includes:

a. Analysis of existing data: A considerable amount of data on land mine events are already available. The completeness of this and the extent of repetitions is unknown. Each partner was asked to supply their data on coverage and impact for 1997. All were able to provide listings of the activities performed, and none had data on changing patterns of mine awareness.

b. Institutional Review: For each of the partners, curriculum materials and delivery strategies were reviewed and their coverage mapped across the sentinel communities. Each partner was asked to indicate

which sites were covered by their programme, later to permit analysis of expected and actual coverage.

c. Baseline household assessment: In the panel of 86 sentinel communities, household quantitative data were collected on mine smartness in relation to coverage with mine awareness activities. The household survey was applied to 9,124 households, almost always to a male respondent (Annex 3).

d. Key opinions: Interviews with nine mine awareness trainers (three from OMAR and six from SC/US) helped to document the prevailing training culture, to identify potential factors in success or failure of the training. Specific questions were asked about the mine committees/councils (Annex 3 for questionnaire).

e. Focus group discussions with at-risk people: There were 86 male focus groups with 849 participants (one in each site) and seven focus groups with 42 women in Kabul. The schedule and reporting format from the focus groups is provided in Annex 3.

f. Schools-based monitoring: The review of children's knowledge of the risks and the source of their knowledge were explored through 86 children's group interviews, one per site, including 915 participants.

The sample

Based on data from the last census projections, four UN operational regions (all excluding the North) were stratified by district to provide a framework for second stage district level selection. In each UN operational area, a random sample of 48 districts were drawn from a list of all districts, stratified by population density. From each of these districts, a single site was selected from a stratified list (urban/rural). In addition, two other major constituencies were included in the sample of residential sites. Refugee camps visited in the 1994 survey were revisited in 1997 to permit follow-up over time. Also included in the sample, though analysed separately, were several of the residential communities included from the 1994 survey. The main 1997 survey was conducted in November of that year, by which time the nomads had not yet returned to their winter quarters. Repetition of this component of follow-up from 1994 was therefore impossible. The MAE framework took into account the scope of mine action in Afghanistan:

- C A total of 35 clusters from northen Afghanistan were excluded from the CIET-UNICEF national sample because no UNOCHA-associated organisation was involved in the area,
- C The 30 clusters visited during the 1994 study¹⁷ were included;
- C Five clusters were added intentionally in the Kandahar Region to give a weighted representation of the area currently served by Handicap International.

The MAE thus had a total of 102 clusters distributed as follows:

- Western Region: 21 clusters of which seven were sites from 1994.

- Eastern Region: 37 clusters of which 23 sites are added from the 1994. The 1994 sites in this region gave representation to refugee camps (Eastern went from 1 to 6 clusters).

- Southern Region: Five clusters were added purposively to this region, mainly districts of the Kandahar province. The total number of clusters in this panel is 25.

¹⁷ Andersson N, Palha C, Paredes S. Social costs of land mines in four countries. *British Medical Journal* 1995,311;718-721.

- Kabul or Central Region: No clusters were added to the 19 in this panel.

Several of the sites could not be reached:

In the Western region, the team was advised by UNOCHA to avoid Site 21 for security reasons.
In the Eastern region, fighting took place in site 44 during the pilot testing, and the team was turned back by villagers; the same occurred in sites 47, 49, 50, 56 and 57.

- Central region sites 67, 68, 70-73, 75 and 77 are on the front line with the north; the teams could not get into these villages even with help from relatives of the Sayyed.

- In Kandahar, the team was stopped by the local government administrator from entering site 102.

Process: the evaluation activities and deliverables

a. The process began with clarification of the services to be evaluated, through liaison with the UNOCHA focal point and the collaborating NGOs. This led to summaries of collaborating programmes, linked to sites where the partner programmes are implemented (see Annex 1).

b. Development of instruments for data collection by household survey, key opinion interviews, group techniques or institutional reviews in English, Dari and Pushtu. These were field tested, during which time 36 field workers were recruited and trained. At the end of the training, two supervisors were selected as field coordinators. Requirements for interviewers included: a good level of education, ability to understand and to speak both Dari and Pushto; they required previous interviewing experience. The first stage of training focussed on the household interview. The focus group discussion was part of the second stage. All moderators and monitors were trained on how to conduct and register events in a focus group discussion.

c. Fact finding started at the end of October 1997. Data gathering through household survey, key opinions and institutional reviews were conducted in 86 communities. The household questionnaire was administered to the head of each household.

d. Two focussed discussion groups (one of men and one of schoolboys) were organized in each cluster. The children's discussions was started by a circle game, using the SC/US design, to get the children talking about the issues. The facilitator formed a circle with the children, standing outside of it. The rapporteur sat to the side of the facilitator to take note of the children's responses. The facilitator threw a ball to a child in the circle. The child who caught the ball was asked one of a list of questions (Annex 3) by the facilitator. If a child answered the question correctly, s/he threw the ball to another child. If the child answered incorrectly, the facilitator asked other children in the circle if they could give the answer. This was followed by the group questionnaire (Annex 3).

e. Data collection was completed by mid-December 1997. Double data entry and preliminary analysis led to the draft report (5 May 1998, revised version 6 July, 1998).

f. Discussions with partners. In October 1998, UNOCHA arranged tripartite meetings with each of the implementing partners to discuss the findings.

g. Definitive analysis, including comments of the implementing partners and the recommendations were included in the final report.

Results

The study population

Figures 4 reflects the demographic structure of the sample surveyed in the MAE 1997. A noteworthy finding, reiterating that of the earlier CIET survey in Afghanistan (Figure 5), is the apparent "disappearance" of women over the age of 50 years. In part this may be explained by people not knowing their year of birth, and underestimation of the age of older women; given the expected male mortality during the war, however, this is probably only a part of the story. Field supervisors in both surveys, when asked about the finding, said "We do not often see old women in Afghanistan". Another part of the story maybe the high reproductive risk for this age group, being much greater than for other age groups.

Few people considered themselves internally displaced, despite the well-known population shifts over the past two decades. It seems probable that, with displacement so commonplace, few consider themselves in this category. Since the northern sector of the country was excluded from this survey, the ethnic groups there are not found in the sample. Two-thirds of the sample was Pushtoon, and the remaining third was almost entirely Tajik. A tiny fraction was Hazara, in proportion with that expected from the geographic spread of the sample. One third of respondents were farmers, an important risk factor for mines/UXOs; a tiny fraction (0.6%) had no male over the age of 14 years (Table 2).

The biggest problem reported in this survey was food or food related; the second biggest was related to income or money. This helps to set the stage for an understanding of mine-related risks. When only one third have access to the land, and so many are short of food or income, there are pressures to seek a means of survival. Women's focus groups in Kabul said their biggest problems were lack of water, sanitation and electricity; unemployment among women; the nonfunctioning of the school system and wakils who don't help their communities.



Figure 4 The demographic structure of the sample population (MAE 1997)

Occupation of househ	old head 41% farmers
	10% unemployed
Ethnicity	67% Pushtoon
	29% Tajik
	2% Hazara
Our biggest problem	39% say food related
	30% say economic
	9% say water





	W	/estern	E	astern	(Central	So	uthern	S	ample
Total study population		12,638	2	23,358		6,748		14,543	:	57,287
Total number of households		2,145		3,452		1,103		2,424		9,124
Average people per dwelling		6		7		6		6		6
HH with no male 15+ yrs	0.7%	14	0.9%	30	0.1%	1	0.3%	8	0.6%	53
HH with children <5 years	72%	1547	73%	2506	67%	740	74%	1789	72%	6581

Table 2 Population and household data

Endogenous mine-smartness

The concept of "endogenous mine-smart behaviour" is one of common sense: when someone sees a neighbour go into a mine-field, get his foot blown off and have his children go hungry as a result, there is a strong and compelling message. Mine smartness refers to the positive adaptive responses to this fear, or local information¹. If a mullah considers it his religious duty to warn his community about the dangers, this can be independent of, or reinforced by, an externally-funded mine awareness programme. Returning soldiers, residents returning from other locations, teachers, elders and a wide variety of opinion makers might also be endogenous focal points of mine smartness.

From the point of view of the household interview, people change their daily activities and *do things differently* to be safer from mine and UXOs. They perceive the risk and take *precautions* to protect their land and animals, and they are *aware* of incidents and signs of mines/UXOs in their community and when they are traveling between communities. People who are mine smart *tell others* (spouses, children, relatives, neighbours, newcomers to their community) about the dangers of mines and UXOs and show them how to recognise and protect themselves from mined areas. They also call *attention of local authorities* to the problem of mines and UXOs in their community, *calling for action* to be taken to clear the mines and UXOs, either by trained community members or deminers and battle area clearance teams. Mine smart people believe that practicing safe behaviour is *beneficial*; that events are sufficiently noteworthy to warrant *reporting*.

In mine awareness, part of the logic of capitalising upon endogenous mine smart "systems" is that these are more likely to be effective. They are already adjusted to local culture and physical conditions. They are also more cost efficient and sustainable, and coincide with a broad range of development objectives.

Knowledge of mine fields

The definition of "communities in mined areas" used in this evaluation rests on the categorisation of MAPA. There were several other opinions, including those of the individual partners and the focus groups. In general, these coincided with the MAPA definition of mined areas, but some of the partners or local sources also considered a large part of the country to be mined that MAPA informants had categorised as not mined. For example, only 103 households (one site) were interviewed where the focus group thought the place was not mined, when in fact it had been considered by MAPA as mined. Yet

¹ Andersson N. The socio-economic costs of anti-personnel mines. An agenda for mine action. Ottawa. Round table presentation 2 December 1997

3,319 households lived in places the focus group considered to be mined, where MAPA had identified these as not mined. The household answers show a similar divergence of opinion. Around one in ten (9% or 397/4450) thought their areas to be mined when MAPA classified them as "no mines". In effect, this means they could think the problem is more extensive than it is in reality.

More than one half of the households in the sample (4674/9124) lived in communities said by MAPA informants to be affected by mines. These communities had a higher rate of mine affected households² (274/ 4674 or 5.8%). A further 1268 households (14% of the sample) lived in areas where

In Fateh village, which is our neighbour, once a scrap metal trader came to purchase things from the village. The children of the village had an unexploded shell of a heavy cannon and brought it to him to earn some money. But, the trader refused to purchase it and advised the children that cannon shells are very dangerous and not to play with them. The children took his advice to be ridiculous and said, "we are playing daily with these things" and started throwing the shell onto the rocks. Suddenly the shell exploded and it was a catastrophe. It killed 29 children and youngsters of that village at the place of the explosion. It was our big tragedy.

Male FG, Qarabagh, Ghazni, 1997

mines had been cleared from the community but not from the vicinity. In these, the mine affected rate was 5.5% (71/1268), probably reflecting an originally high rate, followed by a lower rate. Some five percent (437/9124 or 4.8%) of households had lost someone, or had someone injured, by landmines.

"That field"

In each of the sites identified as mined by MAPA, a specific mine field was identified from discussions with MAPA informants. This was used as a reference point in an attempt to assess knowledge of "that field". Some 57% (2653/4674) of respondents in mine affected areas said they did not know the mines in the field indicated. It is possible these fields were relatively newly marked from recent surveys, perhaps not yet known to the communities. It is also possible the question did not work well, with indications of "that field" being insufficiently clear.

Of the respondents who knew the affected areas, 73% said these had been marked with red stones (all areas chosen for this test had been thus marked). Credit for this marking was given by respondents to MCPA (26%), ATC³ (23%), OMAR 11%, MDC/MDG 9.3%, local deminers 8%, Halo Trust 8% and "people of the area" 2.4%. Most said this was done in 1995 and 1996.

Do you consider it brave

One in ten respondents in mined areas (420/4366) considers someone not a deminer but goes into a mined area as brave. Only one percent of the overall sample (n90) and 1.6% (72/4353) in mined areas said any member of their household had attempted to demine. There was no difference between different categories of mine awareness exposure. This rate of tampering is substantially lower than reported from Afghanistan in earlier surveys – this could be a halo effect, with

A mine awareness course must be established. Our farms are full of mines, and we request a demining organisation to clean it up because we are dependent on farms, but unfortunately, they refused and said that their time was finished in the area.

Male focus group, Chaparhar, Nangarhar, 1997

² A household with at least one landmine victim

³ ATC and MDC are "demining" agencies

respondents telling field workers what they think we wanted to hear, or it could be an impact of the mine awareness programme. Of those few who openly said they did collect mines (n72), 16% said they gave them to the army and 36% exploded them for scraps of metal.

Reasons for going into a minefield:

One in three households in mined areas (1072/3332) said a member had been into places they knew to be mined. They apparently went into the area for a variety of reasons, most commonly to obtain their livelihood (69% went for firewood, livestock, agriculture, metal scraps); a smaller proportion (18%) transited these areas while travelling home or to work; and 5% went to visit graveyards (Figure 6). A fraction said they were involved in some way in

Figure 6

Reasons for going into a mined areas (Hatched segments indicate occupationally related)



mine action (3.3%). These proportions coincide with the answers about why "other people" go into known mined areas. A sizeable proportion among those who answered (n128) said it was because these were not marked.

Four of the seven women interview groups said the main reasons they went into mined areas was a lack of knowledge about the dangers or presence of mines. A women's group suggested that one might knowingly go into mined areas to commit suicide.

Income: Each household was asked whether mines/UXO reduced their income. Overall, 7% said yes, 9% in mined areas and 3.7% in non-mined areas. Asked by how much, 43% said 25%, 37% said 50%, 18% said 75% and 3% said 100%.

Perception of risk

A starting point for endogenous mine-smart behaviour is the prevailing perception of mine risks. Respondents were asked which of their household activities were risky because of mines/UXO. The single most common answer at national level (77% unweighted) was "no risk", even excluding those households without mines in the vicinity (74%). This is in stark contrast to earlier surveys, which revealed a substantial perceived disruption of household activities (see Figure 7).

When asked "what is the main thing needed to improve mine smartness in your community?", the overwhelming majority (74%, 3342/4513) among those who gave an answer to this question said "demining courses" (Figure 8). The second most common answer was to "inform people" (11%),

Figure 7 Household activities perceived to be at risk (excluding those who say there are no mines)



posters and pamphlets (6%), and signs⁴ (2%). Only a few individuals spontaneously mentioned the benefit of radio warnings or removing the mines.

Regarding what they themselves could do to solve the problem of mines (see Figure 9), the main responses were maintaining the marking system and warning people (36% each, of those who gave answers) and a further 22% suggested keeping in contact with the mine action agencies.

Initial questions to evaluate the partner NGOs also tried to determine whether direct training reaches communities that are most affected by landmines. These are often more difficult to access. In this analysis, the extent to which mine awareness activities occurred in communities with higher event rates over the past 20 years was taken as an indication of targeting. Households in communities where NO source of mine information was said by adult focus groups to be available, there was a much lower rate of mine affected households (27/1237 or 2%); this is compatible with concentration of mine awareness activities in those places where they are needed.

Focus group responses

Women: Four of the seven women's focus groups in Kabul said it is the wakil's (community leader) responsibility to address the problem of mines and UXO. Two other groups concluded that they should be cleared as soon as possible from the area. One group concluded it is every informed person's responsibility to tell others about the dangers of mines and UXO. One of the women's groups expressed disdain that they have no-one in the area to solve this problem, that their Mullah didn't care

Figure 8

Household views of the main thing needed to improve mine smartness



Figure 9

Household views of local solution to mine problem (excluding those who say there are no mines)



about this issue, and that the NGOs and UN organisations should find a solution for them.

Children's focus groups mostly identified mine awareness and demining agencies as the reference points. Their other responses were characterised by different levels of mine risk. Three groups (n86) mentioned teachers as active in mine awareness; six percent of households (20/339) in these three communities had been affected by mines. The Mullah was seen by children to be active in mine awareness in only one community, one with more mine events (11/104). "Knowledgeable people" were cited as the sources in five communities where the event rate was very low (1.7% or 9/520); this source was significantly more respected in communities with little or no mine problems. Although only one children's group

⁴ "Signs" in this context could refer to the minefield markings (red stones) used to demarcate mined areas; it could also refer to local marking systems.

spontaneously mentioned child-to-child information sharing, where this occurred it coincided with mines affecting 10% of households.

This raises the possibility of a "self-targeting" process, where children become interested because mines are a special problem. Where children saw "mine experts" as the source, there was little concentration of risks. Where they reported "mine awareness teachers" as the source of information, there was a strong convergence with risks in the households (43/507); again, this is consistent with the awareness teachers going to where the problems are worst.

Male adult focus groups: One third of focus groups thought elders could play a key role; this could have had something to do with the composition of the focus groups. There was also strong support for the Malik, 42% of groups saying he could play a key role. The few places

Figure 10 Who promotes mine awareness? (among those who specified someone)



where parents were cited as potential promoters were not the higher risk communities. Less enthusiasm was shown for the teacher; nine percent of the sample lived in communities where focus groups cited him as a potential promoter. However these communities, unlike those suggesting elders and Maliks, did concentrate more mine events (62/852 households or 7.3%). One group suggested the *Taliban* as potential promoters; this was one of the higher risk communities (10/102 households were affected by mines). The same community also suggested "ASWs" (Afghans who had seen the world) as potential promoters.

The Jihad was cited as the source of mine awareness information in communities with 722 households; among these, 26 (3.6%) had suffered mine events, compatible with poor overall targeting of this channel of information, possibly in part due to the appropriate targeting of information to other areas. Where the Mujahadeen were referred to as a major source (320/9124 households), there were relatively few households affected (13/320).

A similar phenomenon is seen with the Malik: where events are more uncommon, they are seen as the information resource on mine risks (36/1248).



The household interview

Asked who in the community promotes mine awareness, some 85% said "no-one"; 90% in Western, 77% in Eastern, 81% in Central and 96% in the Southern Region. This shows either the absence of ongoing mine awareness activities, or the failure of the community to recognise them as such where they do exist. It is possible that communities are conditioned to think of mine awareness as classes, where they are lectured to, since this delivery mode has extensive coverage. With modernisation of direct training methods and increasing emphasis on committees and promoters, they may not recognise these activities as mine awareness. It is also possible that the existing programme has not found a sustainable community base, and it is optimistic to consider a community as "covered" after a presentation, training session or meeting with one or more community members.

Figure 12 Who best helps you to understand mine smartness? (% of household respondents)



Only 15% of the sample did describe some mine awareness activity and this is presented in Figure 10. In these few places with ongoing mine awareness promotion, after the BBC, the Mullah played by far the most widely recognised role. Some $73\%^{nu}$ (934/1282) of those who said someone provided mine awareness referred to the mullah. A further $12\%^{nu}$ (152/1282) referred to the malik.

Asked systematically whether they had received mine awareness orientation from the Mullah, 17%^{nu} said yes (Figure 11); 46 % had said they heard about mines from the BBC.

Although not strictly comparable since it comes from a different question, overall 7.6% (10.5% in mine affected areas) indicated they had been in direct training. When asked the source which best helps to understand safety in mined areas, 46% indicated "nobody" and 43% said the BBC (Figure 12).

Table 3

Physical injury suffered by mine victims (figures are numbers of victims**)

	W	estern	Ea	astern	С	entral	So	outhern	Sa	mple
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1. Died	16	2	66	4	31	1	32	3	145	10
2. Limbs below knees	16	0	34	5	20	1	19	1	89	7
3. Limbs above knee	3	0	13	3	3	0	3	0	22	3
4. Limbs below elbow	5	1	21	3	6	1	8	0	40	5
5. Limbs above elbow	0	1	4	4	2	0	1	0	7	5
6. No amputation	10	0	15	0	7	0	22	0	54	1
Total*	56	5	175	28	76	4	89	4	396	41

* This total takes into account that people can have more than one injury; in some victims, the injury was not specified

** Number shown here pertain only to the sample used in this evaluation.

Mine events and social costs

Figure 13 shows that the majority of victims are male and of military age. There are dramatically differing rates at different ages (for males, 5.3, 28.8 and 13.5 per 1000 for the three increasing age categories portrayed in Figure 13; among women it was 1.3, 2.1 and 1.6 for the different groups). Table 3 details the loss to human life and limb as a consequence of land mines over the past 20 years.

Time trends

By asking when each mine event had happened, it was possible to plot out the time trends of events (number of individuals affected) in the sample over the last two decades. Figure 14 shows the number of events each year across the sample. The peak in 1993 is compatible

Rate of mine incidents, injuries and death (per 1000 people)



with that found in the 1994 landmines survey, possibly related to the influx of returning refugees and internally displaced people to the mined areas. After the peak, there is a marked and continued decline up to the time of the evaluation.

Figure 13

The 1997 figure is adjusted to take account of the fact that only 10 months of 1997 are included, since the survey was done in November. Even with this adjustment, 1997 is the fourth successive year of declining events. Ordinarily, time trends of mine events, like scorpion stings, snakebites and other acutely painful and memorable events, there is "time crowding" - the event was so unpleasant, it seems more recent than it was in fact.

Mortality from mine incidents was 53.2 males and 4.7 females per 10,000 population over the 20 year period. Figure 15 shows the rates of land mine incidents (per 10,000 people at risk).

Figure 14 Time trends in 86 communities 20 years of mine events (one victim=one event)



Mortality levels are roughly the same in urban and rural areas, whereas rates of injury are lower in rural areas. This could reflect the migration of mine victims to the towns, in search of health care and some employment. The 20 year mortality in urban, rural and refugee areas is reflected in Figure 16.

Among the two in three victims who survived the blast, the commonest injury among the survivors were those that resulted in belowknee amputations. This is a very similar picture to that emerging from the 1994 *Social cost of land mines* survey. In all regions, below-knee loss of limbs (typical of land mines) are more common than other types of injury, many of which are caused by UXOs. Looking at time trends in upper limb and other injuries, since most of the partner programmes started in 1994 (BBC) and 1996 (III and SC(US), there is a small reduction in low



Mortality and injury from landmines 1978-97

(HI and SC/US), there is a small reduction in lower limb injuries.

OMAR started its work in 1991, so this may be diluting the time trend. The activities of victims at the time of the event – the real target of mine smartness – are portrayed in Figures 17a and 17b.

The single commonest activity at the time of the event was travelling related to income generation; by far

Figure 15

the greater part of the remaining causes also had to do with earning a livelihood (Figure 17a&b). The implications for mine smartness support programmes are considerable. People have to weigh up the risks of no income or food with those of going into mine infested areas. Almost all (1336/ 1337 people) who go into the mine affected areas said, in answer to a separate question, that they know these areas are affected.

This implies it is not a question of awareness, but one of competing pressures to stay alive. Activities unrelated to earning a living accounted for only one fifth of



victims' activities at the time of the blast.

Asked whether the mine injury caused financial difficulty, 88% of respondents for 471 victims said "yes" -- 7% of all households. In this survey, the exact monetary loss was not documented.

Child injuries and death

Overall, there were 110 mine and UXO victims under the age of 15 years, in a population of 31,834 (31.6 per 10,000 children); 42 of these children died as a result of their injuries. Of the survivors, 25 lost lower limbs, 20 lost upper limbs, 8 were blinded and the remainder had non-amputation injuries. Asked what they were doing at the time (Figures 17a and 17b), there was a broad similarity between adults and children, in the sense that most accidents were related to income generation. More adults were affected in the Jihad, and more children were playing at the time.

A higher proportion of children (60% or 65/109) were affected in herding, gathering and agriculture than was the case for adults (49% or 174/356). The four children affected while tampering ("exploding devices") were not in the SC/US coverage area.

Figure 17a

What was s/he doing at the time of the landmine/UXO injury? (Labels indicate number of cases aged 0-14 years)



Figure 17b

What was s/he doing at the time of the landmine/UXO injury? (Labels indicate number of cases aged 15 years and over)



Table 4Audience and radio use

	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	Sample
Find it easy to listen to radio	40%	54%	48%	52%	50%
Do not own a radio	53%	36%	43%	43%	43%
Listen to New Home New Life	36%	53%	44%	48%	47%

The BBC and mine awareness

In its agreements with its partners, certain performance indicators were set by MAPA for monitoring of progress. These include:

1. Coverage: the number of people who receive mine awareness education indicates the extension of the project;

2. Impact: a reduction in injuries attributable to the application of avoidance strategies;

3. Participation: increased participation in self-help mine awareness and involvement in the establishment of community-based priorities for threat elimination projects; and

4. Reporting: increase in the quantity of accurate reports of high risk areas.

In the household survey, a large number of questions were asked about mine awareness and access to the media, particularly the radio which traditionally has played such an important role in Afghanistan. The four performance criteria established in the agreement with UNOCHA were used to examine its performance as an awareness programme.

1. Coverage and the BBC

Asked whether they found it easy to listen to a radio, 49% of the household respondents in mine affected areas answered "yes" (Table 4). Asked why not, 88% of those who do not listen answered that they had none (3888/4393). Other explanations were "no batteries" (11%), not being allowed to and not having sufficient time. Among those who have easy access, 93% listen to *New Home New Life*. Some of those without easy access also listen, making the total "easy listenership" of this sample 47%. *New Home New Life* listenership in the mined areas was considerably lower in urban and IDP camps than it was in the urban areas (40% urban/IDP compared with 53% in rural areas). This could indicate a potentially productive investment area for future mine awareness/smartness programmes with considerable spinoffs for other areas of governance and information services. Household questionnaire respondents were asked whether their wives listened with them. Among those with easy access to a radio, only one in 500 (0.2%) said their wives and children.

2. Impact

Do listeners have less risk of mine or UXO accidents? The review of time trends shows encouraging results for the BBC. At around the time the programme started to address mine-related issues, in 1995 (see Figure 18) the trend among listeners dropped below the trend among non-listeners. It remained rate below the level of non-listeners until the time of the evaluation (10 months).

The visual impression from this graph is that listeners may be protected from smine events in some way. This was submitted to formal statistical testing, using the startup year of the programme (1994) as the cut-off. Considering only those in mine affected areas, a nonlistener was twice as likely be a mine victim after 1994, in comparison with a New Home New Life listener (odds ratio 2.01, p<0.05). Looking at the injury profile of these urban dwellers, it appears the protective effect is against affecting the upper limb and eye injuries, those typically related to UXOs and tampering. A non-listener in the urban areas was eight times more likely to have an upper body injury than was a listener¹.



This encouraging indicator, not

explained by occupation or other indicators of income available in this evaluation, contrasts with the notable absence of evidence of impact on mine events by the direct training programmes. Table 5 demonstrates that this is only in the urban areas. No such benefit could be confirmed in the rural areas.

Table 5

Evidence of impact of *New Home New Life* in urban and rural areas (excluding IDP camps) Number of mine/UXO events before and after the programme began in 1994

ALL AREAS	Urbar Listen t	n areas to NHNL	Rural areas Listen to NHNL	
	yes	no	yes	no
1. Number of cases 1987-94	27	16	115	99
2. Number of cases from 1995-1997	17	30	49	50
3. Population size	4398	5205	21734	21879
Odds ratio and significance of comparison of cases (lines 1&2)*		0.34 p<0.01	odds ratio	o 0.84 NS

MINED AREAS ONLY		Urban areas Listen to NHNL		Rural areas Listen to NHNL	
	yes	no	yes	no	
1. Number of cases 1979-94	21	9	73	62	
2. Number of cases from 1995-1997	9	14	42	37	
3. Population size	2058	3161	12410	10334	
Odds ratio and significance of comparison of cases (lines 1&2)*		0.28 p<0.02	odds ratio	0.96 NS	

*interpretation: a listener has around one-quarter the risk (0.28) of a non-listener in urban areas

Lessons

¹ Among 14 upper injuries among listeners, 3 were after 1994; among 16 in non-listeners, 11 were pre-1994 (odds ratio 8.3, p=0.01)

Respondents were asked "What have you learned about mines from the BBC?" Overall, around one in five listeners (22%) said they had not learned anything. In mine affected areas, this varied under different conditions: in urban areas, 26% said they learnt nothing, 20% in rural areas and 39% in the IDP camps.

Among those that said they had learned something, the commonest response across the whole sample (unweighted) was a nonspecific "understand the risks" (31%); not entering a minefield or deserted building (30%); not touching the devices (23%) and being attentive to signs² (12%) (see Figure 19). Figure 19 Main lessons learnt from the BBC, listeners in mine affected areas



Mine smart behaviour

Understanding mine risks does not necessarily produce more mine-smart behaviour. Listeners were also asked how

they behaved differently after receiving the information from the BBC. The most frequent response was simply that listeners are more careful (37%); some 28% said they now would not go into a marked area; 20% said they would now not touch unknown objects; 4% said they changed their routes of travel, 2% would not enter an unknown area and 2% said they would now not send children into a mine field. Only 3% said they would tell others about the risks.

In unmined areas, 11% said they would do nothing different. In the mined areas, less than one out of ten listeners said they would do nothing different (9%): in urban areas, 8.6% (25/290), rural 7.8% (136/1734) and camps 15.5% (20/129).

Which story?

In an effort to earmark the most impressive BBC mine stories, listeners were asked which story they remembered best (Figure 20). Some 32% said no story was particularly memorable and a further 36% said they could not remember one. Of among those who mentioned one, the best remembered was Jandad (39%).





² "Signs" in this context could refer to the minefield markings (red stones) used to demarcate mined areas; it could also refer to local marking systems.

Reporting of cases and evidence-based planning

At the time of this evaluation, a needs assessment among members of the audience (small surveys and panel discussions) gave rise to the story lines; more recently, the needs assessment has taken a focus group format. Internal assessment of the BBC programme is conducted through monthly consultative meetings with experts (including UNOCHA) and members of audience on the quality, accuracy and appropriateness of messages transmitted through the soap opera.

Listeners to *New Home New Life* had an identical pattern of mine reporting to non-listeners. Only 3.2% said they would not report finding a mine/UXO; 55% said they would refer it to the mullah and malik, 18% to the shura and 24% to MAPA.

Children and the BBC

The children's group interviews were asked several

Figure 21

What did you learn about mines from the BBC Responses of the children's group discussion Number of groups concluding that this was the most important thing they learnt (n=)



questions about the BBC's *New Home New Life*. Asked if they listen to the programme, a majority said "yes" in 48 of the 86 groups. The majority answer in 33 groups was "no". In four of these groups, children said the reason was that they do not have a radio. In one group, children said the programme was at "sleeping time". Only one group said they do not understand the stories. Asked what they had learnt from the programme, most groups concluded with messages about not going into a mine area and not touching (66 groups) (Figure 21).

Children were also asked "does your mother listen to *New Home New Life*". In 40 groups, the majority said yes; in 28 groups the majority of children said no. For those who said no, the question was asked "do you tell her about what you hear on it? Why?"

The majority say they do tell their mothers in 35 groups. Some of the reasons they gave are reflected in the text box.

Why do you tell (or not tell) your mothers?

yes, they should be aware in order to protect themselves yes, because they should be safe yes, so that they don' touch mines/suspicious things yes, that she should be careful when walking on paths yes, she is also interested to learn yes, we tell the stories which discuss mine dangers

- no, she listens to the programme
- no, no mines are here
- no, we don't have radios
- no, my father doesn't allow me to listen to the radio
- no, we don't listen

no, we don't listen to the BBC, but we tell them the lessons we learn in school, from the radio, out of the house $% \left({\left[{{{\rm{B}}_{\rm{c}}} \right]_{\rm{c}}} \right)_{\rm{c}} \right)$

Direct mine awareness training

Recognising that aspects of this assessment will be out of date shortly after completion of the survey, the evaluation reviewed the same four performance criteria as listed in the UNOCHA agreements with its partners.

1. Coverage of direct training

According to its Annual Report, UNOCHA supports mine awareness education to more than half a million people annually. By 1998, it claimed to be covering around one million people. Of the nearly 60,000 people in the sample, 23,973 people (42%) live where direct mine awareness education was conducted (they live in communities where direct training took place, they did not necessarily receive direct

Figure 22

Coverage of mine awareness partner programmes Direct training and BBC (9,124 household responses)



training). Nearly 50% listen to the BBC, of whom 93% listen to *New Home New Life* (see Figure 22). These figures probably represent accurately the coverage of the BBC, but they overestimate the coverage of direct training programmes, as additional sites had to be added (six sites in the southern region) to be sure to include the work of HI.

The implications of these data are that considerably more than a million people are *potentially* exposed to mine awareness education – somewhere in the region of 65% of the population could be exposed if one adds those households that listen to the BBC and those living in communities where there is direct training. Yet very few of them seem to have passed on the message; for example, 57% of respondents overall (54% in mine affected areas) who had attended direct training said their wives had not heard of mine awareness.

What is the best way to reach women with mine awareness messages?

All respondents to the household questionnaires were asked when a mine awareness trainer last came to their community, from which agency and how long the training lasted. Of the 1,024 respondents who said a trainer had come, 80% mentioned OMAR. A further 8% mentioned SC/US, a surprisingly high proportion considering this training is directed at children; parents

evidently know about it and recognise it. A small proportion recognise demining organisations -- 3.6% said MCPA, 2% each said ATC and MDC. One reason the reported coverage of HI might be so low (0.2% said HI) is that training occurs several times "removed" from the community members, via *nomaindas* and self-nominated committees (many of which are an individual).

HI trains trainers, the trainers train community members. In some if not most cases, this can be as few as one individual (a teacher or a mullah), the community might never know the training has occurred. Four people (0.4%) said that training had been done by the local Shurra. It is probable, by the time this last layer gets to work, that individual beneficiaries do not know it is an HI programme. This lack of

⁻ A course should be established for the women too.

⁻ Women should stay at home or in the grave. Male focus group, Jajimaidan, Paktia, 1997

recognition if HI is a positive achievement, speaking of the ownership issues that lie at the heart of sustainability beyond the life of an externally funded project. In this evaluation, HI communities are those where the programme manager said they had worked -- six of them added purposefully to the evaluation sample.

No less than 22% of respondents (24% in mine affected areas) said their children had received mine awareness education in school: 18% in Western Region, 25% Eastern, 48% Central and 11% Southern (Figure 23).

None of the women interviewed had attended any mine awareness training. Three of the women's groups said their children had been trained by SC/US. These women had not received any mine awareness training because

Figure 23 Respondents who say their children (sons) received mine awareness education in school



none was held specifically for women. OMAR has obtained permission for women to conduct mine awareness training only for other women in the waiting rooms of some clinics in each of the urban centres in which they operate. OMAR also has a small woman-to-women project in Kabul.

The respondents, almost all male, were asked whether their wives had heard about mine smartness and from whom (Figure 24). A substantial 59% said their wives had no source (54% in mine affected areas). Of those who mentioned a source, the commonest was the husband himself, followed by the BBC

programme *New Home New Life*. Only three percent are currently hearing about mine risks from their children, indicating an underplayed potential role of the schools (at least based on the information from fathers).

Targeting

Overall, according to focus groups, either adults or children were trained in about 40% of the sample communities (sites including 3659/9124 households). There was a strong convergence with mine risk, 5.9% of households in communities with training being affected by mines compared with 4% of households in communities with no training. In communities where there were high risks of events, adult focus group participants said they told their family members about what they learned in mine awareness training (OR 2, Mantel-Haenszel 37.9). More affected communities (those with Figure 24 Wife's source of information on mine smartness (among those with a source)



more accidents) were also more likely to consider mine awareness training important for their community (OR 0.58; 95%CI0.47-0.71).

In the communities where OMAR works, 6% of households were mine-affected, more than the "background" rate; this indicates some measure of targeting of the training to the worst affected. In the SC/US communities, some 6.1% had experienced mine events. HI targeting was better, with around 10% of households affected. Roughly the same proportion of the sample were exposed to mine awareness training by the Red Crescent and, among these, the event rate was roughly the same as for HI (9/105). Based on the reports from the focus groups asked about who had done mine awareness training in their communities, what they referred to as "Operation Salaam" (the earlier name for the UN-sponsored awareness programme) potentially covered 310 of the sample households. There were 25 mine-affected households among these, indicating some measure of targeting.

Communities in which some members had received training while in camps in Pakistan (219 households) had a disproportionately high level of affected families (28/219 or 13%), indicating that these are going back to severely affected regions. In communities where the MCPA was cited as the training organisation (212 households) the event rate was higher than in the rest of the sample (13/212 or 6%), but this



10

0

1985

1995

1990

2000

difference is easily explained by chance. The ATC (a demining agency) was cited in the same communities (13/212); the MDC was cited by children in one community; children's focus groups were very much more likely to report the presence of a demining agency as the source of their information/training.

2. The impact of direct training

The final desired impact of mine awareness is the elimination of mine events. There are several intermediate outcomes that, if achieved, will almost certainly have this impact. In this sense, it is not necessary to wait for people to lose limbs in order to detect that a particular strategy is not working; if, for example, people do not stop going into mine fields and if they continue to tamper with mines, attempting to lift them on their own, they will continue to have mine accidents.

By recoding the year when each mine event happened, it was possible to plot out the time trends over the last two decades. Figure 22 shows the trend over time for all mine events in the programme areas of each of the three implementing partners. There is little to encourage the view that the dramatic decline in mine events is related to the direct training, since the decline is largely accounted for by communities that did *not* benefit from the direct training. A perhaps more alarming finding has to do with the time trends where the UNOCHA partners are active. In the sites where OMAR has been working since 1991, there has been a clear *increase* in events. Several possible explanations of this have been discussed in the aftermath of the evaluation.

One possible explanation is that a certain type of training might increase risks in the short term. For example, the traditional mine awareness training emphasizes mine stuff (names and descriptions of different mines, their mechanisms and strike power). It is possible this focus might provoke greater curiosity or misplaced confidence, perhaps leading to amateur mine removal.

Corroborative evidence comes from the pattern of mine/UXO injury. The type of injury was divided into

lower limb and "other" parts of the body – on the basis that tampering was more likely to result in these other injuries. For purposes of this analysis, deaths, paralysis and psychological trauma were excluded. If one compares the type of injury in UNOCHA partner sites and other sites in 1996 and 1997, in contrast with earlier years, the picture is not encouraging.

In UNOCHA sites, there was a recent increase in injuries to the upper part of the body, typical of UXO and tampering. Someone living in a UNOCHA site was nearly four times more likely to suffer injuries to parts other than the legs and feet than someone in the rest of the sample (odds ratio 3.8, 95% CI1.52-9.8, p<0.001). By contrast, they were only twice as likely to suffer an injury to the foot/lower limb Figure 26





(odds ratio 2.03, p0.07). These data are compatible with increased tampering in sites exposed to direct training.

Another possible explanation for this shift in pattern of injuries is that, with demining, there are fewer mines around but less reduction in the amount of UXO. Given that demining has gone on in places not covered by mine awareness programmes, the sites that provide the contrast, this is an unlikely explanation.

Children and impact of direct training

According to the data registered by Save the Children Inc, 55% of landmine victims in Kabul in 1997 were children; 85% of UXO victims were children. Dramatically different to the proportions in the country at large, these proportions coincide with the community based data collected in the present evaluation.

At the request of SC/US, a supplementary analysis was performed of mine events in youth, separating between SC/US coverage sites in Kabul, and other mine affected communities. For purposes of this analysis, the IDP camps were excluded, since these are a very particular risk group; only communities designated by MAPA as mine-affected were included. Prior to 1996, when the SC/US programme began, there were four mine events in their catchment area of 998 children (4 per 1000) compared with 40/15,883 children (2.5 per 1000) in other mine affected areas. This shows appropriate targeting of the SC/US programme.

In 1996 and 1997, during the SC/US programme, there were a further six events in the SC/US areas and 11 events in the non-SC/US mine-affected areas, excluding the camps, with more than 15 times the child population. If no other factors can be found to explain this apparent anomaly, a child in the SC/US programme area is more than five times as likely to be a victim of a mine/UXO accident in 1996-7, in comparison with a child from a non-SC/US mine affected area³. Some of the possible explanations for this finding could be taken into account and excluded. Data on these factors were available from the household questionnaires.

Unless some other explanation can be found, the implication is that something in the SC/US areas is precipitating more mine incidents than in other similar areas. The effect is strongest in children but not limited to them; there is also a suggestion (not statistically significant) of a smaller increase in events among those over 15 years. One possible explanation is the well recognised special circumstances of Kabul; it is possible that these are different in some ways not taken into account in this survey from other sites. In an attempt to consider this formally, SC/US sites in Kabul were contrasted with the other seven Kabul sites, which should be subject to some of the same changes since 1996. The gradient here is the same as between SC/US sites and the rest of the country. A child living in an SC/US site is five times more likely to be a victim after 1996 than one living in a Kabul non-SC/US site (odds ratio 4.9).

In looking for corroborative evidence in the type of injury sustained pre- and post-1996 in the SC/US areas, the cases in that area up to 1995 were added to those in other mine affected areas. There was no evidence to support the suggestion – as in the UNOCHA sites above – of a shift in the pattern of injury. If

³ The basis for this comparison is as follows: in SC/US areas 4 events in 1987-95 and 6 in 1996-7, in a population of 998 children; in non-SC/US areas 40 events in 1987-95 and 11 in 1996-7, in a population of 15,883. Comparing only cases since 1996 with those up to 1995, the odds ratio is 5.5, p<0.02. Factors excluded as possible explanations include exposure to other direct training programmes, recent in-migration to the area, different listening patterns to the BBC, occupation and education of parents, food security and problems in the household.

anything, there was a suggestion of more lower limb injuries in the SC/US sites, though this difference was not statistically significant. Contrasting the activities at the time of the event, a higher proportion in the SC/US areas were gathering firewood, fruits or scraps (6/998 compared with 17/15883). This suggests children in the SC/US area are more than five times as likely to be affected while gathering wood, fruit or scrap in 1996-7 (odds ratio 5.6, p=0.00004).

No immediate explanation is to hand for the surge in reporting since the programme started. One possibility is that the SC/US programme makes residents more aware of child victims and they are more likely to report them than in other places. This would imply there is a huge reservoir of unregistered cases in the rest of the country. Given the obvious nature of land mine/UXO events, there is little evidence to support this explanation. Furthermore, in the programme area do not report more "trivial" injuries, as might be expected if the increase in events was in fact merely increased reporting in the programme areas.

Confidence and the sense of "mine security"

Overall, 50% of household respondents said they felt confident they would not be affected by land mines. This confidence about mines is strongly related to a sense of food security -- in a way that is independent of *actual* food and income availability. Someone who feels he is unlikely to be affected by a landmine, is 50% more likely to say he has sufficient food. This is independent of where he lives, whether or not he had tea in the household at the time of the interview (an indicator of available cash), whether he produced a food surplus last year or his occupation. The effect is particularly strong in the worst off groups (the unemployed, the unskilled, farmers and those who did not produce a surplus last year).

Among the mine affected communities, the rates of "mine security" -- the sense that the respondent was unlikely to be affected by a mine event -- was lower than in the country at large, ranging from 28% in the Kabul (Central) to 50% in the Western Region (Figure 27). People with mine awareness direct training more often report a sense of mine security in all except the southern region (Kandahar). Mine secure respondents are *less* likely to feel they know the minefields and less likely to report a mine event (5.5% say they would not report, compared with 1.9% among those who feel they could easily be affected by a landmine).

Among those receiving training, 42% said they learnt about alternatives. In this survey, only 1.6% of households (n90) had someone who had attempted "amateur demining". This practice was discovered in the 1994 survey as one of the strongest risk factors for mine accidents; it appears to have all but disappeared by 1997. This is a positive finding, quite possibly related to the mine awareness in the country.

One in three people living in the areas classified as mined had been into places they knew to be mined.

Figure 27 Mine security and direct training (% in each region who feel mine secure)



Lessons learnt

An important group for retargeting programmes will be those who claim they have not learned anything (Figure 28). About one half of those who answered the question (n953 in the whole sample) said they had not learned anything: 9% in Western, 22% in Eastern, 13% in Southern and no less than 87% in Central. The extremely high rate in Central is almost certainly related to the focus on children in the SC/US programmes (although OMAR is also present in this region). Since adults are not intended to be the main beneficiaries of the SC/US programme, they probably feel they do not learn anything. SC/US does, however, look to achieve spillover to the parents of children in their programme.

In reply to questions about the main lessons they

had learned from the training, considering only the areas that were mined, 29% (195/684 in mine affected areas) said they had learnt nothing; there were dramatically different responses from the different regions. Among the things they learned (Figure 29), most who said they had learned something mentioned the instruction to pay attention to the minefield markings⁴. So few said they had learnt something that breakouts by region are unreliable.

What did you <u>do</u> differently

Asked what they do differently after the training, around one in ten who said they learned from the training said they did nothing differently. The most frequently reported difference in all regions was that they go less into marked areas or deserted buildings. In response to this line of questioning, over 80% said they were "more careful"; only around 10% said spontaneously that they do not cross the lines of red stones (it is possible many did not cross the lines irrespective of the direct training; red stones are used by MAPA to mark mined areas in Afghanistan).

Table 6The partners supporting mine smart







Figure 29 Main lessons learnt from direct training in mine affected areas



Sena ioui				
	SC/US	Н	OMAR	other/none
Been into known minefield	2%	20%	13%	19%
Consider someone brave	5%	19%	9%	6%
Trade mines for scrap	0.2%	2.3%	1%	1.5%
Attempted demining	0.7%	2.5%	1.1%	1%
Know the local mined areas	75%	67%	54%	57%

Table 7 The effect of training

hehaviour

	SC/US*	н	OMAR	other/none
Training made no difference	0%	5.1%	2.4%	-
Learnt nothing	36%	10%	9%	2%
Learnt of alternatives	3%	39%	50%	46%
Could ask questions	5%	40%	73%	76%
Could tell about own experience	5%	39%	67%	68%
Confident to explain teachings	45%	54%	76%	76%

*SC/US indicators reflect changes in adults, while the programme is direct mostly to children; this part of the evaluation thus considers only one of the SC/US objectives, to influence parents awareness through children

Perhaps a more important set of indicators have to do with the elimination of specific dangerous behaviours. In HI and OMAR programme communities (Tables 6 & 7), there seems to have been little positive behavioural impact in relation to going into a minefield. In this and three other important indicators – considering untrained people brave to go into a minefield, trading mines for scrap and attempting amateur mine removal – the HI communities (in Kandahar) were significantly worse than any others. This could be because HI has effectively targeted the worst communities. It certainly means they have further to go than the others.

The HI management team in Kandahar has built in a series of checks and supervision schedules that provide detailed lists of activities of mine awareness education. At the request of HI, the survey data were broken out by site. A contrast was established to compare HI sites in Kandahar province with others that did not benefit from direct training (though they may have had returnees, trained outside the site). Only mine affected sites were analysed. There were three HI sites (89, 96 and 97) and seven reference sites in the rest of the Southern Region:

- a respondent in the HI sites was more likely to have been into a mine field (121/241 vs 11/514);
- he was more likely to consider an amateur deminer a brave person (97/406 vs 114/695);
- he was more likely to collect metal scrap (12/407 vs 6/695);
- he was more likely to attempt amateur demining (15/407 vs 9/695);
- he was equally likely to know of the existence of the mine field (47%).

Among those who said they had been through some training

• an HI site respondent was more likely to say the training made no difference (3/30 vs 0/37)

- he was more likely to say he learnt nothing (18/48 vs 0/37);
- he was less likely to have been given an alternative in his training (21/38 vs 29/37);
- he was marginally less likely to be allowed to ask questions (26/39 vs 28/37);
- he was marginally less likely to be allowed to tell his experience (25/40 vs 27/37);
- he was less likely to feel confident he could explain what he learnt (22/48 vs 25/37).

These data maintain the impression that the supervisory checks and monitoring reports provided to HI in Kandahar represent only some aspects of what is going on in the HI programme communities.

Direct mine awareness and smartness among children

Does direct training work?

U Mine-smart behaviours (avoidance strategies) are improved in sites where SC/US is active

U Someone in a partner site is more likely to learn from the BBC than in a site with no UNOCHA partners (85% compared with 74%)

Y Mine events are more common in sites that had direct training, and have *increased* there since the programmes began

YCommunity participation is not facilitated; very few people know about mine committees and most depend on external initiation of mine action

The SC/US landmine education programme, based on contacting children in mosques, parks and other public places, reports contacting over 100,000 children in 1997, with over 20,000 additional contacts. Of the new contacts, some 40% were girls. This demonstrates it is possible to contact girl children in Kabul.

Asked who in each group had attended a class on mine awareness, children in 37 of the 86 groups had received direct mine awareness training. Nearly all of these focus groups (34/37) also listened to the BBC. Half of the focus groups who had not received direct training (26/54) listened to the BBC, indicating that this is an important way of reaching children with mine awareness information where direct training is not possible. Four of the children's groups that had received training (11%) did so from the Save the Children Fund, 15 from OMAR (41%). Twelve groups (32%) with direct training could not identify the trainers. One group identified the Mine Dog Committee as the awareness raising organisation. Three groups (8%) identified a school teacher as the one who had taught them, and had learned mine awareness from a mullah. These figures suggest that there is still room for mine awareness programs to become more embedded in the community.

Asked if this information was interesting to learn, all children's groups said it was. In the groups, children showed eagerness in the circle game and were a lively audience for mine awareness education, on most occasions asking additional questions about mines/UXO after the game. Several asked for mine awareness courses to be held for children to learn more and for schools to begin functioning again.

The groups were asked if they passed on what they learned to other members of your family. All 37 of the focus groups whose participants had received direct training reported they did so. Nearly two-thirds of the participants who had passed information on to their family members said they did so make their family members aware and able them to protect themselves from the dangers of mines/UXOs. A few children gave reasons why they couldn't tell their family members, stating they were scared for their parents and that no-one at home asked them about this issue (see Text Box, page 27). The main messages children who had received direct training said they pass on family members were:

- *do not touch* mines/UXOs or other unfamiliar objects (50%)
- *do not go* into areas which are suspected to be mined, have some form of sign indicating that they

- could be mined (e.g. animal bones, ruins, red stones) or are unfamiliar territory (50%)
- *mines/UXOs are dangerous*; children also warned their family members of the dangers of mines to human and animal life (50%).

Several groups identified other messages taught in mine awareness education: do not pull/cut wires/lines in a field (5%) or metal scraps (5%), as well as the shapes and sizes of different mines/UXOs (16%). Three in ten groups reported telling their family members about mine markings, and the use of safe pathways to avoid going into mined/UXO areas.

A recurring problem in mine awareness for children is quite how to communicate the information. Children were asked "If you had to tell a family member or good friend about the danger of mines/UXOs in order to keep them safe from harm, what would you tell them?" Over half who had received direct training (51%) said that they would tell a family or good friend to *not touch* mines/UXOs or unfamiliar, toy-like objects to keep them safe from harm. The same proportion of participants said that they would tell their friends about the dangers of mines and to *not go into mined/UXO areas* to protect them.

Nineteen per cent (16/86) of the groups said they did not know where the mined areas in their neighbourhoods were. All these communities were in the area designated as not mine-affected. In 33 of the 86 focus groups (38%), children said that they knew where the mined areas in their neighbourhood and village were. Thirty-one (36%) responded that "there are no mines here". Only four for the groups (5%) said that their village had been cleared of mines.

Seven of the 86 groups had participants who said that they had tried to go into mined/UXO areas. Of these, two had received direct mine awareness training (by an unspecified organisation), and two listened to the BBC. The remaining focus groups did not have any direct training in mine awareness or access to the BBC. The main reasons given by the children for entering a mined/UXO area were to gather firewood (28%) and to graze animals (28%). Other reasons were to visit family or friends; one group gave the reason that "anti-tank mines there won't explode easily" and another stated that "we are not afraid".

3. Participation and direct training

Participation in training events begins with the delivery style the training adopts. Overall, 62% of participants in direct training sessions (63% in mine affected areas) said they could ask questions during the training. In Central Region, only 28% of those attending training said this had been possible. Comments of awareness trainers interviewed indicated that the sessions are usually very well attended.

Asked whether they had alternatives presented to them, 41% said "yes" (42% in mine affected areas); the situation in Central was worst, with only 16% saying that alternatives had been presented. Some 56% overall said they could tell about the experience or training of the trainer during the training; only 26% in Central said this. Asked whether they had learned of new ways they can get extra information on mine smartness, 38% overall said they had (42% in mine affected areas); only 14% in Central said this.

Overall 70% (78% in mine affected areas) said they feel confident in their ability to communicate mine awareness to others, 96% in Western and 55% in Central. These indicators can serve as benchmarks for the fine-tuned programmes, which could aim for an increase in confidence. Table 6 shows the breakout by partner organisations. In the main, OMAR produces very similar results in these indicators to places where other programmes or no programmes are operational.

Although MAPA explicitly promotes "community participation" and involvement in the establishment of community-based priorities for threat elimination projects, this aspect of the programme is yet to mature. There are at best only weak suggestions of direct training finding multiplication factors. Although 70% overall (78% in mine affected areas) said they could explain their training to others, only 0.6% say they "tell others" after receiving training. There is a continued and explicit reliance on externally motivated courses; asked what was needed to improve mine-smart behaviour, 74% of respondents said courses were the main thing needed to improve awareness. To solve the problem of mines, 22% say "keeping contact with demining agencies" is the main way.

Mine committees and councils

Several distinct types of mine committee are developed and supported by the UNOCHA partners. For the OMAR volunteer council programme, four members from the community (village elders, school teachers, pesh imams or health workers) are trained in mine awareness and avoidance through a 3-day course. These local volunteers are supposed to carry on mine education and avoidance training in community, to write monthly activity reports, and to collect information on mine victims, minefields, mine and UXO-related reports. The volunteer councils are intended to be supervised and monitored by OMAR teams when in the area – twice a month – supplied training materials every three months, and given revision courses every six months. This ambitious scheme could not be encountered in any of the sites where a committee/council was identified.

The question about mine committees, as asked in the household questionnaire, does not differentiate between the different types of committee. There were also several communities which "officially" had mine committees where neither respondents nor focus groups recognised their existence. Overall, 6.3% of the household sample (n574) said they knew of a mine committee. Whatever their theoretical coverage (the 6.3% who knew of a committee were scattered through 34% of the sample communities), this is probably an indication of their *effective* coverage at the time of the evaluation. Ignoring the communities where only one or two respondents had heard of a mine committee, 16 out of the 86 communities (19%) had a committee that was recognised by more than 1.5% of respondents in each site, covering a sample population of 1705 people: 10 in Eastern, 1 Western, 3 Central and 2 Southern.

Some 48 committees had been formed by HI by the time of the evaluation, a handful of them in communities included in the panel of evaluation sites. In HI terminology, a "mine committee" can be and usually is only one person who promotes mine awareness voluntarily. This could explain the low recognition of committees in the HI sites included in this evaluation. HI does have an explicit strategy to attempt to involve the religious structures; this would involve discussions with the mullah, of which the rest of the community might not be aware.

When asked "what is the main thing needed to improve mine smartness in your community?", 5.6% of respondents spontaneously suggested mine committees. The overwhelming majority of respondents in both types of community (16 with recognised committees and the rest with no committees) said that "demining courses" were most needed (73% in mine affected areas). In communities with committees,

more said that informing people should be the priority (17% compared with 9%) and that more minefield markings should be placed (4.5% compared with 1.2%). This could be a positive effect of the committee, or the person designated to be a committee, in generating more dialogue about mines. Additional evidence of a positive effect of the committees came from the question on how the mine committee helped them to behave safely in mined areas: of those who recognised committees, 82% said these were helpful in some way (80% in mine affected areas).

However, fewer respondents from communities that have one of these committees actually suggested starting a committee (2% compared with 7% in noncommittee communities). In response to a second question, "How do you think people here can solve the problem of mines?", only 0.4% suggested starting

Figure 30

"If you found a mine, to whom would you report it?" (in mined areas)



a mine committee. Viewed in the most optimistic light of the apparently positive role of committees where they do exist, these data indicate considerable confusion about just what a mine committee might mean. If it viewed as a single promoter working alone, expectations should be of a strategy of community-based promoters.

4. Reporting and results-based management of direct training programmes

HI has an internal reporting and evaluation system in place, essentially listing training activities that have occurred. In addition to supporting the *nomaindas*, the mine committees are intended to improve mine incident data collection. Trainers are supposed to visit the mine committees they have created -

depending on the source, on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis – to monitor the number of people trained in the period, to stimulate mine committees and to provide refresher courses.

In OMAR, internal assessment is said to depend on reviewing and revision of curriculum by trainers. At this stage, the supervisors are supposed to consolidate the reported incident cases. Despite this going on for many years, a report of mine cases could not be provided for this evaluation. In principle, the volunteer councils are monitored and supervised twice a month, supplied training materials every three months and given revision courses every six months. SC/US, for its part, has a Research and Evaluation Team that collects statistics on landmine- and UXO-related injuries from ten major hospitals in the city, which it then submits to the Mine Action Centre in Central region.



"Reversed causality" – is it possible?

The MAE identified a strong association between direct training and recent mine/UXO accidents. Unless an alternative explanation can be found, managers of those programmes must consider the possibility that they are unintentionally producing mine accidents.

One possible explanation raised by UNOCHA in the feedback process is that this association could simply be the result of appropriate targeting – the mine awareness activities are focussed where the problem is worst, so it appears there are more events.

This evaluation does show appropriate targeting of mine awareness education to the worst-off communities. However, two sets of evidence link the increase in accidents to the direct training:

1. *Temporality:* the increase of accidents in these worst affected communities happens *after* initiation of the mine awareness programmes. There was no highly targeted laying of new mines in these direct training sites since these programmes started.

2. *The type of injury:* there is a convincing shift in pattern of injury after the programmes began (in the OMAR and HI areas) from lower limb injuries, typical when someone steps on a mine, to upper limb and torso injuries, typical of tampering.

At the time of the survey, SC/US employed three teenage "bike boys" who report mine incidents to SC/US. A Curriculum Development and Training Team is responsible for the production of curriculum materials, training materials and implementation of training of staff and community leaders. Community feedback on SC/US training is also somewhat more developed than in the other two partners, coming mainly through letters of parents, teachers and a participatory rural appraisal conducted in February 1997 to determine needs of communities. This led SC/US to establish suboffices in the four districts and to changing their teacher training program to community training.

One of the foundation stones of a preventive strategy is to give weight to each and every event. A specific performance criterion for the MAPA is the rate of increase in the quantity of accurate reports of high risk areas. Respondents were asked, if they found a mine or UXO, to whom they would report the occurrence (Figures 30-31). Four out of ten said they would refer the event to the Malik. A further 2-3 out of ten said they would report to the Mullah or the Shurra. There was some difference between communities served

by SC/US (0% said they would not report), those served by OMAR (1% said they would not report) and HI (2.8%). These data could be of relevance for the mapping of new mine fields; the Malik, Mullah and local Shurra would be cornerstone sources of data on the new areas. This also opens a broadly unexplored route for mine-awareness training.

Feedback from trainers

Trainers from the partner direct training organisations were quick to tell of the supervisory, feedback and monitoring mechanisms. In essence, however, the training remains supply led: this is our curriculum and this is what we can tell you. The processes of introspection and self-questioning in these organisations did not come to the fore in this evaluation, possibly because of its timing; the evaluation coincided with a period of brusque changes in almost all the organisations. These comments are valid only for OMAR and SC/US; HI trainers declined to participate in the interviews, though the programme manager was extremely open and provided valuable information about the programme direction and processes.

An interesting example of feedback comes from SC/US. Pre- and post-training questionnaires are given to children to assess retention of the training. These interesting questionnaires contain a lot of pictorial materials, asking children to distinguish between different mine risk situations and between different suspicious objects. Some 50 children had completed these two questionnaires between May and October of 1997.

Programme synergies

Most of the questions addressing mine awareness showed the population to be very aware; living in a war zone for two decades, this can be expected. This is, of course, different to mine *smartness*, which involves what they *do* about it. But insofar as mine awareness attempts merely to make people aware, it seems either to have done the job, or to be unnecessary.

Reporting mines: At some points in the analysis, communities were divided into those that had received some sort of mine training, those where most listened to the BBC, and those with neither of these educational channels. Considering only communities where there were mines nearby, a respondent that benefitted from both training and BBC was more than six times as likely to report a mine event or detection than one who had heard the BBC but had not received training (odds ratio 6.2 95%CI 3-13, ChiSq34). Although non-reporting is quite rare, it seems likely that training can all but eliminate it; considering all communities, 12/2025 with both training and BBC said they would not report, compared with 29/1140 among those without training but with the BBC.

Do you consider it brave: One in ten respondents in mined areas considers someone not a deminer but who goes into a mine area as brave. This was significantly less likely in places benefiting from direct training and the BBC than someone who just heard the BBC (odds ratio 0.64, 95% CI 0.6-0.94 186/2114 vs 133/1149). Only 1.2% (53/4355) in mined areas said anyone in their household had traded/sold/ reused mines or scrap metal from UXOs. This proportion was significantly higher among those exposed to direct training (1.8% or 37/2103) than it was among those who just heard the BBC (0.8% or 9/1149) or who had been exposed to neither (0.6% or 7/1103). The implication is that direct training is associated with storage and trading of mines/UXO.

Only 1.6% (72/4353) of respondents in mined areas said any member of their household had attempted to demine. There was no difference between different categories of mine awareness exposure. This rate of tampering is substantially lower than reported from Afghanistan in earlier surveys – this could be a halo effect, with respondents telling field workers what they think we wanted to hear, or it could be an impact

of the mine awareness programme. Of those few who openly said they did collect mines (n72), 16% said they gave them to the army and 36% exploded them for scraps of metal.

Rather similar to the finding in relation to reporting of mine events, those who received both training and messages through the BBC were significantly less likely to think someone (not deminer) was brave to go into a mine field, in comparison with someone who just heard the BBC. Again only in mined areas, a household that heard the BBC but did not receive training was 36% more likely to





think the person was brave (odds ratio 1.36 95%CI 1.07-1.73, ChiSq6.6 p=0.01). However, someone who received direct training, whether or not they heard the BBC, was more likely to deal with mines as scrap or to attempt mine action than someone who had not received training (odds ratio 2.5, 95CI 1.34-4.7, ChiSq10, p0.001).

Mine awareness plays an important role in whether people take the risks involved in going into a mine field. In communities marked as mined, people who had received both mine awareness and who heard the BBC were significantly less likely to go into that field than those who had only heard the BBC or those who received education from neither source: 27% (418/1571) with both exposures, compared with 30% (258/864) with BBC alone and 44% (396/897) of those who had been made aware by neither source. Figure 33 How likely do you think a mine/UXO accident is to happen to you? (% in mine areas confident it cannot happen to them, in three education categories)



There is a pernicious coincidence between those too poor to own radios, too pressed making a living to spare the time to attend a lecture, and mine risks. However, occupation does not explain the apparently protective effect of mine awareness education; for most of the occupational groups examined, the additive effect remains. Among the unemployed in mined areas, for example, the proportions who said they went into the minefield was 17% (39/224) among those who received education from both sources, 20% (18/91) BBC alone and 46% (31/67) for those with education from neither.

Among farmers (Figure 32), who might have more reason to go into the field, it was 28% (127/461), 40% (125/315) and 49% (196/397) respectively. The implication for the programme is convincing: mine awareness increases mine smart behaviour independent of social class, education and many other factors.

Sense of mine security: In the mine-smart framework, it was projected that a successful mine awareness programme might produce a greater sense of mine security (Figure 33). Considering only those respondents from communities known to be affected by land mines, someone exposed to both training and the BBC was significantly more likely to feel he could never be affected by a mine accident than someone who heard the BBC alone or someone who had received neither type of education (44% or 934/2111 compared with 39% or 433/1146, and 23% or 249/1103 respectively).

An important implication of this is spelt out in the context of direct training. It is associated with a

statistically significant increase in sense of food security. It could quite possibly have some implication for peace-building, though this is not testable in the present evaluation.

Household food economy

No less than 58% of the overall sample (65% in Southern Region) said they had sufficient food in the week previous to the survey (Table 8). It is possible that people might well say they do *not* have sufficient food when they do, perhaps in the hope of handouts. However, it is unlikely that they will claim to have sufficient food when they do not have

Land mines cost to the household food economy

land animals confidence labour power enough. The picture is one of reasonably good food security. Only 14% (as high as 21% in Central Region) said they had experienced a food shortage in the month prior to the survey.

In the initial mine-smart model, it was expected that mine awareness should increase the sense of food security; if the programme works, there should be more reports of sufficient food among those with education than from their counterparts (same place, same occupation) who did not benefit. In this survey, someone with *any* exposure to awareness education (in or outside the community, by training or through the BBC) is dramatically more likely to say they did *not* have sufficient food in the week prior to the survey. This finding cannot be explained by the partial exposure to mines or by occupation.

In mine-exposed communities, people who were in direct training programmes were less likely to have tea in their household on the day of the survey (tea availability is a sign of ready cash); they were also significantly more likely to purchase basics (ghee, wheat) as the main food item. Those who say they receive neither BBC nor training are considerably more likely to say they were food producers, selling a surplus last year (16% compared with 6% among those who had received some awareness education).

Looking at *when* households were short of food, those with smine awareness education did not experience shortages more recently than those without education. A household exposed to both BBC and direct training is significantly less likely to experience food shortage in the last year, compared with one that received neither type of awareness education (odds ratio 0.84, 95%CI 0.74-0.95, ChiSq7.9 p<0.005).

This illustrates one possible dynamic of mine awareness education impacting on food security. The UNOCHA mine awareness programme is well targeted to the worst off, those most affected by mines and who therefore have the worst food security; these are the "structurally" food insecure. Yet, in the most recent shortage – the last year, within which time the awareness programmes will have had an opportunity to "work" – this education is strongly associated with food security.

1 oou supply and reserve					
% of households experiencing	Western	Eastern	Central	Southern	Sample
sufficient food last week	60%	57%	38%	65%	58%
food shortage this month	23%	8%	21%	12%	14%
without wheat/flour	15%	16%	36%	5%	15%
Average wheat/flour in house	163 kg	276 kg	99 kg	201 kg	212 kg

Table 8Food supply and reserve

RECOMMENDATIONS

The mission of MAPA is to "make Afghanistan safe from the threat of mines and explosive devices through threat avoidance education, threat elimination, and threat prevention." In programme terms, *mine action* involves a combination of mine awareness, surveys, clearance, training and human resource development, management and promotion of international community awareness.

First we hope for a permanent peace to our nation. Then the economic problems are the main causes which compel our needy and poor people to enter mined areas. If safe alternatives were available in the area, nobody has to walk into mined areas.

Male focus group, Kabul City, 1997

According to the UNOCHA corporate strategy, *mine awareness* aims to reduce accidents, injuries and deaths caused by mines and other explosive devices through education on the identification and avoidance of risks associated with living in a contaminated environment. Mine awareness should provide people with knowledge leading to an understanding of the problem, and impart the skills and confidence "which result in consistently safe behaviour in contaminated environments". The programme is supposed to incorporate avoidance strategies and community involvement in the reporting of threats and the maintenance of high risk area warning systems. It was to include reinforcement training through public awareness messages, and education through public institutions and community action committees.

The striking decline in mine incidents over recent years raises several questions relevant to the present evaluation. Local time trends were compared between communities benefiting from the programmes and those not benefiting. No evidence emerged that the three direct training organisations contributed to the decline, but there is a strong suggestion that the BBC programme coincided with the decline.

With the exception of the finding of increased mine events in communities where direct training is present, there is a broad range of evidence that the Afghanistan mine awareness programme works. It has contributed substantially to reducing the psychological burden of land mines. It leads people to do things differently, it makes them feel more secure about mines and it is associated with increased reports of recent food security.

However, like many if not all successful programmes, there is space for improvement. The worrying link between some of the training activities and amateur tampering with mines, even though it affects only one in a hundred households, can be eliminated. There are also a series of unexploited convergences between direct training, and between the BBC and endogenous mine-smart support systems. Women continue to be all but left out, with the token woman-to-women direct training being more of a political step than a real means to generate mine smartness among women nationally.

Any recommendations for improvement of a mine awareness programme – the remit of UNOCHA and its partners – must be seen in the broader Afghan context. For example, a substantial factor in mine/UXO incidents is the poverty of people living there. Income-generation, peace-building and infra-structural development are all needed even to begin to address this. Viewed in this light, perhaps the foundation for a mine smart system is alternative income generation.

Although not initially the obvious line of action of a mine awareness agency, in discussing the results of this evaluation, the BBC team suggested they might look at ways to draw awareness to income generating alternatives through the media available to them. To make a contribution in relation to alternative income generation, it is not necessary that an agency actually open credit schemes or hire vocational trainers.

1. Curricular reform

a. *Shift from supply-led to demand-led promotion:* A change is needed from the current supply-led "sharing what we know about mines" and "we have a curriculum and we know how to teach it" to place-specific evidence-led promotion of mine-smart behaviour. Despite the best motivation in the world, what the demining agencies know so well is simply not the substance of mine-smart behaviour. A renewed focus on local evidence of risk – who was doing what when afflicted by the mine/UXO – could make a much more fertile substrate for direct training.

b. *Mine stuff should give way to mine-smart training:* The perplexing association between direct training and tampering with mines/UXOs is quite possibly the result of a curricular emphasis on mine stuff (technical details on the type of mines, their respective capabilities and how they work). A new focus might be, for example, how to convince others about mine-smart behaviour. Much of what is given in -- and taken home from -- the current programmes is a list of "do's and don'ts": don't do into this field, don't pick up objects, don't take short cuts, and so forth. This is not without benefit, as demonstrated in this evaluation. But in addition to providing the same information as a pre-formulated list of "don't…" messages, local evidence of who was doing what when afflicted might provide this information in a way that appeals more to the intelligence of the "trainees". Mine smartness promoter might begin by listing the activities at the time of the accident of the last five or ten cases; asking what the community can do about this specific risk could have a quite different effect on the "trainee".

c. *The delivery mode* employed in most direct training in Afghanistan is currently being transformed with encouragement from UNOCHA. There is considerable awareness among most of the implementing partners that the classic expert-delivery "classroom" lecture is largely outmoded. Although these classrooms are easily filled in communities where there is little or no entertainment, there is a need for an interactive process based more on the experience of participants, encouraging questions (37% of respondents said they could not ask questions during training sessions) and participation in solutions.

d. *The transfer of content:* In both the institutional review and in the household interviews, it seems much of the content is geared for the trainee to be the end-user of the information. More emphasis should be given to modalities for transfer of the content of the training – direct and radio-based. This could also be a way of reinforcing mine smartness, while getting the same messages further out into the community. An example of this would be the promoter asking "how would you explain this to your wife? ...to your children?". This gives people a chance to formulate the message in their own terms, and it could conceivably stimulate them to pass on the information.

e. In the *special case of children*, SC/US is firm that it does not deal with "mine stuff" in its training, other than "these are what they look like". Yet there is convincing evidence of increasing events -- not explained by recent in-migration -- since the programme started. Most of this increase is accounted for by an increase in events while gathering firewood, fruit and scrap. The programme implication would be a refocusing of training content to address this specific high risk activity.

2. Combine direct training and the BBC

Direct training and the BBC together are measurably more effective than either on their own. It makes sense to promote the complementarity between these two thrusts, exploiting specific results of the MAE. UNOCHA is already involved in the script development process for *New Home New Life*, and coordinating timing and content of BBC broadcasts and direct training initiatives. The soap opera is complemented by

educational compilations, single story extracts that are combined with relevant interviews, made available to agencies involved in training and awareness programmes. A cartoon magazine offers the soap opera in print, making it easy for listeners to refer to. These materials could be used in direct training exercises.

There are several points of application of these modules. For example, at present OMAR uses a fairly rigid curriculum that does not really allow for much place-to-place variation of mine/UXO risks. A "core facts" version of this curriculum might be accompanied by a package of clearly indexed educational modules like those prepared by the BBC. If six of the last ten mine events in the community were about people taking short cuts to work, the trainer could pull out the module on this subject (almost certainly remembered by the audience, given the wide listenership).

UNOCHA could play an active role in promoting the use of the BBC educational modules, helping to guarantee a fuller exploitation of the synergy of individual projects in the mine awareness programme.

Although not addressed in this evaluation, other donors of the implementing partners may be brought productively into the picture. By the same token, there are other players in mine awareness not evaluated here, where additional convergences might be sought.

3. Focus on women

In Afghanistan it is barely acceptable to promote "the community voice" of men; much less is it possible to begin with strengthening the voice of women. This does not reduce the responsibility of promoting mine awareness of *both* women and men -- mines affect everyone in the country. CIET methods ordinarily rely on five steps for building the women's voice into planning. First, existing data are systematically combed for gender trends; in the MAE, this did not yield any usable information. Second, resources are invested to include women as interviewers, often hiring and training bodyguards and, on occasion, providing separate vehicles. In Afghanistan, this was impossible; all interviewers had to be men. Third, all responses to household interviews are stratified by sex of the respondent; in this evaluation, almost all (98.2%) household responses were male. Forth, all data were gender stratified in the analysis, to understand the different risk patterns. Even when it is not possible to incorporate interviews with women, it is sometimes possible to have women's focus groups, facilitated by women, discuss the household survey results.

In the initial MAE design, focus groups were anticipated with women in each sentinel community, to discuss their views of the household data. At the time of the survey, Taliban policy forbade women and girl children from attending school, working or spending time outside their homes, with the exception of those employed by hospitals and clinics. Women were allowed to leave the home fully covered and expected to travel in the company of a male relative trusted by the family.

Starting in Kabul, permission was sought from regional authorities and through the Taliban Shura for women to participate and to be trained in conducting focus groups. Provisions were made to meet the requirements to provide separate transport (with covered windows) for Afghan women who would conduct the discussions. These were to be conducted in named public places, such as hospitals. Dates and times of the training and focus group discussions were to be made known ahead of time, to ensure no man would be present during the discussions. In searching for women who could conduct these discussions, several enthusiastic well-educated and capable women came forward who had led active lives in their communities before the current policies came into effect.

After more than one month of preparation for the focus groups, permission was declined. Shortly after

their refusal to allow women to participate in the MAE, the Shura issued an edict that no women should participate in any social surveys. While waiting for their final decision, the focus group instruments were piloted through a female translator and a female interviewer, with 42 women in seven districts of Kabul City. These women who participated in the preparations welcomed the process and were glad for the opportunity to share what they knew about mines. These seven pilot focus groups in Kabul constitute the very limited access to women's views available to this evaluation. While probably representative of the Kabul area, covering seven of the eight sentinel sites there, they do not necessarily speak for women in the rest of the country.

How to reach women

Asked how women might be reached by mine awareness programmes, the groups suggested the radio and training held in for women in their homes, mosques and clinics. Most did not expect any problem in holding this training. Issues raised include women's lack of time, due to household duties. Five of the seven groups suggested that female trainers from mine awareness organisations come into their homes to conduct the training. Two groups said radios were the best medium to reach women; two other groups countered this by citing the lack of regular electricity and the expense of buying batteries. One of the groups said men trained by mine awareness organisations would pass on the information to their families.

The 86 male focus groups were asked what they thought was the best way to reach women with mine awareness information: most men's groups proposed themselves as the channel. Only six men's groups suggested that women receive this information through direct mine

Organisations should reach women through radio. Women's focus group, Kabul, 1997

awareness training; five suggested the training be given by a female mine awareness trainer with three of these suggesting the training be conducted at home. Four male groups suggested that mine awareness information be given through the radio, one mentioning the BBC. Other ideas mentioned by the male groups were local authorities and posters. One male group reminded the field team that women's education and participation in public activities was forbidden by the authorities.

The SC/US landmine education programme, based on contacting children in mosques, parks and other public places, reports contacting over 100,000 children in 1997, with over 20,000 additional contacts. Of the new contacts, some 40% were girls. They report contacting an average of 5,000 "new" children each month -3,000 of them girls – which could raise a question of the content of the training. Nonetheless, the programme demonstrates the feasibility of contacting girl children in Kabul, on a very large scale.

Action points

a. *Direct training* is being attempted at an experimental level by OMAR with its specialised women's direct training programme, currently being piloted in Kabul. All seven female focus groups said they would like to receive mine awareness training from another woman; five of the groups stated specifically that they would like this training to be held in their homes, and that they would encourage other family members to attend such training as well. This home to home training is not practical on any scale. Since this is likely to be confined to Kabul and the other towns, where funding is available but not where it is most needed, this modality might be useful for developing gender specific training materials, but it will not address the issue of women's mine awareness education in the country.

b. *Child-to-child and child-to-community programmes:* One women's group said they had received posters from OMAR, but did not know what they meant so had consulted their children. They said they also want

to protect the children from any mine dangers. Children are often free to roam and play outside their homes. They often serve as messengers for information and exchange of goods between homes. Children interviewed in this evaluation showed a lively interest in the subject, and offer an inexpensive and socially acceptable channel of communication to their mothers and sisters. Child-to-child (brother-to-sister) and child-to-family components could be added to the existing children's programmes offered by SC/US. School-based programmes have the disadvantage of leaving out the girls. Yet by drawing attention to the gender issues in landmine events, it may be possible to stimulate mine smartness among boy children while at the same time reiterating and thereby reinforcing the value of women.

c. *Access to radios:* the BBC is currently the principal channel to inform the socially isolated women in Afghanistan about mine awareness. It makes sense to increase the supply of radios in a way that targets women who currently do not have access to this medium. Despite the usual well founded reservations on the matter, in this survey lack of batteries was only very rarely given as a reason for not listening to the

Women should be given mine awareness training in their homes; they don't listen to radios, neither do their children. There is no electricity and it is too expensive to buy batteries.

Women's focus group, Kabul City, 1997

radio. This could be because radios are held currently by the better off groups in Afghan society. If they were distributed on a massive scale to the poorest and most vulnerable, this situation may be different. There is considerable international experience with battery-free Baygen windup radios, though some of these have presented problems in the Afghan context.

d. *Special soap opera themes:* Discussion of the results of the evaluation with the BBC team led to several themes for soap opera story lines and other communication tools. If the practice of amateur demining was to resurface, this could provide a storyline. Episodes and storylines could show women involved in mine-related incidents, both in negative behaviour and in positive mine-smart behaviour. An educational compilation could be considered that would facilitate a combination of direct training awareness with the BBC.

4. Reinforce endogenous mine-smartness systems

Mine committees: There is a need to revisit the definition of and process for establishing mine committees. One fragility of these committees is their voluntary nature. Of the many places worldwide that have attempted to develop services based on volunteers, in few places has the seriousness of the problem been sufficient motivation for them to continue working indefinitely without remuneration. Most have to earn a living. A second problem with committees in the Afghan context is their delinking from governance structures. Although there may be exceptions, in most cases this means a group attempting to decide what should happen, but without any real means to implement it. Similar discussions have been experienced in many countries with other voluntary committees, like parent-teacher associations (PTAs). In Afghanistan, a new community-based collective decision-taking process that is successful in influencing behaviour is likely to be short-lived. A balance has to be struck between their desirable separation from the central state institutions, on the one hand, and their isolation and probable ineffectiveness on the other. One partial solution to this is to attempt to link mine smartness promotion with the existing religious and governance structures.

A reflex of programme managers not accustomed to evidence-based planning is to demand the names of the sentinel communities where "something isn't working", and to go out and fix it. The finding that many communities officially had a committee without the community knowing about it, provoked such a

reaction. A sentinel monitoring system relies on each communities representing around 100 other communities like it. If one targets those few communities that formed the sample, ignoring the others, the only real achievement is eradication of the ability to monitor progress. Changes derived from these evaluation results should be wide-sweeping, covering sentinel and non-sentinel communities in the programme.

The mullah: Communities tended to cite their mullah as potential local promoter. Adult focus groups in 42% of the sample communities saw the mullah in this light. In the household questionnaire, 73% of respondents nationally and 69% of respondents in mine affected areas said they informed the mullahs, maliks and shurras when they became aware of any mine events; 17% said they heard about mines from the mullahs. With this potential link between the clergy and mine awareness, it is disappointing that only 10% say the mullah best helps them understand. These key local opinion makers have been left out of the loop in much of the mine awareness training and mine smartness promotion. There are many fewer maliks, mullahs and shurras than there are people to be contacted for direct training. If all these opinion makers could be a fast-track to those who report mine and UXO findings to them.

A special problem in respect of the role of the women is promoting mine awareness among women. In Sunni Islam it is unacceptable for women to listen to the mullah, so they are excluded from this channel of mine smart promotion. One link may be their very young daughters, as these go to the mullah to learn to recite religious teachings and prayers. This would require development of a child-to-mother module of mine smartness.

5. Mine action tracking and management by results

At present, field management of the UNOCHA programme is based primarily on "executive visits". Despite the very unrepresentative picture this brings to the planning table, if repeated with sufficient frequency and intensity, it can be a useful mechanism in pressuring for improvement. But in the current climate of financial stringency, where mine awareness has to make the case for its existence in the competition for resources, it is possible and necessary to transform this into serious management by results.

It has become less and less acceptable to claim that the programme is working, "because it seems to our supervisors that it is working". Hard objective data are needed to understand the scope of the land mine catastrophe, but they are also needed to ensure mine action is well-targeted and its effectiveness benchmarked over time. The technologies exist to provide reliable operational accounting of mine action impact, allowing for resources to be channelled to where they are most needed and programs tailored to each local situation.

• The baseline: The present baselines establishes levels of awareness and strategies to promote mine smart behaviour through household questionnaires supplemented by focus group discussions among adults and children of mine affected communities, and key informant interviews with local leaders. It has established a series of reproducible indicators for mine/UXO incidents, changing behaviour and for the social costs of land mines. The extent to which the baseline is acted upon – not in the sentinel sites, but in the entire mine affected population – will determine the effectiveness and efficiency of MAPA.

- **Participation of mine affected communities and individuals in the process**: A central aim of CIET's mine action tracking (MAT) approach is to obtain mine action data in a way that precipitates effective local action. In addition, both endogenous factors and exogenous programme actions that work measurably at a given time can and do change. Mine action that works well at one time might not work equally well at another, under different conditions. There is a need for ongoing community input for fine-tuning and the identification of locally effective communication channels to promote mine safety. As local needs change over time, local conditions and survey findings are first discussed with the communities at risk, and new strategies for improving local conditions based on their point of view. A GIS platform is under development that permits mapping of the problem for regionalised strategies to promote mine smart behaviour.
- **Benchmarking progress**: On-going monitoring of mine affected communities through repeat surveys of these communities allows the MAT to detect gains, "levelling-out" or ineffectiveness of mine action initiatives. Decreases in mine injuries and land loss, as a consequence of mine awareness and mine clearance activities, can help to fine-tune and to re-target operations. Because so little was known about the coverage and impact of mine awareness training in Afghanistan, establishing the present multidimensional baseline was quite cumbersome. Followup of key indicators, many of them developed in the course of this evaluation, ought to be a more straightforward matter.
- Mine action end points: There will not be an end to the need for mine action in Afghanistan in the immediate future. From a donor's point of view however, it is necessary to detect levelling out of gains of programmes -- as repeat surveys detect a falloff of gains of awareness training. Thus, ineffective programs can be stopped and effective ones reinforced in order to optimise investments. This monitoring system can inform national and international agencies of how best to re-allocate their resources to produce the greatest gains for mine affected communities. The national point of view is no less important; local skills must be developed to run all aspects of mine action.
- Social audit and governance: Strong messages about results-based management and can be conveyed from systematic monitoring of the impact of mine action. By paying attention to the registration and details of every single case, messages can be conveyed about the importance of women and children. The MAT approach builds national measurement capacities, so the country can more easily pursue evidence-based planning and management of its own programmes. When mine affected communities are involved in mine action in an informed way, through the design, implementation, analysis and use of the information gathered in the research process through carefully targeted communication strategies, then mine action can become a sustainable network of local initiatives to reduce the risk of land mines.

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